

프 로 그 램

□ 2003년 10월 30일 (목요일)

18:00~21:00 환영만찬

주 최 : 부 만 근 (제주대학교 총장)

□ 2003년 10월 31일 (금요일)

09:30~10:00 등 록

10:00~10:10 개 회 식

개 회 사 : 우 근 민 (제주도지사)

환 영 사 : 김 우 식 (연세대학교 총장)

10:10~10:30 대통령 기조연설

“동북아 평화와 공동 번영의 새로운 지평”

10:30~11:10 휴 식

11:10~12:30 제1패널 : 동북아 안보공동체의 구축 : 공동의 지혜와 비전

사 회 : 공 로 명 (전 외무부 장관)

주제발표 : Donald GREGG (Korea Society 회장, 전 주한 미국대사)

AKASHI Yasushi (전 UN 사무차장)

Evgeny PRIMAKOV (러시아 전 총리, 전 외무장관)

MEI Zhaorong (중국 전 인민외교학회 회장)

12:30~14:00 오 찬

오 찬 사 : 윤 영 관 (외교통상부 장관)

14:00~15:30 제2패널 : 6자 회담과 동북아 평화 : 이론적 모색

사 회 : 김 경 원 (사회과학원 원장, 전 주미대사)

주제발표 : “지역 안보협력에 대한 현실주의와 자유주의의 견해 : 이론과 실제”

(John IKENBERRY, Georgetown University 교수)

“6자회담과 동북아 다자간 안보협력구상”

(OKONOGI Masao, 게이오대 교수)

“6자회담과 한반도 안보”

(문정인, 연세대 교수)

토 론 : 하 영 선 (서울대 교수)
HAN Feng (중국 사회과학원 아태연구소 부소장)
William DRENNAN (미국 평화연구소 수석연구원)

15:30~16:30 정치지도자 라운드테이블 : 6자 회담과 동북아 평화 : 실천적 모색
사 회 : 김 달 중 (연세대 교수)
패널토론 : 박 진 (국회의원)
양 영 식 (전 통일부 차관)
유 재 건 (국회의원)
한 화 갑 (국회의원)
AKASHI Yasushi (전 UN 사무차장)
Curt WELDON (미국 하원의원)

16:30~16:45 휴 식

16:45~17:45 외교관 라운드테이블 : 북한과 새로운 다자 공조의 틀
사 회 : Donald GREGG (Korea Society 회장, 전 주한 미국대사)
패널토론 : 이 선 진 (외교통상부 외교정책실장)
Colin HESELTINE (주한 호주대사)
Thomas C. HUBBARD (주한 미국대사)
Dorian PRINCE (주한 EU대사)
TAKANO Toshiyuki (주한 일본대사)
Alexander TIMONIN (주한 러시아 부대사)

17:45~18:45 국제언론인 라운드테이블 : 노무현 정부와 남북한 관계
사 회 : 손 지 애 (CNN)
패널토론 : 이 병 중 (Newsweek)
Paul ECKERT (Reuters)
Gordon FAIRCLOUGH (Wall Street Journal)
Donald KIRK (전 International Herald Tribune 서울특파원)
Donald MACINTYRE (Time Magazine)
Charles SCANLON (BBC)
Andrew WARD (Financial Times)

19:00~21:00 만찬
주 최 : 우 근 민 제주도지사
만찬사 : William PERRY (스탠포드대 국제문제연구소, 미국 전 국방장관)

□ 2003년 11월 1일 (토요일)

09:00~12:00 세계 리더 라운드테이블 : 동북아 허브 국가와 세계의 역할
 사 회 : 이 영 선 (연세대 국제학대학원장)

(09:00~09:45) 기조발표 : “동북아 허브 국가로서의 한국”
 (배순훈, 동북아경제중심추진위원회 위원장, 전 정보통신부 장관)

(09:45~10:00) 휴 식

(10:00~12:00) 패널토론 : 김 국 주 (제주은행장)
 이 길 현 (제주도관광협회장)
 이 덕 훈 (우리은행장)
 Barnett BARON (Asia Foundation 부회장)
 John HALEY (Watson-Wyatt 회장)
 KOHSAKA Setsuzo (일본 경제동우회 Director)
 Evgeny PRIMAKOV
 (러시아 상공회의소 회장, 러시아 전 총리, 전 외무장관)
 REN Xiao (상하이 국제관계연구소 선임연구원)

12:00~13:30 오 찬
 오 찬 사 : 정몽구 (현대자동차 회장)

13:30~15:00 제3패널 : 공동평화와 번영을 위한 참여정부의 이니셔티브 : 평가와 전망
 사 회 : 이 중 오 (대통령자문정책기획위원회 위원장)
 패널토론 : 김 방 회 (경제평론가)
 김 영 희 (중앙일보 고문)
 김 진 현 (전 과학기술처 장관)
 송 영 길 (국회의원)
 원 회 룡 (국회의원)
 이 수 훈 (대통령자문정책기획위원회 위원, 기조발제)
 한 덕 수 (산업연구원 원장)

15:00~15:15 휴 식

15:15~17:30 제4패널 : 동북아 공동체 구상과 제주도의 위상
 사 회 : 김 세 원 (서울대 교수, 제주국제자유도시포럼 공동대표)
 주제발표 : “동북아 평화 공동체와 제주”
 (고성준, 강근형, 김부찬, 제주대 교수)
 “동북아 경제 공동체와 제주 국제자유도시의 미래”
 (좌승희, 한국경제연구원장)

“동북아 경제공동체와 제주 국제교육 단지”

(김동재, 김택권, 연세대 교수)

패널토론 : 강 원 철 (제주도의회 의원)

고 진 부 (국회의원)

김 우 남 (제주도의회 의원)

서 중 석 (제주4·3사건 진상규명 및 희생자 명예회복 위원회 위원)

조 성 운 (제주참여환경연대 공동대표)

채 남 희 (중앙토지수용위원회 상임위원)

한 석 지 (제주대 교수)

현 경 대 (국회의원)

17:30~18:00 폐회 세션

사 회 : 문 정 인 (연세대 교수, 제2회 제주평화포럼 공동 집행위원장)

18:00~18:10 폐 회 식

폐 회 사 : 고 충 석 (제주발전연구원장, 제2회 제주평화포럼 공동 집행위원장)

18:30~20:30 고별만찬

주 최 : 김 영 훈 (제주도의회 의장)

Conference Program

□ October 30 (Thursday)

18:00~21:00 Reception and Dinner
Hosted by BOO Man-Keun (President, Cheju National University)

□ October 31 (Friday)

09:30~10:00 Registration

10:00~10:10 Opening & Welcoming Remarks
Governor WOO Keun Min (Jeju Provincial Government)
President KIM Woo Sik (Yonsei University)

10:10~10:30 Presidential Keynote Speech
“Toward a New Horizon of Peace and Prosperity in Korea and Northeast Asia”

10:30~11:10 Intermission

11:10~12:30 Panel 1 : Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia : Collective
Wisdom and New Visions

Chair : GONG Ro-Myung (Former ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs)

Presentation : Donald GREGG

(President, Korea Society. Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea)

AKASHI Yasushi

(Former Under Secretary General of the United Nations)

Evgeny PRIMAKOV

(Former Russian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs)

MEI Zhaorong

(Former President, Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs)

12:30~14:00 Luncheon

Luncheon Speech by YOON Young-Kwan

(ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade)

14:00~15:30 Panel 2 : Six-Party Formula and Northeast Asian Peace : Two Contending Views
Chair : KIM Kyung-Won (President, the Institute of Social Sciences, Former ROK
Ambassador to the U.S.)

Presentation : “Realism, Liberalism, and Regional Security Cooperation : Theory and Practice”
(John IKENBERRY, Georgetown University)

“Six-Party Formula and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia”
(OKONOGI Masao, Keio University)

“Six-Party Formula and Security on the Korean Peninsula”
(MOON Chung-in, Yonsei University)

Discussion : HA Young-Sun (Seoul National University)

HAN Feng (Deputy Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Affairs, Chinese
Academy of Social Science)

William DRENNAN (Director, Research and Studies Program, United States
Institute of Peace)

15:30~16:30 Political Leaders’ Roundtable : Six-Party Formula and Northeast Asian Peace
: Practical Approach

Chair : KIM Dalchoong (Yonsei University)

Panel Discussion : PARK Jin (ROK National Assembly)

YANG Young Shik (Former Vice Minister of Unification)

YOO Jay-Kun (ROK National Assembly)

HAHN Hwa Kap (ROK National Assembly)

AKASHI Yasushi (Former Under Secretary General of the United Nations)

Curt WELDON (USA Congressman, House of Representative)

16:30~16:45 Intermission

16:45~17:45 Diplomats’ Roundtable : North Korea and a New Framework of Multilateral
Cooperation

Chair : Donald GREGG (President, Korea Society. Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea)

Panel Discussion : LEE Sun-Jin (Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International
Organizations, MOFAT)

Colin HESELTINE (Australian Ambassador to Korea)

Thomas C. HUBBARD (U. S. Ambassador to Korea)

Dorian PRINCE (EU Ambassador to Korea)

TAKANO Toshiyuki (Japanese Ambassador to Korea)

Alexander TIMONIN (Russian Minister-Counsellor to Korea)

17:45~18:45 Foreign Correspondents' Roundtable : The New Korean Administration and
Inter-Korean Relations

Chair : SOHN Jie-Ae (Seoul Bureau Chief, CNN)

Panel Discussion : B. J. LEE (Newsweek)

Paul ECKERT (Reuters)

Gordon FAIRCLOUGH (Wall Street Journal)

Donald KIRK (Former Seoul correspondent, International Herald Tribune)

Donald MACINTYRE (Time Magazine)

Charles SCANLON (BBC)

Andrew WARD (Financial Times)

19:00~21:00 Dinner

Hosted by Governor WOO Keun Min

Dinner Speech by William PERRY

(Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.
Former U. S. Secretary of Defense)

□ November 1 (Saturday)

09:00~12:00 Business Leaders' Roundtable : A Northeast Asian Hub and Private Sectors :
Architecture, Concepts, and Strategies

Chair : LEE Young-Sun (Dean, GSIS, Yonsei University)

(09:00~09:45) Keynote presentation : "Korea as a Northeast Asian Hub State"
(BAE Soon Hoon, Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian
Business Hub. Former Minister of Information and Communication)

(09:45~10:00) Intermission

(10:00~12:00) Panel Discussion :
KIM Kook Joo (CEO, Jeju Bank)
LEE Gil-hyun (President, Jeju Tourist Association)
LEE Duk Hoon (President and CEO, Woori Bank)
Barnett BARON (Executive Vice President, Asia Foundation)
John HALEY (President and CEO, Watson Wyatt & Company)
KOHSAKA Setsuzo (Director, Japanese Association of Corporate Executives)
Evgeny PRIMAKOV (President, Russian Chamber of Commerce. Former Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Federation)
REN Xiao (Senior Fellow, Shanghai Institute for International Studies)

12:00~13:30 Luncheon
Luncheon Speech by CHUNG Mong-Koo
(Chairman and CEO of Hyundai Motor Company and KIA Motors)

13:30~15:00 Panel 3 : Participatory Government and the Peace and Prosperity Initiative :
Assessments and Prospects

Chair : LEE Chong-Oh (Chairman, Presidential Commission on Policy Planning)

Panel Discussion : KIM Bang-Hee (economic commentator)
KIM Young Hie (Editor-at-Large, JoongAng Daily)
KIM Jin-Hyun (Former Minister of Science and Technology)
SONG Young-gil (ROK National Assembly)
WON Hee Ryong (ROK National Assembly)
LEE Su-Hoon (Presidential Commission on Policy Planning. Keynote talk)
HAN Duoc-Soo (President, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Trade)

15:00~15:15 Intermission

15:15~17:30 Panel 4 : The Jeju Island in the Context of a Northeast Asian Community

Chair : KIM Cae-One (Seoul National University, Joint Representative, the Jeju Free International City Forum)

Presentation : “Northeast Asian Peace Community and the Jeju Island”

(KO Seong-Joon, KANG Kun-hyung and KIM Boo-Chan, Cheju National University)

“Jeju International Free City in the Northeast Asian Economic Community”

(JWA Sung-Hee, President, Korea Economic Research Institute)

“Human Capital Formation and the Future of Northeast Asian Economic Community : The Case of Jeju International Educational Complex”

(KIM Dong Jae and KIM Taekwon, Yonsei University)

Panel Discussion : KANG Weon Chul (Jeju Provincial Council)

KO Jin Boo (ROK National Assembly)

KIM Woo-Nam (Jeju Provincial Council)

SEO Jung-Suk (Sung Kyun Kwan University. The National Commission on Jeju 4.3 Incident)

CHO Sung Yoon (Representative, Jeju Solidarity for Participatory Self-Government & Environment Preservation)

CHAE Nam-Hee (Standing Commissioner, Central Land Tribunal)

HAN Seok-Ji (Cheju National University)

HYUN Kyung Dae (ROK National Assembly)

17:30~18:00 Wrap-up Session

Chair : MOON Chung-in (Yonsei University. Co-Chairman, the Steering Committee of the Second Jeju Peace Forum)

18:00~18:10 Closing Remarks

KOH Chung-Suk (President, Jeju Development Institute. Co-Chairman, the Steering Committee of the Second Jeju Peace Forum)

18:30~20:30 Farewell Dinner

Hosted by KIM Yung-Hoon (Chairman, Jeju Provincial Council)

개 회 사

동북아의 평화와 공동번영을 기원하며

우 큰 민
제주도지사

존경하는 노무현 대통령님, 그리고 제주평화포럼에 참가하시어 이 자리를 빛내주시는 주요 국가의 정치지도자, 경제지도자, 학자, 외교관, 언론인 여러분 대단히 감사합니다.

이제 ‘동북아 평화공동체의 건설’이라는 주제를 가지고, 제2회 ‘제주평화포럼’의 막을 올리려고 합니다. ‘동북아 평화와 공동 번영’이라는 주제로 출범시킨 2001년의 제1회 ‘제주평화포럼’과 2002년의 ‘세미 제주평화포럼’을 잇는 세 번째 행사입니다. 이제 제주평화포럼은 정례화의 길로 들어섰습니다.

제주는 동북아의 지정학적 중심에 위치하고 있습니다. 그래서 저희는 제주의 생존이 동북아 평화체제에 의존하고 있고, 제주의 번영이 동북아공동체의 발전과 번영에 의존하고 있다고 생각하고 있습니다.

동북아의 지정학적 중심에 위치하고 있다는 사실은, 제주를 둘러싸고 있는 국제적 환경여하에 따라 제주에는 위험성의 요소일 수도 있고, 가능성의 요소일 수도 있지만, 제주는 능동적인 태도로 그 가능성의 요소를 극대화하려고 하고 있습니다.

세계화의 시대에 제주만을 보고 국내만을 보아서는 제주의 발전도 국가의 발전도 도모할 수 없다는 것이 저희 생각이었습니다. 1998년 외환위기의 어려움 속에서도 ‘국제자유도시, 제주’, ‘평화의 섬, 제주’라는 비전을 제시하고, 다양한 사업을 활발하게 펼쳐온 이유가 여기에 있습니다.

그 동안 저희는 중앙정부와의 협력 속에서, 첫째, 제주국제자유도시특별법을 제정하여 관련사업을 다양하게 추진해 왔습니다. 둘째, 제주4·3특별법 제정, 진상보고서 채택 등을 통하여 4·3문제의 미래지향적 해결을 도모해 왔습니다. 셋째, ‘평화의 섬 제주’ 구상에 따라 세계적 수준의 제주평화포럼의 출범 및 정례화, ‘밀레니엄관·남북평화센터(가

칭)’의 건립에 착수하였습니다. 또한 세계 평화의 섬 지정 및 남북평화재단의 설립도 추진하고 있습니다.

제주평화포럼은 이러한 구상, 특히 ‘제주, 평화의 섬’ 구상의 일환으로 출범한 것입니다. 저희가 생각하는 ‘제주, 평화의 섬’ 구상은, 제주의 지정학적 위치, 천혜의 자연경관, 한국을 대표하는 관광지로서, 이미 구축한 세계적 수준의 관광인프라를 기반으로 하고 있습니다.

이러한 기반을 이용하여 제주를 동북아, 나아가서는 세계의 평화와 공동체 형성을 위한 외교적 공간, 국제적 교류와 협력의 거점으로 발전시키려는 것입니다. 사실은 이것이 ‘제주, 평화의 섬’ 구상의 핵심입니다.

이제 우리나라도 제네바 정도는 아니더라도, 국제적으로 인정받는 외교적 공간 하나쯤은 가질 수 있는 수준에 이르렀다는 것이 저희 생각입니다. 말하자면, 제주가 지닌 특성을 극대화하여 제주의 발전과 국가의 발전, 나아가 동북아와 세계의 발전에 기여하려는 것입니다.

1990년대 냉전체제가 종식되는 과정에서, 제주는 한·소, 한·미, 한·일 정상회담의 개최 장소로서 그러한 가능성을 이미 확인하였습니다. 사실은 이 정상회담들이 ‘평화의 섬, 제주’ 구상을 촉발시킨 계기이기도 했습니다.

물론, 냉전체제가 형성되던 1940년대에 제주가 겪어야 했던 ‘4·3’이라는 비극을, ‘평화’라는 탈냉전적이고, 미래지향적이며, 주민통합적인 이념으로 승화시키려는 우리의 지향도 ‘제주, 평화의 섬’ 구상을 뒷받침하고 있습니다.

제주 근대사의 최대 비극이었던 ‘4·3’은, 이제 법적 책임을 묻는 ‘진실과 정의(正義) 모델’이 아니라 화해와 상생의 정신으로 정치적 해결을 도모하는 ‘진실과 화해(和解) 모델’에 따라 해결이 이루어지고 있습니다.

제주는 이제 변방의 한계, 섬의 한계를 극복하고 능동적인 태도로 미래와 세계를 향해 나아가고 있습니다. 4·3의 비극을 넘어, 동북아 내지 동아시아의 평화와 공동체 구축을 향해, 나아가서는 평화와 번영의 새로운 세계질서를 향해, 열린 마음으로 그 가능성을 모색하고 있습니다.

6·15 남북정상회담 1주년 무렵에 열렸던 제1회 제주평화포럼 이후, 국내외적으로 많은 상황의 변화가 있었습니다. 북핵문제가, 이라크 전후복구 문제가 세계적 관심을 끌고, 국내적으로도 지금 이라크 추가 파병 논란이 뜨겁습니다.

저희는 이런 문제들을 동북아 평화질서라는 구도 속에서 이해하고, 해법을 제시하고 싶습니다. 오늘 이 포럼에 참가하신 주요 국가의 정치지도자, 경제지도자, 학자, 외교관, 언론인 여러분의 비전과 경륜이, 이러한 우리의 노력과 동북아질서 및 세계질서에 새로운 전망을 더해 줄 것으로 저희는 믿고 있습니다.

저희는 이 포럼의 성공을 위하여 나름대로 정성을 기울이고 있습니다. 제주평화포럼의 정례적 개최와 ‘평화의 섬, 제주’ 구상을 실현하기 위한 인적, 물적 인프라를 구축하기 위하여, 세계적 수준의 연구재단과 연구센터 설립에도 착수하였습니다.

그 중심이 될 ‘밀레니엄관·남북평화센터(가칭)’는 이미 공사가 진행 중입니다. 다음번 제주평화포럼이 열릴 즈음에는 그 구체적 모습을 보여드릴 수 있을 것입니다.

제주평화포럼이 제주만을 위한 것도 아니고, 어떤 고정된 지향점을 가지고 있지도 않은, 말 그대로 ‘열린 포럼’이지만, 다만 제주에 ‘평화’라는 가치가 이곳을 중심으로 더욱 확산되기를 소망하고 있습니다.

그러한 가치가 세계적으로, 특히 동북아지역으로 확산되는 것이, 곧 제주의 발전과 번영의 기초가 될 것으로 저희는 믿고 있기 때문입니다.

아무쪼록, 이번 제2회 제주평화포럼도 지난번의 포럼들과 마찬가지로 활발한 토론과 생산적 결론으로 성공리에 마무리되기를 진심으로 바라마지 않습니다.

이 포럼에 참가해 주신 모든 분들과 특히, 바쁘신 일정 중에도 귀중한 시간을 쪼개어 이 자리에 참석해 주신 노무현 대통령님에게 다시 한번 감사의 말씀을 드립니다.

감사합니다.

OPENING REMARKS

Towards a Realization of Peace and Mutual Prosperity in Northeast Asia

By WOO Keun-min
Governor, Jeju Province

President Roh Moo-hyun, distinguished political and business leaders, members of the academic community, members of the diplomatic corps, foreign correspondents, members of the Korean media, and ladies and gentlemen.

Welcome to Jeju and to the Second Jeju Peace Forum at a time of unprecedented change in and around the Korean Peninsula. As we embark on the Second Jeju Peace Forum based on the theme of “Building a Northeast Asian Community : Challenges and New Visions,” we are reminded of the progress that has been made since the First Jeju Peace Forum that was held in 2001. At the same time, we are also cognizant of the multiple challenges that lie ahead.

Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and not surprisingly, its very prosperity depends critically on peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In this context, two contrasting future trajectories can be imagined with key repercussions for Jeju, and indeed, the entire Korean Peninsula.

First, a path that leads to increased tension, competition, and uncertainty and second, a path that leads to sustained prosperity, growth, and multilateral cooperation. Both trajectories depend on a confluence of forces but one of the most important variables is the prevailing international and regional environment. We must all contribute to the shaping of a more stable and prosperous international order and for its part, Jeju stands ready to make its own contribution towards this endeavor.

In an age of accelerating globalization it is no longer possible to benchmark Jeju's or even Korea's future by looking inward. This is precisely why we have been actively promoting a number of projects related to the realization of two complementary visions : first, the vision of "Jeju, Island of Peace" and second, "Jeju, a Free International City." It is important to keep in mind that even in the midst of Korea's financial crisis of 1997~1998, we continued to implement key steps towards the realization of these two visions.

In tandem with the central government, we were able to enact the Jeju Special Bill and the so-called 4·3 Special Bill to forge more forward-looking frameworks for Jeju. At the same time, we inaugurated the Jeju Peace Forum in 2001 as a major international conference devoted to excavating new avenues of confidence building and security cooperation in and around the Korean Peninsula.

Work is proceeding to launch the so-called "Millennium Hall" and the "South-North Peace Center" at Jeju—the nerve center for future peace-related studies in Korea. Moreover, we are also hoping to set up a "South-North Peace Foundation" to support these endeavors so that in the long-run, Jeju will receive recognition as an island that promotes world peace.

As Korea's premier tourist attraction, Jeju has worked steadfastly over the years to become a world-class tourist site. The explosive growth in travel within the region bodes well for the future of tourism in Jeju. But we also believe firmly that Jeju can only become a truly world-class resort if it also serves as a catalyst for sub-regional diplomacy and cooperation.

To be sure, Jeju cannot be compared with Geneva, but we are hopeful that over time, Jeju will be perceived as a natural conduit for intra-regional dialogue and enduring cooperation. In this respect, we feel that Jeju can make a key contribution towards security and prosperity in Northeast Asia, and by extension, to the broader global village.

Since the 1990s, Jeju has served as the site for a number of important summits. The heads of state and governments from the United States, the former Soviet Union, Japan, and China have all held summits at Jeju coincident with the global ending of the Cold War. These meetings served to further propel the concept of "Jeju, Island of Peace."

In order for this vision to be fully realized, we have to also come to terms with the so-called 4·3 tragedy which occurred in the 1940s at a time of deep ideological divisions. The concept of “Jeju, Island of Peace” therefore synthesizes the yearnings of Jeju residents related to overcoming the wounds stemming from the 4·3 incident but also embracing a new, refreshing, and forward-looking international role for Jeju.

The search for truth but also the fostering of reconciliation lies at the heart of our on-going efforts to build a more prosperous Jeju. Premised on its ability to come to terms with its past and in conjunction with a series of initiatives noted above, we are hopeful that the foundations for abiding inter-Korean, regional, and indeed global cooperation can be built on the basis of new insights from Jeju.

Since the First Jeju Peace Forum was held in 2001 to commemorate the first anniversary of the June 2000 South-North Summit Meeting, significant changes have transpired on the Korean Peninsula. Of the two critical international issues that continues to attract worldwide attention, namely, the North Korean nuclear crisis and postwar reconstruction of Iraq, the North Korean nuclear problem remains as a crucial regional and global problem.

We sincerely hope that the participation of key leaders from the political, business, academic, diplomatic, and media communities will provide new strategies and guidelines for the creation of a new Northeast Asian order and the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem.

Not only have we worked hard to promote the Jeju Peace Forum, we are committed to building parallel research foundations and centers to institutionalize further the progress that has been made through the Jeju Peace Forum. By the time the next Jeju Peace Forum is held, it is our hope that the “Millennium Hall” and the “South-North Peace Center” will be completed to welcome all of you.

In an era when value making has become the norm, we believe firmly that key findings from the Jeju Peace Forum can contribute not only to the internationalization of Jeju, but also toward regional peace, prosperity, and security.

In closing, it is my sincere wish that like the previous Jeju Peace Forum, the second gathering will result in concrete results based on active discussions and deliberations.

I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to all participants, particularly our foreign guests and a very special word of appreciation to President Roh Moo-hyun for taking his time to participate in the Second Jeju Peace Forum despite his enormously busy schedule.

I hope to see all of you at Jeju in the not too distant future and thank you again for making the Second Jeju Peace Forum a reality.

Thank you very much.

Welcoming Address

By Dr. KIM Woo Sik
President, Yonsei University

His Excellency President Roh Moo-hyun, former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Under Secretary General of the United Nations Yasushi Akashi, Foreign Minister Yoon Young Kwan, Governor Woo Keun Min, and ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased to officially welcome you to the Second Jeju Peace Forum based on the theme of “Building a Northeast Asian Community: Challenges and New Visions” at a time of unprecedented local, regional, and global changes.

It has been more than three years since the historic South-North summit meeting of June 2000 and while some progress has been made in inter-Korean relations, we still face a number of challenges.

Although outstanding security issues have to be addressed such as North Korea’s nuclear problem, it is also true that multilateral diplomacy is playing an increasingly important role in diffusing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

In this respect, Yonsei University, together with the Jeju Development Institute, is proud of its role in helping to host this important event with the presence of key leaders from Korea and abroad.

Yonsei remains firmly committed to educating and training leaders of the 21st century especially in the area of peace-building and regional economic cooperation. For our part, we want the future leaders of Korea and the broader East Asian region to say that the first major step towards peaceful unification and regional cooperation began under the wings of the Jeju Peace Forum.

Allow me to close my remarks by mentioning a very special word of appreciation to

President Roh Moo-hyun for taking his time to share his views with all of us at a critical juncture. It goes without saying that we are also profoundly grateful to our distinguished friends from abroad who have traveled all the way to Jeju.

I sincerely hope that our foreign guests will enjoy their stay at Jeju and thank you again for enabling Yonsei University to participate in this important conference.

Thank you very much.

제1패널

동북아 안보공동체의 구축 : 공동의 지혜와 비전

Panel 1

Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia
: Collective Wisdom and New Visions

“Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia”

AKASHI Yasushi

Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations

I feel very privileged to participate in the Second Jeju Peace Forum and to address the subject of “Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia” . This is indeed a most appropriate and timely subject for our discussion, partly because of the intensive attention being focused on the crisis over North Korea and partly because of the keenly-felt need to promote a regional security dialogue in Northeast Asia, which -we must admit- falls behind the other parts of the world in the development of intra-regional cooperation.

Before coming to the Japanese perspective on the important regional issues, let me begin by referring to what I consider to be the enduring characteristics of Japanese attitude after the World War II. Since its utter defeat in the war, and because of the strong and generally positive impact of the American Occupation, the post-war Japan has experienced tremendous growth of democracy in all aspects of its national life. This was facilitated by the experience of parliamentary democracy in the pre-war era, which had been stifled by the double punch of the global depression in the 1930's and the rise of chauvinistic nationalism. The post-war Japan has seen pacifism and anti-militarism as a new prevailing belief. While both democracy and pacifism are being fine-tuned in recent years, I am of the view that democratic convictions and pacifist feelings are so deep-rooted in Japan today that their basic orientation is unlikely to change even if the post-war Constitution involving Article 9 is revised by deleting reference to not possessing war potential and the right of belligerency.

Since 1945, the great energy of the Japanese people has largely been devoted to rebuilding the country which had been completely destroyed. They were largely successful in achieving these national objectives. It is recalled that the Japanese were so single-minded in their economic pursuit as to be described, somewhat derisively, as an “economic animal” by General de Gaulle of France.

Japan's pacifism has meant a resolute denial of military power and external expansionism, and the doctrine of self-defense only and the three non-nuclear principles, or not possessing, nor manufacturing, nor allowing stationing of nuclear

arms. Pacifism has led to a heavy reliance on the United Nations as a new pillar for national security. It is significant that the US-Japanese Security Treaty contains a wistful phrase (Article 10) that the treaty will remain in effect until the United Nations becomes capable of maintaining international peace and security in the area of Japan. Most Japanese, unlike the Korean people, have tended to be unconcerned about security and thought that their security could be left in the hands of the small group of their leaders and the American Government. The people in general were passive and even timid in foreign policy areas other than economics and finance.

Serious economic bust after the bubble experienced by Japan in the last decade have created an even more inward-looking outlook and the lack of self-confidence in the future. In the ongoing electoral campaign, major political parties are emphasizing domestic, rather than external, policies. One noteworthy feature in the present situation is a sense of frustration over the United Nations, which was not able to assert itself in the case of the war in Iraq. The United Nations is seen by some Japanese as insensitive to Japanese aspiration for adequate representation on the UN Security Council, while Japan's financial contributions, amounting to 19.5% of the entire assessed budget, continue to mount. Of course, much of this resentment is off the mark, since the United Nations is not a supra-national body and the failure of the Security Council to act is due to its built-in limitations which are due to the divergent views held by its Permanent Members.

Many Japanese feel today that the country has to strengthen its alliance with the United States in order to cope with uncertainties in Asia, particularly the crisis over North Korea. At the same time, the United State is perceived as the predominant military power which flexes its muscle a bit too often and at times insensitive to civilian lives, as seen in the war in Iraq. There has been outpouring of sympathy and solidarity in Japan with the American people after the tragedy of September 11 in New York and Washington, and the desire exists to share the burden of fighting terrorism. But the perceived tendency of the United States for unilateral action and its preference for military measures in coping with the instability of the post Cold War period is seen as somewhat simplistic and not always appropriate in addressing basic causes of conflict today.

There is admiration of China, with a tinge of envy and concern for its dynamic growth. The Japanese consider that they have to work for co-existence with this emerging major power. A prosperous China is deemed better than a confrontational Middle Kingdom. At the same time, the Japanese tend to be irritated over the Chinese proclivity to lecture on the responsibility of Japan's wartime leaders, despite Japanese apologies offered on a number of occasions. I am aware that not only the

Chinese people but also the Korean people and some others are concerned about the need for greater emphasis to be placed on Japan's history education, particularly its record of inhuman colonial history. I agree that further efforts should be made by Japan in this matter so to enable us to face our common future with more confidence. It is my view that Japan should be more candid in the school teaching of its checkered modern history so that the young generation are better aware of the mistakes made by their forefathers vis-a'-vis our Asian neighbours. But teaching of history is such a sensitive matter which touches on national pride, and therefore it should best be left to the Japanese themselves to decide.

In the meantime, I welcome the steps jointly being taken by the Republic of Korea and Japan for the purpose of reaching a common understanding of their recent history. It was also remarkable that the Japanese Emperor made reference to the Korean blood in his ancestry, thus emphasizing our basic kinship. These efforts, together with negotiations on concluding a Free Trade Agreement, should continue so that we can experience our dynamic future together on the basis of a firm, mutually shared understanding of our past.

Since the World Cup Games were jointly hosted by our two countries last year, there has been a sea change in the Japanese attitude towards South Korea. I was delighted to see the Japanese, particularly its youth, whole heartedly supporting great sportsmanship shown by Korean athletes. This is an outstanding example of cultural exchange in sports in action, transcending national boundaries and contributing to mutual appreciation and understanding.

The world in the post-Cold War period has been characterized by the frequent occurrence of ethnic conflicts and civil wars in Asia, Africa, Central Asia, the Balkans and elsewhere. They constitute more than 80% of the all conflicts and have occupied much of the United Nations agenda. The global strategy to cope with this enormous challenge is contained in the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations adopted in the year 2000. The events of September 11 were a crude, shocking opening of the 21st century, pointing to a new danger to peace and security, emanating from non-state actors who are invisible terrorists and extremists. The threat of terrorism becomes almost overwhelming when it is combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ease with which they can be delivered across national frontiers in addition to abundant supplies of conventional arms.

Despite these challenges, in East Asia as a whole we are witness to an encouraging development of active regional cooperation, exemplified by ASEAN +3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The recent meeting of APEC was a further demonstration of member states' attempt to coordinate policies not only in trade and investment but

also in transnational security issues. It is to be remembered that regional cooperation is an activity recognized and accepted in Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.

While these trends are positive for our region as a whole, it is a matter of great concern that Northeast Asia is still saddled with the negative legacies of the Cold War era, such as the division of the Korean Peninsula into two parts and the existence of Taiwan as a separate entity across the strait from China mainland. The large concentration of troops and arms in this region, which continue to be modernized and reinforced, could disrupt international peace and security, and cast a darkening shadow over the dynamic economies.

In this context, I am greatly encouraged that a six power framework, involving two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China and Russia, has started to function for the purpose of bringing about a peaceful transition to a de-nuclearized and more stable Korean Peninsula. It is fervently hoped that these six countries continue to work together to agree on a firm, verifiable and irreversible process in which North Korea will achieve its transformation to a reformed and open economy, eliminate a looming confrontation with the United States and establish a mutually beneficial and transparent relationship with Japan, the Republic of Korea and others. Japan for one will not accept a nuclearized North Korea. Time at our disposal is very limited in this area.

In parallel with positive signs of a robust security dialogue, it is hoped that the economies of our region will move towards greater inter-change, based on shared interests of all. Free Trade Agreements being negotiated among the countries concerned and other comprehensive partnership agreements should bring about greater prosperity to all and enable our countries to reach the degree of success undreamed of before and enable them to be integrated into a competitive world economy.

Japan has been somewhat hesitant in reacting and adjusting to these exciting challenges because of its built-in internal constraints and the lack of leadership. The fact that Japanese society is slow to change, is also due to the fact that the Japanese tend to value harmony and gradual change rather than a radical transformation and that people are generally content to live in a comfortable consumer-oriented society. The Japanese society has also been over-indulging of its interest groups, particularly the agricultural sector, even if it contributes only 2% of the country's GDP.

Nevertheless, there is no other choice for the countries of Northeast Asia than to opt for a more open, globalized and cooperative economy where competition and change becomes an accepted part of existence. Such economic interaction will gradually bring about a change in the concept of security itself - a change from the traditional balance of power based on nation-states to a notion of cooperative security based on

an enlightened national interest and shared human security.

In the end, changes in the economic, financial and other modes of behaviour should result in a change in our ways of looking at each other as well as our self-recognition and identity. We should ultimately base ourselves on the fulfillment of each and every individual, irrespective of nationality, race, religion and sex. We should accept both the dignity of human persons and independence of each country, while recognizing our economic and political interdependence in ever expanding areas of our lives. Ours has to be characterized as a century in which

- 1) all of us accept and respect each other's national identity and independence.
- 2) we work together for a peaceful and negotiated solution of our common problems, including ecological concerns, contagious diseases, transnational crimes, the spread of the weapons of mass destruction and other related matters.
- 3) we work simultaneously on different layers of mutual security, making use of whatever appropriate means, starting from enhanced bilateral cooperation, going through ad hoc multilateral cooperation, to a more institutionalized regional and sub-regional cooperation ranging from trade and investment, eventually reaching the intellectual, moral and spiritual dimensions of life, and thus creating a multi-faceted foundation for solid mutual trust and confidence.

The challenge for Northeast Asia is that it faces today greater danger of explosion than probably anywhere else, with the possible exception of the Middle East. I submit that these dangers can be circumvented only through our collective wisdom, cool judgment and determination. Let us keep in mind that our region has an enormous possibility and unimagined potential to reap unprecedented benefits in greater security and better life for all.

Peace and Regional Stability

Evgeny Primakov

Former Russian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

I

Without a proper understanding of the current developments, being underway at the global level, there can be no talk about stability and security in individual regions of the world. In this sense, the September 11, 2001 is taken usually as the point of reference. Indeed, the grand-scale terrorist attacks in New York and Washington enforced the new vision of the world – at least, in two aspects. First, the new threats, looming over the mankind in the post-Cold War period, have taken a more salient shape. This applies, first and foremost, to international terrorism and to the catastrophic danger of its “merging” with weapons of mass destruction. Second, the events of September 11, more amply than ever before, exposed the confrontation between the two sharply contrasting trends – on the one hand, sustaining, with certain modernization, of the world order, based on such mechanism of collective actions as the United Nations, and on the other hand – the so-called “unilateralism”, or the stake at the possibility that the universally important decisions would be taken and realized by one country –the United States– on the basis of its subjective perception of international realities.

So, there are all the reasons to suggest that in general terms, the talk centers on the two models of world order: one based on collective perception of threats, appearing on the international stage, on collective actions counter to such threats, as well as on collective efforts for international stabilization, and the order – on unilateral decisions and actions, being taken counter both to the UN Charter and to opinion of most states in the world.

The second model was realized into practice in Iraq. The question is: has it really worked and helped to stabilize the situation in the post-Saddam state? The realities in Iraq are quite far from a reason to respond positively. In military terms as such, the operation has been successful, and it could hardly if ever be otherwise, as the armed clash took part between the powerful United States supported by Britain and

the military second-rate (if not third-rate) state of Iraq. However, the arbitrary actions were skidding at the stage of efforts, designed to make the situation in Iraq more stable than it is. Armed attacks at American and British soldiers are going on. In the period following the President Bush's announcement of the end of the war, casualties among the US servicemen have been close to 100 persons- comparable to the number of US officers and soldiers killed in action during invasion of Iraq. In British forces, too, the number of killed and injured is quite impressive. The occupational authorities so far fail to stop robbery, pillage and illegalities. In Iraq, economy is defunct and the danger of humanitarian catastrophe is growing, although the US spends billions dollars to improve the situation.

Also, the US has failed to find and to rely on a local force that would be able to bring order in the country. The current events seem to be proving that in 1991, after defeating Saddam Hussein's army in Kuwait, President Bush the senior took a correct position when he turned down the calls for a march to Baghdad, voiced by some figures in his team. By all evidence, he understood that to win a military victory over Saddam's regime would be much easier than to bring Iraq into normal after the regime would collapse.

Another noteworthy point is that occupation of Iraq has distracted attention from the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Over there, the current course of events is quite different from the scenario, which the United States started to realize one a half year ago, with then throughout support on the part of the world community.

First of all, since that time nobody has managed to isolate Ben Laden, the leader of "Al Kaida". According to multiple publications, he is hiding in the zone of Pushtuni tribes at the border with Pakistan, which is qualified by President George Bush as the main ally of the US in the anti-terrorist operation. By mass media reports, the same area as well hosts mullah Mohammad Omar, the head of the toppled "Taliban". The latter was heard recently calling everybody to struggle to death against foreign troops in Afghanistan. However, neither the Pakistani army nor the US-led coalition armed forces ever made a raid to that territory in order to capture or to eliminate Ben Laden, Omar and the like. To seize Ben Laden and his close associates seems to be no longer a supreme task of the United States as proclaimed eighteen months ago. American leaders, too, choose to discontinue discussing this subject - it has been replaced by the "more timely" topics, such as construction of the post-war Iraq, or, following Iraq, search of new targets to be attacked.

Meanwhile, some signs appear to indicate that the "Taliban" movement has not been defeated and sets the objective to restore the toppled regime. Mullah Omar appointed the "Leaders' Council of Afghanistan", comprised of 10 field commanders,

most faithful to the “Taliban” movement. Armed clashes between the “Taliban” members and anti-terrorist coalition units occur once in a while here and there. The government of Khamid Karzai actually has no control of situation in provinces, where ethnic and religious clashes continue. The country is plunged in economic disarray, social problems are getting the ever more acute, and the criminality rate is growing. Rapid growth in production of drugs aggravates the general instability. By the UN data, in late 2002 the volume of drugs production reached 3,400 ton of crude opium (equivalent of 340 ton of heroin). What is most dangerous, the opium-poppo production involves the growing numbers of peasants, who do not at all intend to give up big earnings. It happens the ever more often that peasants kill representatives of Kabul authorities who try to impede drug business.

Building the new Afghan army makes a very slow progress. Field commanders do not haste to abandon their armed units. Most of them obey to Karzai’s government in no way at all.

Hence, the general conclusion : the ruling regime in Afghanistan is not firmly grounded.

Therefore, the stake at the arbitrary decisions by the US has neither made the situation in Iraq more stable, nor strengthened the anti-terrorist vector in the world politics. The only remedy is seen in repudiation of the “unilateral” approach by the Bush administration and reiteration of collective actions. Appearing now, the initial symptoms of such move lend some optimism, but these are just the first sprouts.

So, while the US-made occupation authorities retain their role in Iraq, the Iraq problem starts to be “sliding” to the domain of the United Nations. The UN Security Council passed a resolution (and the US voted favorably) enacting the position of a special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Iraq. Together with the occupation authorities, this figure is commissioned to take part in the post-war organization of the country and information of the Iraq government.

Unless this measure becomes a mere formality, it will add arguments in favor of the possibility to decide on the futures world order in the interests of all states.

Apart from the US failures in the post-war Iraq and Afghanistan., there is another circumstance, which offers chances for departure from “unilateralism” - in particular, the fact that the practice of unilaterally taken decisions and thereon-based unilateral actions runs counter to objective developments in the world economy and international relations. As far as economy is concerned, the objective course of events first of all includes globalization and trans-nationalization of entrepreneurial activities, making the world the ever more interconnected and interdependent. In the political domain, the unilateral practice is incompatible with the structural changes that have taken place in

international relations since the end of the Cold War.

What was perfectly clear during the Cold War, there were the two systems and two “superpowers” – that is, the Soviet Union and United States. In my view, today there are no “superpowers” at all – whether the Soviet Union that has stopped in existence, or the United States, although the latter is economically and militarily the most powerful state with exceptional political influence in the world. The term of “superpower” was a category of the Cold War, and the criteria was made by both quantitative and qualitative parameters – that is, a “superpower” made itself the center for a conglomerate of states by providing their security in the hard-line confrontation with the opposite bloc. Exactly the safeguarding of security for other states allowed a superpower to take the lead in decision-making that was binding for its allies in the given bloc. Today, the picture is different. As the global confrontation is gone, there is no need, for example, in the “nuclear umbrella”, which the United States and Soviet Union opened over the heads of their allies and partners.

Another evidence of incompliance between “unilateralism” and the current realities is found in the fact that after the Cold War the world has been shifting towards a polycentric structure. A whole number of cases in point would support such conclusion. Let us take the European Union, for example. Who might have imagined just a decade ago that Western Europe, uniting for economic considerations into an integrated community, would as well strive for political and military integration? Today, however, there are all the reasons to argue that the European Union is becoming a “center of force” comparable in terms of its production capacities with the United States.

Who would dare to argue that China, building up its economic muscles, would become a part of the one-pole world system and would humbly follow the course of events, directed from the single center? The same applies to Russia, India, and Japan, while the latter, as we can see, has been persisting to bring its political influence in the world in consistence with its economic potentials. Certainly, formation of the polycentric world is not an easy process and requires a good deal of time, but it makes the main vector of the current developments anyway.

Polycentrism of the world requires activation of the United Nations. However, while standing by the need of collegial decision-making, one should not at all rule out the need to modernize the already available instruments for collective measures – in particular, the United Nations. For an instance, it seems imperative to modify the system for structuring the list of UN SC permanent members having the right of veto. By all evidence, there is a need to revisit and assess the current functions of the UN through the prism of their relevance to the changed international environment.

This organization must be better adapted to exercise the peacekeeping functions. However, in whatever the case, it appears impermissible to amend the UN Charter in the part, which stipulates that resolutions to the effect of force methods to be applied against sovereign states must be taken by no other body than the UN Security Council.

While a considerable number of states did not support the American pattern of the world order, illustrated by the action in Iraq, the world has evaded a new split. Anti-Americanism subsided in the policy of those countries that did not accept the US action, as they, too, were led by the understanding that without the United States, there would be no chances for successful struggle against international terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and impoverishment of nations living beyond the borders of the so-called Golden Billion. At the same time, this understanding does not mean a repudiation of collective actions. Such dialectical approach would create the proper external environment for the United States to correct – let it be gradually and without any sort of dramatic gestures – its policy. Some changes on the US domestic political scene, too, would contribute to such move. The close-to-President political figures, which usually are seen within the group with shared extremist ideas, while expanding on inevitability of force methods applied unilaterally by the United States, now speak much less categorically than they did at the start of the Iraq campaign.

II

All of the above-discussed global trends to some or another extent cause an impact on the situation in the region of Northeast Asia. At the same time, however, this region is marked by its own specific developments, which already influence or to even a greater extent can influence the general world situation.

First of all, this preamble is related to the subject of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. In October 2002, the DPRK confirmed the existence of its nuclear program, based on highly enriched uranium. In early 2003, the DPRK seceded from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On July 8, 2003, in the course of the UN consultations, the DPRK representatives announced that processing of 8 thousand nuclear-fuel rods was completed. By experts' estimates, 8 thousand rods would be sufficient to extract the mass of weapon plutonium as necessary for production of 5~10 nuclear bombs. By all evidence, the DPRK as well made a progress in production of compact nuclear warheads, which can be installed at 200 "Rodong"

ballistic missiles being at disposal of Pyongyang, and these 1,300km range missiles can cover the zone including South Korea, Japan and therein stationed US bases. Quite naturally, this situation cannot but be a source of reasonable concern.

First, no neglect is allowed with regard to the fact that North Korea is a side in the North-South conflict, which periodically grows to a point of crisis. In such circumstances, there can be very little if any hope that the trend for acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea would not intensify as a matter of response to behavior of the DPRK. Even if the United States, in form of an alternative, succeed in opening its "nuclear umbrella" over the Republic of Korea, the conflict on the Korean Peninsula would acquire the nuclear dimension.

Second, apart from South Korea, Japan, too, voices grave concerns in connection with the currently shaped situation. According to the prevailing number of experts, Japan would have nuclear weapons within several weeks after the same is in possession of the DPRK.

Third, the United States also manifests serious concern - especially, in connection the "leakage" from Pyongyang to the effect that should the DPRK be attacked, a North Korean missile with a nuclear warhead will be launched toward the US base in South Korea, which stations several dozen thousand military-uniformed Americans.

Considering the events in Iraq, one should not totally rule out the possibility that the US would apply military measures against North Korea under the pretext that the latter is close to possess mass destruction weapons. In the article, published by the "Washington Post", William Perry, the former US Secretary of Defense, argues that the situation is propelling towards warfare between the US and DPRK.

Mr. Perry is not alone in this concerns, President talks on "additional measures" to be taken in case the DPRK does not give up its nuclear program cannot but put on the alert. Such measures were mentioned for the first time in the joint statement, issued after negotiations between South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and US President George Bush in Washington. Commenting on that communique, the ROK President stated that the "additional measures" might be realized in case of "the worst course" of the situation. While Japan, too, joined the given statement, nobody chooses to disclose the substance of such "additional measures". Furthermore, in his interview for a Japanese newspaper of "Iomiuri", Roh Moo-hyun actually excluded economic coercion and stressed that he would stand against enactment of economic sanctions against the DPRK, Can it be that those observers are right, who assume in the present circumstances that all this talk means preparations for a kind of armed attack at North Korea? Apart from the fact that such - so far, hypothetical - prospect does not fit in any normal pattern of interstate relations, it might ensue a

most dangerous blow-up with unpredictable consequences.

The situation can be settled through no other but political and diplomatic methods. Meanwhile, application of the same is blocked as a result of the dispute on the format of negotiations. In fact, Russia is ready to accept any format that would be agreed by other potential negotiators. Seeking to clear the road to settlement, Russia supported the meeting among representatives of the DPRK, PRC and US that took place in Beijing last April. The meeting, however, turned out as practically fruitless. At the same time, when this paper was in writing, Pyongyang used to insist on bilateral negotiations with the United States and thus evidently tried to resolve its economic and security problems by means of “exchanges” and compromise. Washington, however turned down the bilateral option. In the given situation, it would be wise to persist in offering another format of negotiations – namely, the one that would involve North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and United States. Such multilateral forum seems to be more acceptable in terms of a possible influence on the situation.

A positive factor is that the pause in negotiations is not transformed into a dangerous vacuum, but rather is filled by bilateral contacts, including those between the DPRK and ROK. In the course of such contacts the Republic of Korea abides by the position that the “nuclear problem” of North Korea must be resolved first and issues of bilateral relations next. It seems that discussion and resolution of economic, defense and political as well as other issues between two Koreas would provide the more fertile soil for settlement of the “North Korean nuclear crisis”.

Among collegial and efficient measures that might render a positive impact on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the two of them – one military-political and the other economic-deserve a special reference. Much has been said about the need to build a regional security system on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large. However, without a settlement of the regional conflict between the two Korean states, to launch this project would be hardly if ever possible. While the current conditions are not yet ripe for immediate resolution of the regional security agenda(this would remain as a major task for the future), it would be appropriate to realize – through collective, mainly the Russian-American efforts – the idea of the regional ABM system(TMD). This proposal was set forth on the part of Russia. With such system in the region, any country, potentially interested in development and use of nuclear-missile weapons, would certainly behave more prudently.

Economic leverage, too, must be used in order to provide for stability in the region. By all evidence, the quite unsatisfactory economic situation in the DPRK would objectively require to turn its foreign policy so that to alleviate the situation and to

open a broad vista for cooperation – primarily, with South Korea and Japan. To this end, however, it is needed to develop ambitious and purpose-oriented programs of economic support for the DPRK rather than merely to make statements on readiness to provide economic assistance to the given country.

Continuing humanitarian actions, such as family reunions, would as well play a certain role for the future of the Korean Peninsula.

By my assumption, in order to neutralize destructive developments in the region, it would be important to promote the idea of such, so to say, “geometrical configuration” as Russia – China – Japan – United States. Naturally, this does not mean an intention to build a sort of formal association, whether a political or defense one. However, it would be useful to start practicing both bilateral and multilateral consultations among the “vertex” states of this “geometrical figure” to consider all major problems of the region, as well as to move to coordination of actions aiming at strengthening of regional security.

Quite naturally, the work for stability and security at the regional level must be based solidly on economic ties among the states of the region. To this end, realistic prerequisites are available already. With diversification of international economic ties in the region, a considerable part thereof accounts for in-region trade and economic cooperation. Exactly this part manifests itself as the most dynamic.

Among trade partners of the PRC, the first dozen includes Japan, US, South Korea as well as Russia, and in the recent decade the latter has ranked first by the growth rates of trade with the PRC.

The United States, China and South Korea are the main trade partners for Japan. It goes beyond saying that for South Korea, too, trade and economic ties with China, Japan and US are of paramount importance. What is no less evident, markets of the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Russia are quite important for the United States.

While over a half of Russia’s foreign trade accounts for European countries, its economic cooperation with Northeast Asian and Pacific states acquires a good deal of dynamism. For example, by preliminary data, in the first half of 2003 Russia’s trade with the PRC has grown by 40%, and with US – by 17%. These figures reflect the maximal growth rates for Russia’s foreign trade in the current year, and, besides, the United States has become the major investor by the volume of investments in the Russian economy, accumulated within the latest decade.

Although growing less dynamically than with China and US, Russia’s economic cooperation with Japan, Republic of Korea and DPRK has undoubtedly great potentials. Good prospects are seen in the project for linking the trans-Siberian railway with railroad networks of both Koreas. The plans for construction of oil

pipelines from Angarsk to Nakhodka and to Daqing also appear as most attractive. With realization of these projects, countries of the region would have a convenient access to Russian hydrocarbon resources and could generate a new impulse for economic cooperation in the region.

In short, all necessary prerequisites are available for the further intensification of in-region economic cooperation, which is to bring positive quality shifts in the political climate in general and on the Korean Peninsula in particular.

It is said that a pessimist is nobody else but just a well-informed optimist. We would like to see good knowledge of the situation in Northeast Asia to refute the given statement. Notwithstanding the difficult complexity of the situation, it seems to contain all the grounds for albeit moderate optimism.

Speech at the 2nd “Jeju Peace Forum”

Mei Zhaorong

Former President, Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs

Mr Chairman,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Mr Chairman, Ladies and gentlemen, I am deeply honored to come to the beautiful Jeju Island for the well-renowned “Jeju Peace Forum” and explore the building of a security community in Northeast Asia with friends from various countries. I would like to take this opportunity to extend gratitude to the host for your kind invitation and gracious hospitality. I wish the Forum a complete success.

I. Last November, the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the strategic goal of building a well-to-do society in an all-round way in the next 20 years. The fulfillment of such a grand task calls for a stable and peaceful international environment, particularly a favorable surrounding environment. Northeast Asia is undoubtedly the most important neighbour of China, not only for its proximity with China but also for its unique features.

From a security perspective, Northeast Asia remains an area featuring outstanding contradictions and disputes after the disintegration of the bipolar pattern. Problems left over from the Cold War still linger. Clash of ideologies remains to a large extent. Resentment and distrust are still deeply rooted among some countries. Due to historical and realistic reasons, disputes over territories, maritime space and related interests still exist among certain countries, which result in occasional frictions and impede the development of their relations. Particularly noteworthy is that this area sees the confluence and clash of strategic interests of big nations. Complex big-nation relations have a significant bearing on the situation here. Chronic separation and military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula have always carried the seeds of tension and conflicts. The DPRK nuclear issue is particularly noteworthy. In a word, uncertainty and instability exist to a large extent in the security situation of

Northeast Asia.

From an economic perspective, Northeast Asia occupies an important place in the world economy. GDP figures of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, DPRK and Mongolia add up to 6 trillion US dollars annually, accounting for one fifth of the world' s total. Their trade volumes approach 2 trillion US dollars, accounting for one eighth of the world' s total. Northeast Asia is an important pole of growth and a technologically creative place. It also stands out among other areas in China' s foreign economic cooperation and trade. China' s trade with Japan and ROK reached 101.9 billion and 44 billion US dollars respectively in 2002, accounting for one fourth of China total foreign trade. In nation-specific terms, Japan has been China' s largest trading partner for 10 years running and ROK is No. 3, whereas China is Japan' s 2nd largest trading partner and ROK' s 2nd largest export market. Japan is the 2nd largest overseas investor in China. The Japanese government supplies more Yen loan and free aid to China than any other foreign country. China' s average annual economic growth rate of near 10% in the past over 2 decades of reform and opening-up has a lot to do with China-Japan and China-ROK economic cooperation, trade and capital cooperation. On the other hand, the rapid development of Chinese economy also creates a huge market and favorable investment destination for Japan, ROK and other countries and helps their own economies. However, of the world' s three economically dynamic blocks Europe, North America and East Asia, Northeast Asia has lagged behind in regional and sub-regional cooperation due to political, security and historical reasons.

Given the importance of Northeast Asia to China, Asia and the world at large, the new Chinese leadership has put the maintenance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia and promotion of Northeast Asian cooperation in an extremely important place, and vigorously seeks to achieve common security and development of all countries in Northeast Asia based on the policy line of living in amity with neighbouring countries and seeing neighbouring countries as partners.

II. The core of Northeast Asian regional security and China' s Northeast Asia policy is the maintenance of peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. China maintains good bilateral relations with all Northeast Asian countries. This puts China in a favorable position to play a unique role on the peninsula issue. We believe that proper settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue is the most pressing task for the Korean peninsula. The basic position of China on this issue is that, for the sake of peninsula

peace and stability, China supports a nuclear-free peninsula, stands for accommodating the reasonable concerns of DPRK and insists on a peaceful settlement through dialogues. Hence China has been doing the job of persuading them into peace and encouraging dialogue. And, as a result, the three-party and six-party talks took place in Beijing respectively. During the six-party talks, all parties agreed in principle to settle the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner through dialogue and continue the process of talks. This is an important consensus. However, the DPRK nuclear issue is very complex. It is impossible to have all the problems resolved with one or two talks. There is still a long way to go in the future. All parties should have enough patience. What should be stressed in particular is that peace talks are the only right choice. China is working on relevant parties in the hope that they will further demonstrate sincerity and flexibility to create conditions for the early launch of the second round of talks. It is a basic prerequisite for the promotion of Northeast Asian cooperation to continue the process of Beijing talks and push for the peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.

Recent developments on the peninsula show that the establishment of a permanent Peninsula mechanism of peace is a pressing task. Relevant parties have explored this, which is very helpful. In pursuing a peaceful settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue, parties concerned may continue to explore this and try to make some initial headway. (For example, if an agreement is made on providing security guarantee to DPRK within a multilateral framework, could it be a stepping stone for future peninsula mechanism of peace?)

By and large, China and ROK share identical positions and concerns and have maintained good communication and coordination. The strengthening of mutual cooperation and support between China and ROK is vital to promoting the eventual peaceful settlement of DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue and maintaining the peace and stability of the Peninsula. Tension or the easing of tension between the North and the South on the Peninsula is an important aspect in the security situation of this area. With the North-South Summit in June 2000, the Peninsula situation took a turn for the better, which was well received and welcomed by the world. China supports the policy of reconciliation initiated by President Kim Dae-Jung and supports the improvement of North-South relations through dialogue and reconciliation and their eventual peaceful reunification on their own terms. To our regret, peace process on the peninsula has suffered setbacks from time to time due to internal and outside disruptions. There is no denying that the Bush Administration's tough policy

toward DPRK worked adversely in this respect.

III. One major obstacle in Northeast Asian security cooperation is lack of mutual trust. The root cause is that some country does not correctly look at its history of aggression during World War II and does not take a correct attitude. Germany, another chief culprit of that war, however, has been forgiven by countries it invaded due to its correct attitude towards history. France and Germany not only achieved reconciliation but also became the driving force of European integration. This is something worth reflecting over. China and Japan has a more-than-2000-year-long history of friendly exchanges. China has never blamed Japan's aggression of China on the Japanese people in the belief that the majority of Japanese people stand for a friendly China-Japan relationship. China also understands that Japan, after over 50 years of development and changes, wishes to be a "normal country" and play a political role in regional and international affairs commensurate with its economic strength. However, when some in Japan tamper with the history textbook regarding World War II, particularly when its government leaders pay respect to Yashukuni Shrine where templates of A-class war criminals are worshipped, elderly Chinese who suffered bitterly from Japanese aggression and young Chinese who know about the modern history can not but having misgivings. I believe it is the same case with ROK and DPRK.

On the other hand, when the Chinese economy develops rapidly and national strength begins to increase, there would be people spreading the so-called "China Threat" theory. This is a mentality not good for the promotion of mutual trust, which only wishes to see itself grow strong and does not hope to see others develop and attempts to contain China's development. In history, the rise of big nations has always and unexceptionally been on the basis of bullying and weakening neighbours. This way no longer works now. With the deepening of the tendency of economic globalization and regional cooperation, interdependence of countries keeps increasing. Each big nation would need a stable and prosperous neighbourhood, need to help neighbour get rich and take the path of common development. China is no exception to this. In actual fact, the abject poverty of China might be a disaster to its neighbours. It has and will continue to prove that China's growth is a blessing to the surrounding countries. With the increase of China's purchasing power and market demand, China will play an increasingly big role in supporting and facilitating Asian economy. The "China Threat" theory should give way to "China Opportunity" theory.

Another major obstacle in Northeast Asian security cooperation is the old outlook on security guided by the cold war mentality. It bases one nation's security on the insecurity of others and attempts to ensure one's own security by means of military buildup and strengthening of military alliances. To safeguard international peace and security, China puts forward a new outlook on security with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination as the core, which implies settling disputes through dialogue and cooperation. It reflects China's strategic thinking in conflict prevention and peace-safeguarding. The four principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination are mutually complementary and supportive as an organic whole. Mutual trust is the basis of the new outlook on security, which implies that effective cooperation should be conducted on the basis of mutual trust. Mutual benefit is the goal of the new security outlook, which stresses common security and is opposed to the practice of seeking one's own security at the expense of others' security interests. Equality is the guarantee of the new security outlook, which implies that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be followed and countries are equal no matter how big or small they are. Coordination is the form the new security outlook takes, which implies that factors of insecurity should be removed through equal consultation and mutual accommodation.

IV. Security can not be separated from economy. Northeast Asian cooperation should move ahead in parallel on the two tracks of security and economy: to ensure economic development with security cooperation and to promote security and stability with economic cooperation.

Today, there are diverse mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation in the security arena in Northeast Asia, including the six-party talks, four-party talks, TCOG and NEACD, etc.. China hopes that all these mechanisms will play their positive roles. China will support proposals by some countries on how to improve the security cooperation in Northeast Asia which are good to the security of this area. At the same time, China sees the promotion of Northeast Asian economic development as a key part of its Northeast Asia policy. China attaches importance to the economic strength and potential of Northeast Asia and would like to deepen its economic relations with countries here on the basis of mutual benefit. China's strategy of reinvigorating its northeastern provinces is closely linked to the development of Northeast Asia. We welcome business people of these countries to invest in China's northeastern provinces and seek opportunities.

It is an important part of China's Northeast Asia policy to promote Northeast Asia sub-regional cooperation. Not long ago, leaders of China, Japan and ROK issued a joint declaration on the promotion of trilateral cooperation, which defined the basic framework for cooperation among the three countries and agreed to continue working on the proposed China-Japan-ROK Free Trade Area. We hope that it will give an impetus to the development of Northeast Asian sub-regional cooperation. China also supports continued discussions on Northeast Asian Economic Circle and Tumen River development.

In today's world, economic globalization and technological advances are gaining pace fast. The international situation keeps changing. Peoples of Northeast Asia are faced with not only tremendous opportunities but also severe challenges. The Chinese people are wholeheartedly focusing on construction and development. We earnestly hope to develop equal and mutually beneficiary cooperation with all peoples on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China would like to join hands with all countries, correctly realize the historical trend, figure out ways of strengthening Northeast Asian subregional cooperation and contribute its own bit to the peace, stability and common prosperity of Northeast Asia.

Thank you!

제2패널

6자 회담과 동북아 평화 : 이론적 모색

Panel 2

Six-Party Formula and Northeast Asian Peace
: Two Contending Views

The Vulnerability of Alliance : The Future of America's East Asian and European Security Partnerships

G. John Ikenberry

Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice
Georgetown University

INTRODUCTION

For the first time in fifty years, America's alliance partnerships in Europe and East Asia are in peril. Across the Atlantic, many observers contend that NATO is losing its purpose and efficacy as a security pact. It will not disappear as an organization; it will simply be less relevant. In the months before the Iraq war, as the Bush administration found France and Germany actively working against the United States on a matter that it considered of supreme national security importance. The pending American decision to deploy bases from Germany into Eastern Europe -- signaling the end of the legacy deployment left over from the Cold War -- could further fragment NATO. In East Asia, the Bush administration and South Korea also find themselves working at cross-purposes over North Korea and public support in Korea for the American alliance has dropped. It is now possible to envision the departure of American troops from South Korea with uncertain implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. More so than ever before, America's alliance system and the post-war American hegemonic world order on which it is built is in play.

The vulnerability of these American-centered global security ties is a result of a confluence of factors, including: the end of the Cold War, the rise of American unipolar power, the political unification of Europe, the revolution in military affairs, the rise of terrorism and WMD as global threats, domestic political backlash to American dominance, and the introduction of new strategic thinking in Washington. Some of these factors are deep, long-term shifts in the international system and others are contingent developments. Together they have prompted policy makers in

Europe, Asia, and the United States to reassess basic, decades-old strategic relationships. The vision articulated by the Bush administration -- at least its hard-line, neo-conservative officials -- is of diminished formal alliance commitments. The new thinking is captured in Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's famous formulation: "The mission will determine the coalition" rather than the other way around. In other words, the United States will define threats and make choices about the use of force and other states are invited to join in as an ad hoc coalition of the willing. But the formal, binding, reciprocal, and cooperative security basis of the alliance system fades in importance.

Yet it is important to observe that the Cold War ended over a decade ago and the alliance system survived quite nicely through the 1990s. The specific threats that gave rise of these alliances have disappeared(at least in Europe) yet the alliances have not simply ceased to operate. The United States and its security partners in Japan and Europe actually expanded and deepened their security ties in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reason why this is so is that alliances do a lot more "work" than is often understood or captured in the realpolitik understanding of what alliances are or do. Alliances provide institutional mechanisms to convey assurances and reinforce economic and political partnerships. The alliances bind the United States to other major democratic states providing both parties with reassurances about their future relations. The alliances serve to both extend American power and make it more predictable and "user friendly." The alliances give the junior states in the alliance "voice opportunities" that is, they provide channels for regular access to the United States which makes these states more likely to work with the United States rather than resist or work against it.

So there are cross-cutting forces: some are serving to undermine the American alliance system while others reinforce it. To speculate on the future of the alliance system it is necessary to make judgements about what shifts that undermine alliance relations are inevitable driven by deep forces of power, technology, and political development and what shifts are driven by more contingent choices of policy makers and their assessments of threats, interests, and goals. Most importantly, it is necessary to come to some assessment about what alliances actually do, including their role in supporting the organization of the wider international order.

The question that must be asked is: do these Cold War-era alliances still matter in the new age of American unipolarity? The answer is yes indeed, they arguably

become more important. They might matter less if alliances are understood narrowly as institutionalized joint forces aimed at a common threat. But America's challenge as the dominant and unrivaled unipolar power is this: to manage global order and make American power acceptable to the rest of the world. No country had dominated the world as the United States does today. This gives the United States unprecedented options and it makes it easier for it to resist entangling security and political commitments. But unipolarity has also unsettled world politics. It gives other states reasons to resist America. It is here that institutional security commitments with the rest of the world matter for the United States they provide incentives for other countries to engage rather than work against American power. The maintenance of alliance partnerships plays an important role in this regard leveraging American power and making that power a source of opportunity rather than a threat to other states.¹⁾

This paper has three tasks. First, I sketch the postwar American-centered alliance system. This allows us to put into historical perspective the embedded role of alliances in the wider international order. Second, I look specifically at the logic of the American alliance system. Third, I explore the forces that are undermining America's postwar alliance system in both Europe and East Asia. I focus in particular on the ways in which the rise of American unipolar power and the growing disparities in military capacity interact with shifting global threats.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

Many observers expected that the end of the Cold War would usher in dramatic and destabilizing shifts in world politics. But despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and bipolarity and despite great swings in the international distribution of power the United States and its partners navigated their way into a new era while maintaining stable and cooperative relations. Indeed, the most important characteristic of the current international order is the remarkable absence of serious strategic rivalry and competitive balancing among the great powers. At the core of this order are the major industrial democracies of Europe, North America, and East Asia a community of states with stable governments, liberal societies, and advanced market economies and tied together by security alliances, economic interdependence, and a variety of multilateral governance institutions.²⁾ The United States whose military, technological, and economic superiority increased during the 1990s sits at the order's epicenter.

Forecasts of post-Cold War breakdown and disarray missed an important fact: in the shadow of the Cold War a distinctive and durable political order was being assembled among the major industrial countries. This order might be called the American System evoking the multifaceted character of this American-centered order organized around security alliances, open markets, multilateral institutions, and forums for consultation and governance. It is an order built on common interests and values among the advanced industrial countries and anchored in capitalism and democracy. But it is also an engineered political order built on American power, institutional relationships, and political bargains.³⁾ At the heart of the American System are the array of American-led postwar security alliances.

The American System is a product of two order building exercises after World War II. One is familiar and commonly seen as the defining feature of the postwar era. This was the containment order, organized around superpower rivalry, deterrence and ideological struggle between Communism and the free world. Truman, Acheson, Kennan, and other American foreign policy officials were responding to the specter of Soviet power, organizing a global anti-communist alliance and fashioning an American grand strategy under the banner of containment. America's strategy was to "prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won to reshape the postwar international order."⁴⁾ This is the grand strategy and international order that was swept away in 1991.

But there was another order created after World War II. Here American officials were working with Britain and other countries to build a new set of relationships among the advanced industrial democracies. The political settlement among these countries was aimed at solving the problems of the 1930s. This was a political order whose vision was articulated in such statements as the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, and the Marshall Plan speech in 1947. Unlike containment, there was not a singular statement of strategy and purpose. It was an assemblage of ideas about open markets, social stability, political integration, international institutional cooperation, and collective security. Even the Atlantic Pact agreement of 1949 was as much aimed at reconstruction and integrating Europe and binding the democratic world together as it was an alliance created to balance Soviet power.⁵⁾

The importance of American power in postwar order building was most evident in the occupation and security binding of Germany and Japan. American troops began as occupiers of the two defeated states and never left. They eventually became

protectors but also a palpable symbol of America's superordinate position. Host agreements were negotiated that created a legal basis for the American military presence effectively circumscribing Japanese and West German sovereignty made necessary in the early 1950s by a growing Cold War could only be achieved by binding Germany to Europe, which in turn required a binding American security commitment to Europe. Complex and protracted negotiations ultimately created an integrated European military force within NATO and legal agreements over the character and limits of West German sovereignty and military power. A reciprocal process of security binding lay at the heart of the emerging American-led system. John McCloy identified the "fundamental principle" of American policy in the early 1950s: that "whatever German contribution to defense is made may only take the form of a force which is an integral part of a larger international organization. There is no real solution of the German problem inside Germany alone. There is a solution inside the European-Atlantic-World Community."6)

Japan was also brought into the American System during the 1950s. The United States took the lead in helping Japan find new commercial relations and raw material sources in Southeast Asia to substitute for the loss of Chinese and Korean markets. Japan and Germany were now twin junior partners of the United States stripped of their military capacities and reorganized as engines of world economic growth. Containment in Asia would be based on the growth and integration of Japan into the wider noncommunist Asian regional economy what Secretary of State Dean Acheson called the "great crescent" in referring to the countries arrayed from Japan through Southeast Asia into India. Bruce Cumings captures the logic: "In East Asia, American planners envisioned a regional economy driven by revived Japanese industry, with assured continental access to markets and raw materials for its exports."7) This strategy would link together threatened noncommunist states along the crescent, create strong economic ties between the United States and Japan, and lessen the importance of European colonial holdings in the area. The United States would actively aid Japan in reestablishing a regional economic sphere in Asia, allowing it to prosper and play a regional leadership role within the larger American system. Japanese economic growth, the expansion of regional and global markets, and the bilateral security ties generated by the Cold War went together.

Behind the scenes, America's hegemonic position has been backed by the reserve and transaction-currency role of the dollar. The dollar's special status gives the United States the rights of "seigniorage": it could print extra money to fight wars, increase

domestic spending, and go deeply into debt without fearing the pain that other states would experience. Other countries would have to adjust their currencies, which were linked to the dollar, when Washington pursued an inflationary course to meet its foreign and domestic policy agendas. Because of its dominance, the United States did not have to raise interest rates to defend its currency, taking pressure off its chronic trade imbalances. In the 1960s, French President Charles de Gaulle understood the hidden source of American hegemony all too well and complained bitterly. But most of America's Cold War allies were willing to hold dollars for fear that a currency collapse might lead the United States to withdraw its forces overseas and retreat into isolationism.

Also behind the scenes, the American System has been made more stable by nuclear weapons. Even if the other major powers were to lose interest in alliance partnership with the United States, the possibility of seeking a wholesale reorganization of the system through great power war is no longer available. The costs are too steep. As Robert Gilpin has noted, great-power war is precisely the mechanism of change that has been used throughout history to redraw international order. Rising states depose the reigning but declining state and impose a new order.⁸) But nuclear weapons make this historical dynamic profoundly problematic. On the one hand, American power is rendered more tolerable because in the age of nuclear deterrence American military power cannot now be used for conquest against other great powers. On the other hand, the status quo international order led by the United States is rendered less easily replaceable. War-driven change is removed as an historical process, and the United States was lucky to be on top when this happened.

The American System is based on a vision of open economic relations, intergovernmental cooperation, and liberal democratic society. But the most consequential aspect of the order is its security structure. Although the United States remained deeply ambivalent about extending security guarantees or forward deploying troops in Europe and Asia, it ultimately bound itself to the other advanced democracies through alliance partnership.⁹) This strategy of security binding has provided a structure of commitments, restraints, and mechanisms of reassurance between the democratic alliance partners. The alliances serve to bind Japan, the United States, and Western Europe together and thereby reduce conflict and the potential for strategic rivalry between these traditional great powers. The alliances help these states establish credible commitment to a cooperative structure of relations.

WHAT SECURITY ALLIANCES DO

We can look more closely at the multiple and interactive ways in which the alliance system operates to reinforce the conditions for stable American-centered unipolar order. Alliances are more than simply aggregations of power to counter external threats. They are the beams and joists of modern international relations.

Security Binding

Alliances are formed not just between like-minded states that fear an outside threat. They are also mechanisms for overcoming insecurity and potential strategic rivalry between states within the alliance. By binding potentially threatening states together, the insecurity and security dilemmas that would otherwise led the states toward conflict is reduced. This insight about alliances has been explored by Paul Schroeder. Schroeder argues that the alliance that formed the Concert of Europe was an early manifestation of this binding logic. In this and other subsequent cases, alliances were created as *pacta de controhendo* pacts of restraint.¹⁰ They have served as mechanisms for states to manage and restrain their partners within the alliance. “Frequently the desire to exercise such control over an ally’s policy,” Schroeder argues, “was the main reason that one power, or both, entered into an alliance.”¹¹ Alliances create binding treaties that allow states to keep a hand in the security policy of their partners.

Of course, alliances can vary in the degree to which they entail binding relations. The post-1815 congress system loosely bound the European great powers to periodic consultations and a continuation of the anti-Napoleonic alliance. The 1949 security pact between the United States and Western Europe was a much more binding institutions, particularly after it developed intergovernmental planning mechanisms, a multinational force, and an integrated military command. The range of obligations are more extensive, and the institutional mechanisms that ensure ongoing commitments are greater within the NATO alliance than in other security pacts.

It is useful to think of security binding manifest in NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance as a security practice. When a state confronts a potential adversary it has three major options. One option is to hide. This entails trying to remove yourself from the threat. This essentially is a strategy of isolationism. A second strategy is to

balance against the potential threat. This is the dominant strategy that states have employed over the centuries. In Europe, hiding is not really an option and balancing has been the essential strategy available in the European great power era. It is what France sought to do in the aftermath of its three modern wars with Germany. The third strategy is binding. The states connect themselves to each other in ways that reduce uncertainties and create reassurance. Institutionalized security ties raise the “cost of exit” and create “voice opportunities,” thereby providing mechanisms to mitigate or resolve conflict.¹²⁾

Strategic Restraint

Security binding takes on an added importance when massive power disparities also divide the states as they do between the United States and its European and Asian partners. A states in a commanding global position as the United States was after World War II and is again today face a choice: it can use its power to bargain and coerce other states in struggles over the distribution of gains, or knowing that this is a costly way to manage a hegemonic order, it can move to a more institutionalized order in exchange for the acquiescence and compliant participation of weaker states. It agrees to tie itself down to some extent. It agrees to exercise its power which remains dominant in ways that are mutually agreeable to other states. Limits are set on what a state within the order can do with its power advantages. The implications of being “number one” are circumscribed. Weaker states realize that the implications of their inferior position are limited and perhaps temporary to operate within the order despite their disadvantages is not to risk everything nor will it give the dominant state a permanent advantage. Both powerful and weak states agree to operate within the same order despite radical asymmetries in the distribution of power.¹³⁾

Arguably this institutional bargain has been at the heart of the postwar Western order and the security alliances lie at the heart of this heart. After World War II, the United States launched history’s most ambitious era of institution building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT, NATO, and other institutions that emerged provided the most rule-based structure for political and economic relations in world history. The United States was deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other states or allow its political and economic policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet threat during the Cold War was critical in overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built that both made American power more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and restrained. As a former State Department official who is now Special Trade

Representative described the operation of this postwar bargain: “The more powerful participants in the system especially the United States did not foreswear all their advantages, but neither did they exercise their strength without substantial restraint. Because the United States believed the Trilateral system was in its interests, it sacrificed some degree of national autonomy to promote it.”¹⁴⁾

This bargain was also on display at the end of the Cold War as West and East Germany moved toward unification. Chancellor Kohl was eager to move forward with unification but other leaders were worried because a united Germany would become the most powerful country in Europe. The prospect of a powerful Germany unsettled not only Gorbachev but also the British and French leaders. The broad thrust of Kohl’s policy was to reassure Germany’s neighbors and this took the form of commitments to further bind itself to NATO and the EU. As Hans-Dietrich Genscher articulated the basic German view in January 1990: “We want to place the process of German unification in the context of EC integration, of the CSCE process, the West-East partnership for stability, the construction of a common European house and the creation of a peaceful European order from the Atlantic to the Urals.”¹⁵⁾ In effect, German unification would be rendered acceptable to its neighbors by the same means that a revived West Germany was rendered acceptable after World War II: Germany would be embedded in wider Euro-Atlantic institutions. The NATO alliance and European economic integration would bind Germany to Europe, and the United States would ensure agreement by adding its own security commitment.¹⁶⁾ In a less explicit way, the same logic applies to the way American power has been made acceptable to Europe and Asia. The power doesn’t disappear but it is made more acceptable through institutional binding.

The United States has never foresworn the right to use force unilaterally. But it has agreed to link its forces with Europe in a way that creates both security commitments and a political process that promotes consultations and joint decision making. In the post-September 11th world, the Bush administration has been ambivalent -- at best -- about working with NATO partners. But in seeking partners in its war on terror, the United States will eventually need to rediscover that the alliances and strategic partnerships that have been built over the decades still exist and are useful. Secretary of State Powell remarked after NATO voted its support of the American campaign that fifty years of steady investment in the alliance has paid off.¹⁷⁾ When the United States ties itself to a wider grouping of states it is more effective. But to do so requires some compromise of national

autonomy. It must both restrain and commit its power. The logic of this grand strategy is captured by Robert Jervis: “Binding itself to act multilaterally by forgoing the capability to use large-scale force on its own would then provide a safeguard against the excessive use of American power. This might benefit all concerned: the United States would not be able to act on its own worst impulses; others would share the costs of interventions and would also be less fearful of the United States and so, perhaps, more prone to cooperate with it.”¹⁸) The struggle between unilateral and multilateral grand strategies today is a debate over the costs and benefits of binding American power to wider alliance and global groupings. The United States may give up some discretion but gains partners.

A variation on this argument was offered by Wesley Clark (former SACEUR) in an insight about alliances. Clark argues that “war by committee” (as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld dismissively labels it) binds all members of the coalition to the cause. In effect, they are answerable for the success or failure of the operation and so they push harder than they would if the United States was acting unilaterally. Thus, Clark argues that NATO won in Kosovo because ultimately the leaders of France, Germany and Britain could not afford to lose. The contrast with the war on terror is stark. With little vested in the fight, France and Germany have little incentive to push as hard as they would if they were fighting for their own political survival.¹⁹) The lesson here is that even if coalitions slow the United States down they bind in allies to American goals by ensuring they have a political stake in the outcome.

Voice Opportunities

The open character of the American system and alliance ties work to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called “voice opportunities” it offers opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington’s power is exercised. Foreign governments may not have elected officials in Washington but they do have representatives. Looked at from the perspective of the stable functioning of America’s hegemonic order, this is one of the most functional aspects of the United States as a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, the United States draws them into active, ongoing partnerships that serve its long-term strategic interests.

This interactive character of the unipolar order was evident in the post-September 11th actions of America's allies. European and other world leaders trooped into Washington in the weeks following the terrorist attacks. Each offered its support but also weighed in on how best to wage the coming campaign. Prime Minister Tony Blair is the best example of this strategy of engaging America. The British leader tied himself to the American anti-terrorist plan, but in doing so he has made it an Anglo-American and even alliance-based campaign. By binding itself to the superpower, Britain gained a stake in the struggle but also it hopes a voice in the policy.

NATO and the US-East Asian alliances are institutionalized mechanisms that allow Europe and Japan and South Korea to speak to the United States. The United States does not always listen but a political process is created that allows intergovernmental pulling and hauling. The United States opens itself up to these countries and these countries are given incentives to engage the superpower rather than distance themselves from it or balance against it. There is some evidence that the voice opportunities provided by alliance ties provided Europe and Japan a mechanism to address their dissatisfactions with the Bush administration's National Missile Defense initiative. Republicans modified plans for NMD following consultations they dropped the "national concept" so the United States would not be decoupled from its allies. Similarly, allies have undoubtedly modified policy on Iraq.

In the past year, both Japan and European alliance partners have sought to make the alliance partnerships relevant to American's new preoccupation with terrorism and rogue states. NATO's decision to build a Rapid Reaction force can be seen as an attempt to keep NATO connected to American military establishments its plans and capacities. As the Washington Post reported in November: "Leaders also endorsed a new division of labor, with individual members committing themselves to focus on and improve capabilities in one or more of eight specific areas: chemicals; radiological and nuclear defense; intelligence; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions; long-range transport of troops and equipment by air and sea; aerial refueling; and deployable combat support units. For example, the Germans have agreed to lead a group of countries that will lease, and ultimately purchase, transport aircraft. Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are part of that group, plan to contribute Russian-made Antonov planes they will get as part of a write-off of unpaid Russian

debt. Norway and Denmark volunteered to lead a consortium to develop a NATO sealift capability, and Spain is leading a group specializing in aerial refueling.”²⁰) NATO alliances are looking for ways to keep the United States connected to the alliance, which entails trying to make the alliance useful to Washington. The same is happening in Japan. One Japanese diplomat recently indicated that the focus in government circles is to try to raise the “market value” of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the eyes of Washington.²¹) In doing so, both the Europeans and the Japanese are trying to keep the alliance mechanisms alive that provide access to and partnership with the United States.

Geopolitical Presence

NATO and the U.S.-East Asian alliances make the United States a European and Asian power. In the absence of these security pacts and the forward based presence that they entail the United States would have less influence in each region. This in turn allows the United States to play a diplomatic role in solving or preventing regional conflicts. It also allows the United States to reduce the incentives that might otherwise arise for the great powers in these two regions to move forward with regional security arrangements that would close the regions to American military deployments. These considerations are the geopolitical implications of alliances.

There are two aspects to the geopolitics of alliances. One is simply are political access and influence. When the United States plays a direct and overwhelming role in the security of European and East Asian countries, its views matter in what the governments in these countries do. This influence can be manifest even if the United States does not play the “security protection card” that is, threatens to withdraw forces and protection if the partner country does not bend to Washington’s desires. The influence can be more indirect. Japan thinks twice in making foreignpolicy decisions about how those policies will accord with overall Japanese-American relations. In real ways, Japanese foreign and security policy runs through Washington. If the United States takes advantage of its superordinate position and exploits its role as security guarantor for Japan it will eventually pay a price. The United States also plays a superordinate security role in Europe although the asymmetries are less stark. This alliance tie gives the United States a voice in the evolution of the European Union. America’s role in NATO expansion interacts with the EU’s agenda of expansion. The close ties the United States has with Eastern European countries

forged through NATO expansion makes the EU as it expands eastward more American friendly. Again, the United States must not exploit its singular role as security provider of last resort. But when conducted with tact and sensitivity, American influence can be considerable.

The other geopolitical implication of the NATO and East Asian alliances is that they forestall regional conflicts and alternative regional orders from emerging. In this sense, the alliances are corks in the dam. The presence of an American security commitment to Japan and Western Europe with forward deployed military capacities prevents the emergence of security dilemmas in the two regions. In Europe, the American presence has played an important role in the postwar reintegration of Germany. The willingness of France and Great Britain to see a reconstructed and reunified Europe hinged quite explicitly on America's continuing role as anchor of the Atlantic alliance. At the moment of Germany's unification even Soviet President Gorbachev agreed that he would rather see a united Germany inside NATO than a united Germany situated outside regional institutional frameworks. Today, of course, the United States military presence in Europe plays a reduced role as the continent's pacifier. But the continued presence does matter still in provides assurances that allow European integration to proceed in an Atlantic-friendly direction.

In East Asia, the American presence has a more direct and immediate role in forestalling security dilemma-driven conflict. Few people doubt that if the United States pulled its troops out of South Korea and Japan that dangerous security competition would follow. If the United States left Korea, for example, it would raise questions about America's commitment to Japan which might in turn prompt Japan to engage in an arms build up and possibly acquire nuclear weapons. China would be threatened and the region would likely spiral into an arms race.²²) For these reasons there has been some reason to believe that Beijing actually favored a stable U.S.-Japanese alliance to the extent it kept Japan from becoming a free standing regional military power and triggering security conflict.

Open Markets and Security Externalities

One of the striking developments in world order over the last fifty years is the rise of a truly open global economy. This was not an automatic or inevitable outcome. The roots of it reside in the 1940s as the United States -- along with Great Britain

and a few other countries -- made choices about the organization of markets and proceeded to put their power at the service of these goals. It is indeed difficult to imagine the rise of an open world economy without the parallel construction of a linked global security system. The pieces fit together: the United States provided security protection for European and East Asia states and underneath this security umbrella governments were encouraged to lower tariffs and pursue trade oriented economic development strategies.²³⁾

There are several aspects to this linkage between security and open markets. First, the ability of the United States to build postwar order around binding security ties anchored in the occupation and reintegration of Japan and West Germany created an unprecedented "great power peace" among the major non-communist great powers. These countries were tied together in a way that made a return to the balance of power and great power rivalry among them impossible. As a result, markets could develop. Governments did not need to pursue competitive "relative gains" economic policies toward each other. The long-term interest that each of these parts of the American System had in free trade and open markets could be pursued without security risks. Even today, it is probably true that an open multilateral economic order still hinges on the indivisibility of security between Europe, the United States and Japan. If these three parts of the advanced industrial world broke into competitive security spheres, economic openness and the joint gains this entails would be put in jeopardy. If the alliances disappeared it is not inevitable that this world would break into regional blocks but a dramatic fragmentation in the security structure would bias politics and economic policies in that direction.

The second way that the American security umbrella mattered is in East Asia. It is difficult to imagine that the East Asian tigers South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and others would have been able to pursue an export oriented development path without close security ties to the United States. Because these countries were allies, the United States was able to see the economic success of these countries as a security asset to America. The long-term balance of payments deficits that the United States ran as a result of this and other trade relationships was tolerable because economic growth and integration in this part of the world was linked to America's larger alliance-security system.

The classic discussion of trade and peace starts with the liberal premise that free trade and open markets have a pacifying effect on states. The argument made here

turns this logic around. It is the security structure that provides political supports and reinforcements for the open world economy. When Washington makes decisions on its alliance relationships it is important that it also factor in the implications that follow for the organization of the world economy.

ALLIANCES IN DECLINE?

A series of developments in recent years has put pressure on the rationale and political support for America's far-flung alliance system. The more alliances are understood in simply, instrumental terms as joint forces aimed at deterring specific threats the more vulnerable these alliances are.

End of the Cold War

The American security commitment to Western Europe and East Asia would not have arisen without the onset of the Cold War. After World War II, the United States government was reluctant to make formal security guarantees to countries in either region. In each instance, the United States signed alliance pacts and stationed troops in front line states so as to gain cooperation by these countries in the struggle against communism. In effect, American security commitments were a bargaining chip that the United States played in constructing its global Cold War coalition. In Europe, the United States signed the 1949 Atlantic security pact as part of a more general effort to stabilize and unify Western European countries and integrate them into an anti-communist bloc. In Japan, the security commitment -- which took shape after the Korean war -- was part of a wider regional strategy aimed at reassurance and defense against communist advances in China. Alliance security guarantees were sold to the American public on the basis of Cold War threats.

The sudden end of the Cold War in 1989-91 removed this core underpinning for America's global alliance system. American presidents and European and Asian leaders who sought to preserve Cold War security ties were forced to reinvent alliance rationales. In Western Europe, the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany were directly tied to a redefinition of NATO. It was now characterized by its members as a political alliance aimed at ensuring stability in the region. The first Bush and Clinton administrations emphasized the Atlantic order's historic significance

and America's shared values and interests with Europe. In East Asia, the existential debate about the future of America's security ties culminated in the Nye Report which likewise emphasized the importance of the bilateral alliances for regional stability. Its famous phrase that "security is like oxygen" sums up the rationale that was advanced.²⁴) The report made the case that the U.S.-Japan alliance and the engagement of China remain in the long-run interest of the United States America's security presence had direct and indirect impacts on the stability of the region and the ability of the United States to achieve its interests.

The end of the Cold War did not end all the threats that are still felt in Europe and Asia. This is particularly the case in East Asia where the Cold War has really not fully ended. North Korea, China, and the standoff over Taiwan continue to pose security challenges to America and its Cold War allies. But the end of the Cold War did lead to a redefinition of the American alliance system away from the defense against threats to the maintenance of regional and global stability. The decline in the presence of an obvious and overwhelming security threat in Europe and Asia has weakened the rationale for the alliances but the end of the Cold War itself does not appear to be a sufficient development to imperial the alliance system.

The Rise of American Unipolar Power

The most dramatic development of the late-1990s is the rise of American unipolar power. The disparities of power particularly military power between the United States and other states are unprecedented. Such power advantages to not dictate a particular American policy orientation but they do make it easier for the United States to act unilaterally and resist cooperation. This is the view articulated by Max Boot: "Any nation with so much power always will be tempted to go it alone. Power breeds unilateralism. It is as simple as that."²⁵) The United States has become so powerful that it does not need to sacrifice its autonomy or freedom of action within multilateral agreements and alliance partnerships. Unipolar power gives the United States the ability to act alone and do so without serious costs.

Unipolarity creates opportunities for the United States to resist alliance cooperation even if the incentives to do so or not do so are more complex. But the underlying assumption made by those who expect the United States to draw back from its alliance commitments is this: states want to be as free as possible from international commitments and obligations as possible. They would prefer not to be tied down.

The rising power position of the United States makes it easier to act on this deep impulse. Put another way, power disparities make it easier for the United States to walk away from international agreements which inevitably entail some limitation or constraint on America's freedom of action. Across the spectrum of economic, security, environmental and other policy issues, the sheer size and power advantages of the United States makes it easier to resist such entanglements. That is, the costs of non-agreement are lower for the United States than for other states which gives it bargaining advantages if it wants them but also a greater ability to live without agreements without suffering consequences.²⁶⁾

Unipolar power has a second impact on alliance cooperation. Shifting power differentials creates new divergent interests between the United States and its security partners. In the security realm, the United States has global interests and security threats that no other state has. Its troops are more likely to be dispatched to distant battlefields than those of other major states which means that it is more likely to be exposed to the legal liabilities of the International Crime Court than others. Washington has almost stood alone in resisting the Land Mines treaty because it uniquely has to worry about North Korean forces arrayed along the DMZ where landmines are a critical component of deterrence. Together, the United States must worry about threats to its interests in all the major regions of the world. American unipolar power makes it a unique target for terrorism. It is not surprising that Europeans and Asians make different threat assessments about terrorism and rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction than American officials. If alliance commitment hinges fundamentally on a common assessment of threats, the rise of unipolarity will have a corrosive effect on America's security partnerships.

Transformations in Military Technology and Force Projection

The United States has jumped ahead of the rest of the major military powers in its pursuit of advanced weapons and logistics. This has resulted in a long-term massive American commitment to military innovation. In recent years, the United States has accounted for 80 percent of world expenditures on military R and D. These technological advantages -- coupled with the more general disparities in military capabilities -- have had a double-edged negative impact on alliance cooperation. First, the United States is increasingly able to use force on its own without the help of allies. It can project power and move forces over great distances as a free-standing

superpower. Tight alliance cooperation is less important than in earlier decades when combined forces were essential for confronting conditional threats. The changing threat environment discussed below exacerbates this problem.

Second, the growing gaps in military capabilities create problems in integrating and coordinating joint allied forces. Other countries are not as technologically sophisticated and this poses difficulties in training and operating together. NATO is built on the vision of not just an integrated command but also interlocking national force structures. As the United States continues to leap technologically out ahead of its allies, it will be increasingly difficult to realize this vision. Operationally, the revolution in military affairs harms alliance partnerships.

Rise of Terrorism and WMD

The alliance system was built in an era when the major threats to the advanced democracies were conventional and nuclear attacks by communist states. Stalin and the Red Army and later the Cold War-era Soviet military juggernaut were the focus of danger for the United States and its allies. This threat created incentives for close alliance cooperation. The major challenge was to establish an effective deterrent to Soviet power. The threat was known, it had a fixed location, and allies could readily agree on how to array power to defend the "free world". Conventional deterrence required the aggregation and deployment of conventional military forces along the long expanse of the West European and East Asian divide. Nuclear deterrence required dispersed and credible retaliatory nuclear forces. There were controversies at various moments about what constituted sufficient conventional and nuclear deterrent force but the central threat and objective of alliance cooperation was not in doubt.

Conventional or nuclear attacks from enemy great powers are no longer the central security challenge for the United States or its allies. Today the threat is small groups of terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction, perhaps with ties to rogue states. This fundamentally changes the security environment and plays havoc with security partnerships. To start, the threat is more elusive and uncertain which makes it more difficult for allies to agree on how to assess the threat or respond to it. We do not know what the capabilities, targets and strategies are of shadow terrorist groups. Was September 11th just the beginning of a relentless terrorist assault on the United States and the West or a lucky shot that will not occur again in a generation?

Because the nature of the threat is so uncertain, the assessment of threat easily divides allies. Our imaginations can turn it into something dire and immediate that requires extraordinary actions today. Or our imaginations can turn it into something remote and fleeting that allows us to return to business as usual. This is a type of threat that not only does not create automatic unity of agreement among allies; quite the opposite, it is a threat that can fuel disunity because it can easily be manipulated by elites to suit their own agendas.

Second, the terrorist threat is also likely to be more fully targeted at the United States than Europe or Asia. This is not known for sure but the United States is uniquely visible as a target for Islamic terrorism. Europe which has a different set of geographic and political relations with the Arab and Islamic world experiences the rise of global terrorism differently. It is filtered through a different set of social and political institutions. The United States is at war with terrorism but Europe is not. These divergences on threats make alliance cooperation -- as the 2003 war in Iraq revealed -- more difficult. The targets of terrorism are easily disaggregated. The West itself is not at risk -- as it was during the Cold War -- but it is now New York and Washington. So terrorism is a subjectively defined threat that is differentially experienced across the Western world. Alliance cooperation suffers.

Third, during the Cold War, Western Europe and East Asia were more directly imperiled by the Soviet Union (and China and North Korea) than the United States and, as a result, the United States saw its security tied to the security of its alliance partners. Cooperative security ties with European and Asian partners were desirable because it demonstrated to the American public that its allies were sharing the burden of providing security. The attack on September 11th, 2001, changed this dynamic. Now it was America itself that was imperiled not the allies. Now the Bush administration needed to show the American public that it could act to defend the homeland. During the Cold War cooperative security made good domestic politics. Seen by the Bush administration, in the age of terrorism where the Washington is more threatened than Paris or Berlin, multilateral security cooperation is a luxury at best and perhaps even a dangerous entanglement.

Emerging Regional Identities and Capabilities

Another development that undercuts alliance cooperation is the rise of independent

Asian and European political spheres. To be sure, neither region has articulated a vision of full strategic autonomy from the United States. But long-term shifts in the political identities and military capabilities of these regions can diminish the importance of the American security guarantee and alliance ties. Europe is the most advanced in this regard. The recent war in Iraq exposed an emerging dynamic: France and Germany actively resisted America's effort to organize a United Nations' backed intervention in Iraq and France used the crisis as an opportunity to articulate a European-wide alternative to American leadership. It remains uncertain and perhaps doubtful that the French strategy of building European unity around opposition to American hegemony will succeed. Indeed, such a strategy appears to divide Europe more than it threatens Atlantic relations. But the longer-term development of the European Union will certainly continue to generate debate over the virtues of greater security autonomy. In East Asia, this development is less advanced and there are more intractable geopolitical obstacles that prevent the rise of a regional alternative to the American security umbrella.

Another dynamic at work that threatens the American-centered alliance system is growing and sustained anti-Americanism in both regions. Part of this anti-Americanism is actually anti-Bush administration and it could less pass away as the Bush administration alters its policies or losses the next election. But the domestic politics within South Korea, Japan, and Western Europe has taken a turn in the last few years particularly in the months preceding the American invasion of Iraq. The American base system for forward deployment of forces and the wider alliance system depend on stable relations with host countries. The rise of anti-Americanism puts the future of these bases in play. The United States may also preempt these anti-American-driven problems and move to redeploy its forces. The Bush administration has signaled its willingness to move American soldiers in South Korea to more southern positions within the country and actually move some of these forces off the peninsula. In Western Europe, the United States has also announced its intention to thin its forces in Germany and move bases into the new NATO countries in East Europe.²⁷⁾ The interaction between rising public resentment of American forces in South Korea, Japan, and Western Europe and the Bush administration's desire to thin out its troop presence in these areas and deploy them in the fight against terrorism might lead to the gradual attenuation of security cooperation.

New Strategic Ideas in Washington

These developments end of the Cold War, unipolarity, technological disparities, and regional might not in themselves doom the American alliance system. But the Bush administration's own set of ideas about national security and the war on terrorism give them greater effect. In the aftermath of September 11th, the Bush administration has unveiled a dramatic shift in American national security thinking that emphasizes the unilateral and preemptive use of force in confronting terrorism and hostile states.²⁸⁾

For the Bush administration, the threat of catastrophic terrorism has far reaching implications. To begin, deterrence doesn't work against this threat. Shadowy networks of terrorists are either willing to die for their cause or they cause escape retaliation because they have no home address. You must go on the offensive. The terrorists must be killed before they kill. Despotic states must be disarmed or overturned before they pass their destructive technologies over to terrorist groups. In turn, this shift in strategy has implications for traditional international legal norms about self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations charter. In a world where "you don't know what you don't know" and "kill before you are killed" are at the core of the security strategy of the world's most powerful state, the old international rules and norms are thrown into dispute.

The Bush administration's recasting of security challenges has far reaching implications. One result is the rise of a provocative new doctrine about how to deal with despotic or failed states that are anti-Western or hostile to the United States. In effect, the presence of these states themselves is a latent national security threat. Containment and counter-balance are not enough to protect the outside world from their dangerous states. Despotic states whose dictatorial rule is based on hostility with the United States -- particularly those capable of acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- are inherently unacceptable. They have got to go. Importantly, an American grand strategy built on this view turns the United States from a status quo hegemonic state into a revisionist power. The United States no longer is simply trying to uphold the rules of the international system. Now it is bent on regime change and political transformation around the world.

An aspect of this new grand strategy is a general depreciation of international rules, treaties, and security partnerships. One reason for this relates to the new threats

themselves: if the stakes are rising and the margins of error are shrinking in the war on terrorism, multilateral norms and agreements sanctioning and limiting the use of force are just annoying distractions. The critical task is to eliminate the threat. But the emerging unilateral strategy is also informed by a deeper suspicion expressed by some influential voices inside and outside the Bush administration about the suspect value of international agreements themselves. Part of this view is a deeply felt and authentically American belief that the United States should not get entangled in the corrupting and constraining world of multilateral rules and institutions. American sovereignty is politically sacred. For some Americans this leads to a preference for isolationism. But the more influential view -- particularly after September 11th is not that the United States should withdraw from the world but that it should operate in the world on its own terms.

The new Bush grand strategy argues that the United States will need to play a direct and unconstrained role in responding to threats. This conviction is partially based on a judgement that no other country most regrettably even Western Europe has the force projection capabilities to respond to terrorist and rogue states around the world. A decade of military spending and modernization has left even American allies far behind in terms of military capabilities. At the level of combat operations, the alliance partners increasingly are not interoperable. But it is also a conviction based on the judgement that joint operations and the use of force through coalitions of allied states tends to hinder effective operations. To some observers this is the lesson of the allied bombing campaign over Kosovo. This sentiment was also expressed in the run up to American military actions in Afghanistan.

No one argues that NATO and the US-East Asian alliances should be dismantled. It is simply that these alliances are less useful in the way the United States sees how tomorrow's military capabilities must be configured to address the new threats. Some officials would argue that it is not America's decision to depreciate alliance partnerships it is the unwillingness of the Europeans to keep up. In any event, the upgrading of the American military and its sheer size relative to the rest of the world's military assets leaves the United States in a class by itself. In these circumstances it is increasingly difficult to maintain the illusion of co-equal partners. Political partnerships become simply allies who are more or less useful depending on the circumstance. The United States still finds attractive the logistical reach that its global alliance system provides, but the relationships with Asia and Europe become more utilitarian and less premised on a vision of a common security community.

CONCLUSION

If American policy makers see their postwar alliance system in simple instrumental terms the alliance system is in trouble. But if it is viewed in its more expansive role as a vital part of a larger American-centered international order the alliance system will last. In both Europe and Asia, the alternatives to the American security umbrella are either not desirable or attainable. The demand for the alliance system in both regions remains. The future of the alliances will hinge on how the United States itself defines their role and operates within its own unipolar order. The forces that are weakening the postwar security system are powerful but the incentives to hold onto that system are also very real.

The American alliance system is not simply or even primarily about aggregating power to confront external threats. The postwar security pacts with Europe and East Asia have a lot to do with the preservation and extension of American power as well as the creation and maintenance of a stable and legitimate international order. The alliance system as well as America's wider support for multilateral institutions and a rule-based international order is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states thereby encouraging their acquiescence and cooperation. This is a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the 20th century.

This basic order building strategy is straightforward. Multilateralism becomes a mechanism by which the dominant state and smaller and weaker states can reach a bargain over the character of international order. The dominant state reduces its "enforcement costs" and succeeds in establishing an order where weaker and smaller states participate willingly rather than resist or balance against the leading power. It accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power. The rules and institutions and alliances that are created serve as a sort of "investment" in the longer-run preservation of the leading state's power position. Weaker and smaller states agree to the order's rules and institutions and in return they are assured that the worst excesses of the leading state manifest as arbitrary and indiscriminate abuses of American state power will be avoided, and they gain institutional opportunities to work with and help influence the leading state. If this argument is correct, the rise of American unipolarity should make alliance pacts more rather than less desirable for the United States.

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- 11) Schroeder, "Alliances: 1815-1945," p. 230.
- 12) These terms are from Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- 13) This logic is presented in Ikenberry, *After Victory*, Chapter Three.
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- Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 120.
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Globalization of North Korean Problem and Japan's Regional Policy

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Globalization of the North Korean Problem

North Korea's foreign policy goal has always been local. It can be viewed that the North Korean development of weapons of mass-destruction has its direct motivation in its regime's survival. As a result of its resounding defeat by South Korea for mainly economic supremacy, North Korea began developing nuclear weapons and missiles simply to ensure its regime's survival. The general characteristic of the weapons has made the North Korean problem globalized.

However, what has made the North Korean problem more global was the 9.11 terror that hit the heart of the United States in 2001. That is because the 9.11 terror has redefined the North Korean problem from the world history viewpoint. In particular, after the "axis of evil" speech on January 2002, the United States began to look on North Korea as a "Far East version" of Iraq.

Like in many other areas, the term "globalization" is synonymous with "Americanization." In other words, Washington's domestic politics, including its policy-making process and its presidential elections, have become the greatest variables in world affairs, although this does not necessarily mean that Pyongyang's domestic politics, North Korea's economic situation, inter-Korean relations, and North Korea's relations with Japan, China and Russia are unimportant in dealing with the North Korean problem. This has been the second trend since the Korean War.

The multilateral talks to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem that is, the three-party talks held at the end of April involving the US, North Korea and China; and the six-party talks that additionally included Japan, South Korea and Russia, that were held in Beijing were primarily intended to maintain the "unstable balance" that exists between North Korea's brinkmanship policy and the US's warnings of

economic sanctions, and to even for a limited extent, institutionalize it through information sharing and ensuring transparency among multi-parties involved. However, if these three-party and six-party talks prove to be ineffective, we may see steps being taken that will draw us dangerously close to escalating military tensions. If that becomes the case, the multi-lateral talks may mean to prepare for a basis for a joint coping of the new situation among the five parties involved, excluding North Korea.

In the context of Washington's bureaucratic and domestic politics, it has to be viewed the multilateral talks as the product of a compromise between US hardliners and soft-liners. The hardliners agreed to have the talks only to satisfy the need to avoid two-front strategy until they first cope with the Iraqi situation. Interestingly, the confusion over the Iraqi occupation has reduced the possibility of military action against North Korea, and has given soft-liners such as Secretary of State, Powell, the longer "opportunity of diplomacy."

Complicated Connection with the Iraqi War

North Korea has learnt several lessons from the Iraqi War. Among them, what are most important include: first, without the US ground force's invasion of Baghdad, it was impossible to topple the Hussein regime; and second, the US would not have been able to invade Baghdad if Iraq had possessed nuclear missiles that could reach Israel; and the third would be the danger of accepting international inspection. Thus, North Korea's possibility of accepting demands other than IAEA monitoring seems quite low until the United States abandons its "antagonistic policy" toward North Korea, or in other words, until the political relations between the US and North Korea improve.

Thus, if North Korea already has the technological capability of miniaturizing nuclear weapons so that they can be set atop guided missiles, or if it acquires this capability in the near future, further negotiations with North Korea will probably be impossible. However, if there requires several more years until it obtains such technological capability, it is not necessarily impossible to negotiate with North Korea through the combination of carrots and sticks. Although I am in no position to state with any certainty, I believe that it is unlikely that North Korea has the technology it requires, taking into consideration the fact that why it has newly launched its uranium

enrichment plan, that it continues to stick to direct negotiations with the US, and that it continues to demand parallel progress with a package deal.

Nevertheless, even in that case, negotiation with North Korea is not easy. That is because the lengthening of occupation of Iraq and the scheduled Presidential election in the US has given the North Korean leader psychological relief. Inducing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program will require a skillful blend of dialogue, together with concerted pressure applied by the surrounding countries that are committed to working in unison. There require a tentative or at least initial agreement indicating that the biggest goal for now is that North Korea refreezes nuclear development, and not to allow further production of plutonium.

So far, the Bush Administration appears to have no detailed policies other than to issue “threats” . If North Korea had been threatened and gave in by looking at the preemptive strike in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush Administration would have had achieved a brilliant diplomatic achievement. However, if that is not the case, the non-existence of US policy only allowed North Korea the liberty of nuclear development. There is no doubt that the accumulation of plutonium, which had been frozen during the Clinton Administration, will reach a level of danger not in the long distant future.

Three Scenarios

Before the second six-party talks are held, we have three possible scenarios. In the first scenario, there will be slow progress towards a tentative or initial agreement, which will be drawn up in time for the US presidential election. Reiterating what President Bush said at the October APEC Summit: if a joint document can be obtained that dismantle North Korea’s nuclear development program and addresses “the security concerns of North Korea within the context of the six party talks,” negotiations with North Korea will become easier. Not only that, if the principle of a package deal and parallel action can be included in the statement, if partially, it is possible that North Korea will respond more flexibly than we think.

In the second scenario, the second six-party talks will accentuate great differences of position between the US and North Korea, making it far more difficult to resolve the problem through negotiation. At worst, this could lead to the cancellation of the third

round of the six party talks, resulting in the issue of the North Korean nuclear program being brought before the UN Security Council. If this is the case, North Korea will have to give up negotiations with the Bush Administration, start another brinkmanship policy including the experiment of A-bomb and hope that the Democratic Party candidate wins the Presidential election.

In the third and final scenario, which falls somewhere between the first and second scenarios, the US and North Korea will make a very half-hearted attempt to negotiate, leaving the six-party talks in a state of limbo. In this case, the situation will remain deadlocked until after the US presidential election. Although it is possible that there will be sporadic North Korean provocation or a US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), North Korea will undoubtedly continue its nuclear development during this period.

Japan's Regional Diplomacy

Japan's North Korean policy has been a pendulum swinging between two nightmares. The first nightmare involves the US taking military action against North Korea to stop its nuclear development. This is a very real fear, given that had Washington rendered pinpoint strikes on the Yongbyon nuclear facility in 1994, the world would have seen a second Korean War. The second nightmare involves the opposite scenario, in which Washington suddenly goes over Japan's head and improves its relations with Pyongyang, in much the same way as occurred with China after President Nixon's visit there in 1972. This nightmare appeared to be coming true in October 2000, four months after the South-North Korean Summit when Secretary of State Albright visited Pyongyang, giving rise to Japanese concerns that President Clinton himself would stage a successful visit to Pyongyang.

Needless to say, it was the first nightmare scenario that threatened Japan before the Japan-North Korea summit meeting of September 2002. With Iraq set as the US's first target for attack, many saw North Korea as its inevitable second, and having North Korea as a second Iraq meant a national security crisis for Japan itself. Unlike the time in 1994, North Korea has now dispatched about 200 Rodong missiles. Japan's position may be similar to that of Israel during the Gulf War.

Prime Minister Koizumi's Pyongyang visit had an aspect of conflict prevention

diplomacy, in addition to the aspect of normalization of bilateral relations and the hampering of nuclear development. As it was a regional initiative to avoid military conflict, surprisingly, the visit appeared to be of common benefit to both Tokyo and Pyongyang. However, the initiative collapsed when North Korea dropped two bombshells: one announcing the deaths of the eight abductees; and the other revealing the North's uranium enrichment program. Since then, Japan's choice of actions has again been restrained.

The Six-Party talks held in Beijing represent a combination of the US's global initiative and China's regional initiative. If Japan's independent regional diplomacy is a failed one, it is natural that Japan actively supports the talks to stop North Korea's nuclear development. That is because the success of the talks will reactivate the suspended Japan-North Korea talks, and will make the resolution of kidnap problem possible in addition to the problem of nuclear weapons and missiles. It is imperative, therefore, that Japan has to respect the US initiative while strengthening its regional initiative through active cooperation with China, South Korean and Russia. After achieving a tentative agreement with North Korea, we should plan to hold six-party talks in Tokyo.

Korean Security and Multilateral Security Cooperation : The Case of Six Party Arrangement¹⁾

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I. Introduction

The Korean peninsula has long been considered the last relic of the Cold War era where protracted military tension has outweighed prospects for peace and stability. Defying the global trend of progress toward post-cold war order, two Koreas have been trapped in the vicious circle of suspicion, distrust, and tense confrontation, often flaring up in military clashes. Despite a major breakthrough in June 2000 in the wake of the Korean summit, practically speaking, North and South Korea are still at the state of war. Amidst improved inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, both Koreas often engage in military conflicts as demonstrated by recent naval clashes. Moreover, the current nuclear standoff with North Korea has heightened military tension on the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia.

How to overcome the current security dilemma and to open a new horizon of peace and security on the Korean peninsula? This paper aims at exploring this question by looking into the feasibility and desirability of the six party arrangement involving North and South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. The multilateral security arrangement has drawn new attention because of a recent six party talk on the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. Although its first round in Beijing in early September this year was not successful, it bears important implications and promises for multilateral security cooperation for peace building on the Korean peninsula.

The first part of this paper examines the nature of security dilemma on the Korean peninsula by elucidating outstanding security issues between North and South Korea. The second part explores ways of enhancing peace and security on the Korean peninsula by paying attention to peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building. The third part presents a historical overview of modalities of conflict resolution

pertaining to the Korean conflict ranging from two party to multi-party talks. Fourth, the paper analyses the feasibility and desirability of six party formula in light of the recent nuclear crisis and overall peace and security in Korea. Finally, the paper draws some theoretical and policy implications for the initiation and sustainability of the six party formula.

II. The Korean Security Dilemma : An Overview

South Koreans strongly believed that the North-South summit talk, the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration, and improved inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation since 2000 would bring about peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, peace was near, and war was forgotten. But they were nothing but the beginning of a long and precarious journey towards peaceful co-existence and reunification. Despite the remarkable progress, an array of old and new tough agenda awaited future inter-Korean negotiations. The most pronounced in this regard is the question of peace and security. The summit and improved inter-Korean relations notwithstanding, both Koreas have not shown any fundamental changes in their threat perception, force structure, deployment patterns, and military planning. There are some encouraging signs of tension reduction, evidenced through the ban on propaganda warfare along the DMZ, opening of two ground routes across the De-militarized Zone (DMZ) for both the reconstruction of the Seoul-Shinuiju railway system and the Mt. Kumkang tourist project, and the continuation of inter-Korean ministerial talks that serve as an important channel of communication between two Koreas.

But they still consider each other principal enemies, retaining their old strategic and tactical doctrines. North Korea maintains its offensive deployment posture along the DMZ, and is known to have engaged in several massive military maneuvers since the June summit, heightening security concerns of South Korea and the United States. South Korea has not modified its security posture either. Defense budgets have remained by and large intact, and the planned acquisition of FX, SAM-X, AWACS, Aegis, and attack helicopters is being implemented without any interruption or delay.²⁾ It is an irony to observe contradictory postures of North and South Korea in their military planning. Both emphasize and anticipate peaceful co-existence, but they are not willing to compromise their security posture, symbolizing a classical security dilemma in the transition from war to peace.

While both Koreas have been successful in expediting exchanges and cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural arenas, no progress has been made in the area of tension reduction, confidence-building measures, arms control and an inter-Korean

peace treaty. South Korea has consistently called for including tension reduction and military confidence-building measures in the agenda of inter-ministerial talks, but the North has intentionally avoided these issues. Although the second ministerial talk was able to produce a joint statement urging tension reduction and activation of inter-Korean military talks, the North has been rather reluctant to discuss these issues. The situation will be even more complicated if North and South Korea begin deliberating on arms control, limitation, and reduction. It is not easy to realign and reduce the combined forces of nearly 1.8 million soldiers and related weapons systems, since such moves can severely undercut the institutional interests of the military in both North and South Korea.³⁾

Transforming the armistice treaty into an inter-Korean peace treaty system will pose even more complex and daunting challenges. South Korea is not a legal party to the armistice treaty because of its refusal to sign it in 1953. Only North Korea, the United States, and China are de jure parties to the treaty, with the United States representing the United Nations Command.⁴⁾ Thus, dismantling the armistice treaty involves complex legal processes which would be difficult for North and South Korea to resolve through the principle of self-determination. The transformation of the inter-Korean peace treaty should be resolved in a forum other than bilateral negotiations. The Four Party Talks could be a more desirable venue in this regard through which inter-Korean peace treaty can be mediated and guaranteed by China and the United States. However, such efforts could contradict North Korea's intention to sign a bilateral peace treaty with the United States ahead of the dismantling of the armistice treaty.⁵⁾ Hence, inter-Korean peace-building is a much more complicated task than commonly thought of, and it would be difficult to envisage peace and security on the Korean peninsula without undergoing the process of tension reduction, confidence-building measures, and arms control and reduction.

Weapons of mass destruction and missiles are another important issue that can critically undermine peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. Although North Korea has shown some restraint on test-launching of long-range missiles, the issue of nuclear weapons has triggered a major security concern. During the three-party talk held in Beijing on April 23, 2003, North Korea implied that it had already possessed at least two nuclear warheads before the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. More recently, it announced the completion of the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods stored in a water pond for the manufacturing and potentially exporting of plutonium, which were previously frozen according to the Agreed Framework. Equally important is the admission of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program to a U.S. special envoy, James Kelly, during his visit to Pyongyang in

October 2002. Along with this, North Korea has been emphasizing the adoption of new nuclear deterrence doctrine in order to cope with American nuclear threats. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and its intention to use them can not only threaten peace and stability in Korea, but also jeopardize Northeast Asian security by precipitating vicious nuclear arms race in the region.⁶⁾

The Bush administration's plan to develop the Missile Defense (MD) system in East Asia can complicate the situation all the more.⁷⁾ North Korea, along with China, has made it clear that it will oppose the MD. The American MD venture could undermine previous efforts to persuade the North to suspend its missile program through the Perry process. It could also cause a new policy discord between South Korea and the United States. South Korea would not be interested in participating in the MD for several reasons: technical uncertainty of its effectiveness, high financial burden, the China factor, and the North Korean factor. The divergent views in the pursuit of the MD might become another source of tension on the Korean peninsula.

III. Three Pathways to Peace on the Korean Peninsula⁸⁾

Likewise, the Korean peninsula is still trapped in a major security dilemma. How to overcome the current security dilemma and to pave the way to a stable peace on the Korean peninsula? Three pathways to peace can be conceived of. They are peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building. South Korea has pursued a mix of strategies in forging peace on the Korean peninsula.

First is peace-keeping. Peace-making and peace-building cannot be achieved without maintaining peace. Peace-keeping is, thus, predicated on strong security posture and effective deterrence. Because weak security posture can precipitate adversary's hostile action, jeopardizing peace per se. The idea of peace-keeping is anchored in the traditional wisdom that those who wish to achieve peace must prepare for war. It is with this understanding that both the Kim Dae-jung government and the Roh Moo-hyun government have undertaken the engagement policy based on strong security posture. It might sound paradoxical. But the very paradox is the essence of the Korean conflict in which peace and war constantly overlap. North and South Korea strive toward national unification, while perceiving each other as main enemy. Such ambivalent nature of the Korean problem has led to the adoption of dualistic policy of peaceful co-existence and strong security.

The most critical aspect of peace-keeping lies in the prevention of the outbreak of war through an effective deterrence. The deterrence strategy has been pursued through two channels: military build-up on the one hand and alliance tie with the

United States on the other. Engagement policy under Kim and the peace and prosperity policy under Roh have not compromised their national defense posture in the process of enhancing exchanges and cooperation with North Korea. Despite the economic crisis since 1997, there were no sharp reductions in defense budget. At the same time, key elements of force improvement program have remained intact. Inclusion of FX, SAM-X, AWACS, AGEIS, and attack helicopter programs in the medium-term defense procurement exemplifies this position. And even after the summit talk, the South Korean government made it clear that North Korea will remain its main enemy until an inter-Korean peace treaty is materialized. The Roh government has also emphasized the importance of military self-help in coping with North Korean threats. Likewise, peace-keeping through military deterrence has been the essential feature of the South Korean government.

Another aspect of military deterrence has been the strengthening of alliance ties with the United States. Since the inauguration of the Roh Moo-hyun government in 2003, the ROK-US alliance ties have been rather weakened. Advent of extensive anti-American sentiments followed by the tragic death of two school girls, growing discord between Washington and Seoul over the North Korean nuclear problem, and Roh's occasional statements that favor a more independent line of military posture strained the bilateral alliance of fifty years. But since Roh's visit to the United States in May 2003, both countries have been able to improve bilateral ties. South Korea's dispatch of troops to Iraq to assist the United States in stabilizing post-war Iraq further strengthened the alliance. The South Korean government justifies the continuing presence of American forces on three accounts: as a credible deterrent to war on the Korean peninsula, as a balancer to stabilize regional strategic instability, and ultimately as a peace-maker or peace-insurer even after Korean unification.⁹) Thus, bilateral alliance with the United States and the continuing presence of American forces constitute another important pillar of peace-keeping through military deterrence. Although there might be some realignments such as redeployment and a partial reduction of its ground forces in South Korea, the United States is likely to strengthen its alliance ties with South Korea. Such trend needs to be further consolidated, so that North Korea would not make any political and strategic miscalculation. Indeed, the bilateral alliance is so far the most important backbone of peace-keeping on the Korean peninsula.

Second, while peace-keeping is designed to prevent the outbreak of war or to maintain the status quo through deterrence and conflict suppression, peace-making involves the process of transforming the conflict situation into a more peaceful relationship. Diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement

that arrange an end to a dispute or reduce escalation potential constitute the core elements of peace-making.¹⁰⁾

The South Korean government's peace-making efforts have involved a sequence of inter-Korean tension reduction, confidence-building measures, and arms control and reduction. As noted in the June 15 joint declaration, South Korea failed to win major concessions from the North on these issues. Only limited signs of tension reduction such as the suspension of propaganda warfare along the DMZ, removal of land mines and installation of hot line in conjunction with the reconnection of the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad, and construction of two ground routes between South and North Korea have surfaced. The first inter-Korean defense ministerial talk was held in September 2000, but it was short of producing major breakthroughs for confidence-building measures (CBMs) and arms control. And the South Korean government's belief that increased economic, social, and cultural exchanges will eventually lead to military CBMs involving notification and observation of military maneuvers, installation of hot lines, setting-up of joint crisis control center along the DMZ, and military re-deployment has not yet been materialized.

In addition, the South Korean government has been working on the replacement of the armistice agreement by a new inter-Korean peace treaty. As a matter of fact, the Roh Moo-hyun government has set the replacement as one of its principal goals in its peace and prosperity policy. But North Korea has not sent any positive responses. North Korea has held a consistent position that there is no need for such additional agreement since the Basic Agreement on Non-aggression, Reconciliation, and Exchanges and Cooperation signed in 1991 serves as an inter-Korean peace treaty. Moreover, since South Korea is not a legal party to the armistice treaty, any form of peace treaty replacing the armistice treaty should be signed between North Korea and the United States. Thus, it may not be easy for South Korea to reach a formal peace treaty with North Korea.

Unlike peace-keeping and peace-making, both of which are concerned about managing unstable peace, peace-building efforts are geared toward crafting a stable peace, which can be defined as "the absence of preparation for war or the serious expectation of war."¹¹⁾ In this sense, peace-building touches on the structural parameters of creating and sustaining a stable peace by going beyond traditional techniques of conflict suppression (deterrence) and regulation (CBMs and arms control) that are designed to manage unstable or negative peace. The South Korean government has been suggesting three distinct approaches to peace-building through which the absence of preparation for war or the serious expectation of war can be ensured.

First, the South Korean government has been making every effort to spread the free

market mechanism to North Korea. As commercial liberals argue, the deepening of a market economy and economic interdependence can reduce the likelihood of war, while enhancing chances for peace.¹²⁾ For expansion of markets create vested commercial interests across the border, which would oppose the outbreak of war that could destroy their wealth. It is out of this reasoning that the South Korean government has been trying to induce North Korea's voluntary changes in the direction of opening and reform. Given the fortified Juche ideology, transition to opening and reform might not be easy. However, an array of signs including recent economic reform measures points to the fact that North Korea is taking critical steps toward opening and reform. If South Korea's efforts succeed in inducing opening and reforms in North Korea, that will definitely contribute to building peace on the Korean peninsula.

Second, the South Korean government has been trying to satisfy conditions suggested by republican liberals.¹³⁾ According to them, a republican (democratic) polity can prevent war because it can assure openness, transparency, and domestic checks and balances in the management of foreign and defense policy. As Bruce Russett observes through extensive empirical works, democracies do not fight each other (e.g., OECD members).¹⁴⁾ Thus, enlarging democracy in North Korea becomes the essential precondition for stable peace on the Korean peninsula. Of course, inducing regime change in North Korea is not easy, and might take longer than expected. However, facilitating a transition to a market economy on the one hand, and exerting direct and indirect pressures, as well as offering chances of democratic learning on the other, would eventually increase the prospects for democratic peace in the long run.

Finally, as an extension of capitalist and democratic peace, forming a community of security could be another prerequisite for building stable peace. A market economy and a democratic polity can foster the formation of a community of security through shared norms and values, common domestic institutions, and high levels of interdependence.¹⁵⁾ However, market economy and democratic polity are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the creation of a sense of community and stable peace in Korea. North Korea should be more actively brought into world society, so that it can turn into a normal state. In this regard, the South Korean government has been actively promoting North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the outside world as well as its admission to such international organizations as the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. When and if North Korea becomes a normal state, its erratic behavior would disappear, and it would become a more constructive member of international community.

However, it must be noted that the task of building peace on the Korean peninsula

involves a long-term, rather than short-term, time framework simply because it is predicated on structural changes of North Korea. Inducing North Korea's voluntary changes into the direction of market economy, democracy, and a normal state cannot be achieved in the short run. Such structural realignments require a fundamental and even revolutionary change in North Korea's political and economic regime. In this regard, the peace-building component of the South Korea's peace initiative can be seen as involving an open-ended and long-term process rather than being designed to produce immediate policy outcomes.¹⁶⁾

IV. Modalities of Peace-making on the Korean Peninsula

Keeping, making, and building peace on the Korean peninsula cannot be achieved by South Korea alone. It requires various forms of international cooperation. While peace-keeping requires a strong bilateral alliance with the United States, peace-building through engagement and enlargement is predicated by and large on multilateral cooperation even including such international lending institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But peace-making involves the most complicated modalities of international negotiation and cooperation. Various proposals have been suggested regarding peace-making on the Korean peninsula.

Two party formula : Two-party formula refers to an arrangement of peace-keeping between two nations. South Korea favored the two party formula more than any other modalities. The logic behind its preference is that since direct parties to the Korean conflict are North and South Korea, they should first settle an inter-Korean peace treaty that can replace the armistice treaty. In that way, both Koreas can achieve peaceful co-existence on the Korean peninsula by minimizing foreign influence and interference that can complicate inter-Korean negotiation process. But North Korea has been critical of the South Korean proposal. It claims that the real source of military tension lies in the United States including its forward troop presence in South Korea. And since operational control of South Korean forces during war time is under the US Forces in South Korea, North Korea and the United States should sign a direct bilateral peace treaty. In a similar vein, North Korea has been calling for a legally binding bilateral non-aggression treaty with the United States in resolving its nuclear problem.

The divergent positions notwithstanding, North and South Korea have signed two documents pertaining to peace-making on the Korean peninsula. One is the Basic Agreement in 1991, and the other is the Declaration of De-nuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. While the former stipulates detailed agreements on non-aggression, reconciliation, and exchanges and cooperation including military CBMs, the latter offers provisions regarding non-nuclear Korean peninsula. But none of agreements embodied in these documents have been fully materialized. The Basic Agreement failed to enforce military CBMs, and the De-nuclearization has not been able to prevent the North Korea's venture into nuclear ambition, revealing the fundamental limitations of the two party talks. North Korea and the United States have also entered several bilateral agreements such as joint communique' on non-military threat in 1993, the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, and the Albright and Cho Myong-rok joint communique' on non-hostile intent, mutual respect of sovereignty, and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs in 2000. But these bilateral agreements have become either ineffectual or invalidated.

Three Party Formula : There are two versions of the three party arrangement.

One version is the Camp David (2 plus 1) model, and the other is an outright three party (i.e., North Korea, South Korea, and the United States) talk. The Camp David model refers to an inter-Korean peace treaty that is witnessed and guaranteed by the United States.¹⁷⁾ This model is favored by South Korea since the inter-Korean peace treaty can be assured by its ally, the United States. And it can not only minimize influence peddling of other regional powers, but also enhance the successful peace-keeping through the participation of de facto parties to the Korean conflict.

But North Korea has rejected the proposal on the ground that since the United States is a direct party to the Korean conflict, it cannot remain as a witness or a guarantor. Instead, North Korea used to suggest an alternative three party talk comprised of North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. that can secure a sustainable peace regime on the Korean peninsula. North Korea wants to utilize the three party talk formula as a venue to realize three goals: (1) implementation of North-South Korean non-aggression through the basic agreement; (2) signing of the DPRK-US peace treaty; (3) legally binding arrangements that can assure withdrawal of American forces from South Korea and removal of American nuclear threats. But neither South Korea nor the United States can accept this proposal because it is predicated on change of status of American forces in South Korea.¹⁸⁾

More recently, another form of three party talk involving North Korea, the U.S., and China was materialized in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. It was arranged by China to make a breakthrough to the DPRK-U.S. nuclear stand-off in April 2003. But the three party talk failed not only because of uncompromising attitude of North Korea and the U.S. over the issue of linking American security

assurance to dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs, but also because of North Korea's double play dividing China and the United States. Moreover, the China's dubious role as a mediator, not as a direct party, delimited its effectiveness. It was discarded after holding only one meeting.

Four Party Formula : The four party arrangement involves two models. One is the two plus two (North and South Korea plus the U.S. and China) formula, and the other is an outright four party (North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., and China) talk. The 2 plus 2 model presupposes an inter-Korean peace treaty replacing the armistice treaty that would be witnessed and guaranteed by the United States and China. The United States and China are qualified as third party guarantors because they are direct parties to the Korean armistice treaty. The 2 plus 2 formula seems attractive since it can bring all the de facto and de jure parties to the armistice treaty together, yet excluding Russia and Japan, so that the meeting itself can be manageable. But North Korea has rejected the idea by arguing that the Basic Agreement is sufficient to ensure inter-Korean peace and that a DPRK-US peace treaty is the most critical element in constructing any meaningful peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Thus, in the 2 plus 2 formula, the first 2 must be North Korea and the United States, not North and South Korea.

Nevertheless, North Korea accepted the South Korean proposal of the four party talk during the Kim Young-sam government. Inter-Korean relations became sour under the Kim Young-sam government because of his remarks on Kim Il-sung upon his death in 1994, accusing him of a war criminal during the Korean War as well as his refusal to allow a condolence delegation by opposition party members to attend the funeral ceremony of Kim Il-sung in North Korea. In order to overcome the inter-Korean stalemate, Kim Young-sam proposed a four party talk to Bill Clinton who visited Korea in 1995. President Clinton accepted the idea and engaged in the four party talk comprised of North and South Korea, the U.S., and China. The talk, which South Korea attempted to use as a circumventive strategy to open channels of dialogue with North Korea, was held several times, but failed to produce any meaningful confidence and peace-building measures on the Korean peninsula. The status of American forces became a major stumbling bloc to its progress, and it was eventually overshadowed by improved inter-Korean relations such as the North-South Korean summit in June 2000. While China played a rather passive role in the four party talk, Russia and Japan, who were excluded in the four party talk process, echoed strong opposition to it.¹⁹⁾

Six Party Formula : The six party talk formula can be analytically differentiated into three different types.²⁰⁾ They are the 2 plus 4, the 1 plus 5, and the six party arrangements. The 2 plus 4 formula refers to an arrangement of peace and security on the Korean peninsula in which the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and Japan mediate, endorse, and guarantee an inter-Korean peace treaty.²¹⁾ James Baker proposed the idea as early as in 1991 when he was secretary of state for the first Bush administration. In a similar vein, the Kim Dae-jung government also proposed a similar idea that involved the two stages. The first stage is to expedite the process of the four party talk in which both de jure (North Korea, the U.S., and China) and de facto (South Korea) parties participated. The second stage is to complete the process of peace regime on the Korean peninsula through the participation of Japan and Russia.²²⁾ This alternative proposal was suggested as a way of overcoming the stalled four party talk that became less effective and more time consuming, due to the legal and technical complexity of the armistice treaty. The 2 plus 4 model also contains elements of the concert of power where four major powers guarantee peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

The 2 plus 4 formula has also been applied to the case of the North Korean nuclear problem. As the United States has refused to engage in any direct bilateral dialogue and negotiation with North Korea by calling for ‘first dismantle nuclear weapons, then dialogue and negotiation,’ China and South Korea have proposed a six party talk. Their hidden intention in arranging a six party talk was to create a new opportunity for the DPRK-US bilateral talk within the framework of the six party talk. Although the United States and North Korea accepted the arrangement, and met bilaterally, its outcome was dismal, jeopardizing the very process of the six party talk formula.

As an alternative to the 2 plus 4 formula, the United States has recently suggested a counter-proposal assuring a written guarantee of non-aggression to the North through ‘a 1 plus 5’ formula.²³⁾ The proposal is based on the idea that five parties (the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea) offer a security assurance to North Korea through a memorandum provided that North Korea takes steps to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The new proposal seems similar to the Ukrainian model in which Ukraine signed a memorandum of understanding on “Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” with the U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom. According to the memorandum, the U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom assured Ukraine in return for its elimination of all nuclear weapons: (1) independence, sovereignty, and territory of Ukraine; (2) refraining from the threat or use of force against Ukraine; (3)

refraining from economic coercion on Ukraine; (4) securing the United Nation's assistance in the case of external conventional and nuclear aggression on Ukraine; (5) non-use of nuclear weapons on Ukraine. This formula is innovative in the sense that while the United States does not have to offer any 'legally binding bilateral non-aggression treaty' to the North, North Korea could achieve its goals of securing non-hostile intent, mutual respect of sovereignty, and non-interference with domestic affairs from the United States in a multilateral, but written manner.²⁴⁾

Finally, there have been several proposals relating the six party formula to the formation of multilateral security cooperation regime in Northeast Asia. In this case, the six party formula comprised of North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia could deal with overall security concerns in the region such as transparency, strategic stability, and comprehensive and cooperative security. The Korean peninsula problem can be seen as one of several regional security concerns to be dealt with in this forum. The six party forum can address other security issues such as regional confidence-building measures, arms races and arms control, territorial disputes, and weapons of mass destruction. Former president Roh Tai-woo's proposal on the creation of 'the Consultative Conference for Peace in Northeast Asia' which he made through his speech at the United Nations in October 1988 exemplifies this effort. Former Japanese prime ministers Kaifu and Obuchi also made a similar proposal on a six party talk. These proposals are by and large an attempt to apply the model of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) to the Northeast Asian region under the theme of common and cooperative security.

Apart from the above modalities of peace-making, proposals on regional multilateral security cooperation regimes involving more than six nations have been made.²⁵⁾ Han Sung-joo, former foreign minister of South Korea, once proposed a 'mini-CSCE' in the region in the form of Northeast Security Dialogue as an extension of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Joe Clark, former Canadian Prime Minister, also suggested the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue in July 1990. And the Kim Dae-jung government undertook several multilateral initiatives for shaping international and regional milieu conducive to peace-making on the Korean peninsula. Kim's proposals on 'ASEAN plus 3' and regional multilateral security cooperation arrangements underscore such efforts. Track-two organizations such as the Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific(CSCAP) and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation(IGCC) have taken leadership in initiating and pushing for multilateral security cooperative schemes in dealing with problems of peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

V. In Defense of Six Party Arrangement : Feasibility, Desirability, and a New Proposal

We have examined several modalities of peace-making on the Korean peninsula. None of these modalities have been successful in bringing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Although bilateral talks between two Koreas have produced some visible progress in social and economic CBMs, they are far short of achieving military CBMs and arms control. The bilateral Geneva Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea is also on verge of collapse due to the nuclear stand-off since October 2002. Judged on the past track records, the two party formula is unlikely to make a major breakthrough for peace-making on the Korean peninsula.

The three party formula has not been effective either. While the three party talk involving North Korea, South Korea, and the United States has never been realized, a recent three party talk among North Korea, the U.S., and China on the North Korean nuclear problem turned out to be disappointing. The four party talk among North and South Korea, the U.S., and China was tried, but suspended without producing any meaningful outcomes. Although multilateral security cooperation schemes have been actively discussed among non-governmental actors, governments in the region have not paid any serious attention to them. In view of this, the six party formula seems to be the only viable option that can bring all the principal parties in the Northeast Asian region together to discuss ways and means of enhancing peace-making on the Korean peninsula.

The six party formula is desirable on several accounts. First, an effective and sustainable six party talk could signal the dismantling of the lingering legacies of the Cold War by bringing countries of past enmity into a cooperative relationship. Four major powers (the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan) and two Koreas have neither met nor engaged in any significant interactions for common security in the region since the end of the World War II. Thus, their gathering will open a new horizon of security cooperation, creating a regional milieu conducive to peace-making on the Korean peninsula.

Second, the current Northeast Asian regional system is by and large characterized by collective defense, a security arrangement geared to deterring and defending against a commonly perceived threat. Central to this is defense bilateralism represented by the US-led hub and spoke system. American bilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea is the case in point. Though weakening over time, China, Russia, and North Korea have also maintained a loose form of collective defense. Such competing

collective defense systems have accompanied structural instability in the region by precipitating a sense of mutual suspicion and rivalry. The six party formula can offer a crucial turning point in transforming it into cooperative security and ultimately collective security system. Cooperative security is important because it can contribute to reducing tensions and conflicts in the region by enabling confidence-building and transparency measures. Being a logic step toward building a collective security system, it can promote a formal agreement among a group of states to jointly deter and punish aggression committed by any one member of the group against any other. Transformation of the Northeast Asian region into a collective security system can assure both peace-making and peace-building in the region as well as on the Korean peninsula by creating a shared feeling of security community.²⁶⁾

Third, the six party formula would be also useful in addressing comprehensive security. Undoubtedly, the Northeast Asian region is still dominated by military security issues such as territorial disputes, arms races, and weapons of mass destruction. However, non-military security issues such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, transnational organized crimes, trans-border pollution, and human security have become equally pronounced. The six party formula can serve as a credible regional vehicle in dealing with these non-conventional security issues. It is so more because these issues cannot be effectively dealt with without close cooperation and coordination among countries in the region. Such development can facilitate not only peace-making on the Korean peninsula, but also help both Koreas cope with non-conventional security threats.

Finally, given the asymmetry of power among six nations, the six party formula could revive the specter of the old concert of power in which major powers dictate the geo-political destiny of weaker nations. But if the six party formula is organized and maintained under the principle of cooperative and collective security, such drawback can be turned into a valuable asset, especially regarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Because four major powers are supposed to serve honest brokers and guarantors of peace and security in Korea. Thus, peace-making and peace-building in Korea can be expedited within the framework of the six party formula more than any other modalities.

Is it then feasible to form and sustain the six party formula? A relatively large number of actors involved, divergent interests, and collective memory of the past history could pose major challenges to the idea of the six party formula. Nevertheless, it seems feasible for several reasons. Most importantly, changing security environment since the September 11 terrorist attack has enhanced potential for cooperation among four major powers. Global terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction cannot be coped with an individual country alone, and multilateral cooperation and coordination are essential. Consequently, a new form of multilateral cooperation among all actors in the region has become all the more plausible. The case of the North Korean nuclear quagmire exemplifies the necessity for such security cooperation as manifested by proactive cooperation of China and Russia with the United States in dealing with North Korea.

Along with this, the recent six party talk over the North Korean nuclear problem can be seen as a new momentum for such development. At present, the six party talk is primitive in its institutional format, unclear about its principles and operational procedures, and limited in scope only dealing with the nuclear issue. But a successful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through the six party talk can produce positive spill-over effects by leading to a more stable and institutionalized pattern of cooperation for common security in the region with the expanded scope of issue areas. It is not only because such a success can breed mutual trust among six countries, but also because it provides them with a new institutional mechanism for deliberation on common security issues. In this regard, the current six party talk should not be treated as one shot event designed only to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, but extended to a stable institutional form as well as expanded to include other security issues.

Calculus of interests seems to be converging too. Since the Roh Tai-woo government, South Korea has been advocating the six party formula because it can enhance peace-making on the Korean peninsula within a multilateral framework. Japan and Russia have also been proposing it since they want to play major roles in regional politics, while limiting hegemonic influences of the United States and China. China used to be reluctant to join such security arrangement in fear of that it would provide a playing field for American hegemonic power. The United States has also been less enthusiastic about it because the existing bilateral alliance system is perceived of being more stable and rewarding. Nevertheless, issues of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism appear to have changed their interests. China's mediating role in arranging the six party talk and American attempt to utilize it as a vehicle for the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis indicate the newly emerging pattern of convergence of interests in this formula. North Korea could resist the idea because of its suspicion that the six party formula can be used as an instrument to exert multilateral pressures on it. However, the successful implementation of the six party talk on its nuclear problem could convince North Korea of its merits and virtues.

What kinds of actions are needed to institutionalize the six party talk?

- First, six nations should work hard to make the current six party talk successful because it can serve as a springboard for the creation of a sustainable and institutionalized form of six party cooperation.
- Second, there must be a new political initiative to make a smooth transition from the current talk to a new form of cooperation. In this regard, South Korea could propose a Northeast Asian Peace Summit that can be held regularly with its own charter, secretariat, and supporting institutions such as a regional peace research center and a regional dispute resolution center. Thus, it should go beyond a simple consultative mechanism. In order to materialize the summit idea, foreign ministers of six nations need to hold preparatory meetings.
- Third, the peace summit should be able to cover a wide range of security issues involving military security (CBMs, arms control and reduction, conflict resolution, weapons of mass destruction) and non-military security (terrorism, drugs, organized crimes, and ecological issues).
- Fourth, Jeju would be an ideal place for holding the regular summit meeting and housing its secretariat not only because of its image as an island of peace, but also because of its institutional infrastructure such as the North-South Peace Research Center.
- Finally, track-two approach to expand the scope of discussion on the idea of the Northeast Asian Peace Summit needs to be encouraged. The Northeast Asian Security Dialogue that has been run by the IGCC of the University of California at San Diego, along with CSCAP, can be utilized for the enhancement of the track two approach. And the Jeju Peace Forum might have to deliberate on creating its own track-two approach by forming new institutional networks with IGCC, CSCAP, and other non-governmental organizations.

VI. Concluding Remarks

Peace-making on the Korean peninsula is not an easy task. Mutual distrust and denial as well as military confrontation of more than a half century cannot be resolved easily. And since the Korean security dilemma is deeply embedded in global and regional geopolitical structure, it would be virtually impossible for North and South Korea to disentangle the structural barriers and to enhance peace-making by themselves. Collective coordination of security dilemma in cooperation with four major powers in the region is an essential ingredient in peace-making and peace-building on the Korean peninsula. Here arises the rationale for the six party talk. The Roh

Moo-hyun government should take a bold initiative in pushing for the idea of the Northeast Asian Peace Summit as a way of institutionalizing the six party formula. A positive development is taking place in this regard. Defying its earlier rejection, North Korea has sent an accommodating signal to the Bush proposal on multilateral security assurance in return for its dismantling of nuclear weapons program. The Korean Central News Agency said on October 25, quoting an unidentified North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, "We are ready to consider Bush's remarks on the written assurance of nonaggression if they are based on the intention to coexist."²⁷) The statement can be seen as an expression of its intention to attend the second round of the six party talk. Although a rocky road is ahead of the six party talk due to uncertainties associated with nuclear freeze, verifiable inspection, and irreversible dismantling, such positive development should be firmly grasped, and transformed into a new opportunity to build a more sustainable and comprehensive cooperation for common security in the region among six nations.

- 1) This paper is prepared for presentation at the 2nd Jeju Peace Forum, October 31, 2003, Jeju Convention Center, Jeju, Korea.
- 2) The Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2000).
- 3) Chung-in Moon, Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula, (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1996), ch. 6.
- 4) Sung-ho Je, "Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula," Kukga Jonryak (National Strategy), 2:1(1996), pp. 77-78 (in Korean).
- 5) Chung-in Moon, "The Kim Dae-jung Government and Peace-building on the Korean Peninsula," Kukga Jonryak (National Strategy), 5:2(1999), pp.139-170 (in Korean)
- 6) See Chung-in Moon, "Coping with the North Korean Nuclear Quagmire: Containment or Engagement," paper presented at the KEI-Stanford Conference on ROK-US Alliance, October 23-24, 2003, Stanford Univ..
- 7) Since March 2001, the Bush administration integrated NMD (National Missile Defense) and TMD (Theater Missile Defense) into MD (Missile Defense). Thus, I am using the term MD instead of TMD.
- 8) This section draws partly on Chung-in Moon, "The Kim Dae-jung Government's Peace Policy toward North Korea," Asian Perspective 25:2 (2001), pp.177-198.
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- 13) See Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of Peace and Ways of War* (New York: Norton, 1997), ch.8.
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- 16) Dae-sung Song, *Hanbando Pyonghwa Cheje* (Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula) (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1998), pp.179-180.
- 17) Chung-in Moon, "Kim Dae-jung Jungbuwa Hanbando Pyonghwa Cheje Guchuk (The Kim Dae-jung Government and Building a Korean Peace Regime), *Kukga Jonryak* (National Strategy), 5:2 (1999), p. 148.
- 18) Won-sik Kang et.al., *Hanbando Pyonghwacheje Guchuk Bangan* (Measures to Peace Building on the Korean Peninsula) (Seoul: Korean Institute of Unification Studies, 1995), p.14.
- 19) Chung-in Moon and Byung-jun Chun, "Sunshine Policy and Four Major Powers," *Pyonghwa Ronchong* (Peace Journal), 2:2 (1999), p.199 in Korean.
- 20) For a detailed analysis of the six party formula, see Tae-am Eom, "Hanbando Anbowa Dongbuka Yukja Hoidam (Korean Peninsula Security and Northeast Asian Six Party Talk)," *Kukbang Jonhchaek Yonku* 45 (July 1999) and Dongman Han et.al., *Daja Anbo Jongchaekui Iron gwa Silje* (Theory and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy) (Seoul: Seomundang, 2003).
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- 22) *Munhwa Ilbo*, February 11, 1998, p. 5.
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- 25) For a comprehensive overview of multilateral security cooperation schemes, refer to Han Dong-man, *op. cit.*
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Peace Building in Northeast Asia And Role of China

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1. Chinese Security Interests in the Region

The changes in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War make it clear the end of the Cold War does not create the regional stability directly. China is one of the few countries that heavily rely on the region. And Chinese relations with big powers are mainly in the Asia-Pacific region. It is crucial for China to keep the region stable and in balance. Therefore, China attaches vital importance to the regional peace and stability by promoting interrelationship and cooperation,¹⁾ “aiming at the creation of a vast buffer-zone around the nation (China)”.²⁾

China’s basic interests can be summarized as “stabilizing the surrounding” and “basing China upon the region”³⁾ to keep a peaceful and favorable international environment for realizing domestic modernization. The Chinese approach to the security can be ranged in three levels: stable relations with big powers; good relations with neighboring nations, the peace and stability in the region as a whole, especially the Northeast Asia and the Southeast Asia⁴⁾; and national security including domestic stability, unity and security, territory integrity, social prosperity through continuous economic reform.

The regional cooperation is becoming more complex due to the overlap of national strategic interests and area between or among the different structures, such as; the US, China and Russia; China Russia and Japan; Asean, China and Japan and so on. Therefore, the result of cooperation depends heavily upon individual nation’s attitude and interest on the concrete case. China believes that forming multi-polar system will take a relatively long.⁵⁾ The process is uncertain for the security, but this transition period is running with Chinese domestic economic reform and modernization.

2. Korean Peninsula and China

China and the Korean Peninsula are close so the Peninsula's stability can definitely affect the peaceful environment surrounding China, and affects peace and tranquility of Northeast Asia as well. However, the Korean Peninsula remains one of the regions in the world with the most intensive buildup of armed forces, there are 1.5 million troops and military clashes have occurred now and then. The DPRK's relations with the US have been deteriorated since Bush came to power and nuclear issue has stood out. As a neighbor, China has always exerted its efforts to maintain the regional stability and given vigorous support to non-nuclearization in a hope the relevant issues can be solved through dialogues with peaceful means. However, the Korean issue is also possibly to be out of control because of: 1) complicated historical background with the Cold War legacy; 2) deep mistrust between the DPRK and the USA, in addition to local players themselves; 3) local issue with wide international impact without efficient management.

Consequently, China has always taken safeguarding peace and stability of the peninsula as the starting point for tackling the peninsula issue and on the nuclear issue.

Chinese policy on the Korean Peninsula is clear there should be nuclear-free. At the same time, the regional security issues should be addressed through the only means of dialogue and peaceful talks. Since October, 2002 when the Korean nuclear tension intensified, while meeting with President George Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin clearly stated the importance of peacefully resolving the nuclear issue, China has kept close communications with all parties and organized three-party Beijing talks and the six-party talks in April and October, 2003 respectively.

3. Chinese Role

It seems that Multiple-approach is more acceptable at the current stage since it can dilute the tension between the US and the DPRK and reflect the interests of different parties concerned, but communication between the US and the DPRK is still the key to the issue.

What China can do is to provide a platform and create the environment for a dialogue and look for the possibility of peaceful means with joint efforts. The view that China has not made every effort to prevent the DPRK from developing nuclear project is not true and unfair because the DPRK has different interpretation with the

US on nuclear framework in 1994 and required security guarantee from the US. The better understanding between the US and the DPRK is the crucial step. The political restrict on both sides makes multiple approach relevant and useful.

It is also inappropriate to exaggerate the role of China and to regard China as the key to solve the problem. Simply giving pressure to the DPRK has been proved useless. A comprehensive program is needed for a solution, such as some kind of guarantee which can efficiently improve the DPRK's worrisome on security, normalization of the US-DPRK and the Japan-DPRK relation, the DPRK stopping nuclear project and return to IAEA and assistance for the DPRK economic development.

4. Conclusion

In short, Chinese constructive roles in the Korean Peninsula are:

- ◇ Stability : coordinating the relations since China's regional security interests are in line with interests of the all powers.
- ◇ Nuclear free : keeping non-proliferation policy consistence and regional security in balance, China insists the Peninsula nuclear free.
- ◇ Peaceful Solution via Dialogue: taking the complicated background of the issue into consideration, multilateral approach with patient and better understand is precondition peaceful solution.

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정치지도자 라운드테이블
6자 회담과 동북아 평화 : 실천적 모색

Political Leaders' Roundtable
Six-Party Formula and Northeast Asian Peace
: Practical Approach

동북아 평화를 위하여 없어야 할 2개의 큰 山

양 영 식
전 통일부 차관

- 6자회담의 성패는 한반도 전쟁 재발 방지, 동북아 평화질서 구축의 행방을 가늠하는 매우 중요한 변수임.
- 최대 현안인 북한 핵문제 해결, 한반도 평화체제 구축 및 동북아 공동안보와 평화번영을 위한 새로운 다자 안보협력체의 출범문제에 결정적으로 영향을 주게 될 것임.
- 한반도 문제에 직·간접적으로 관련된 4대강국과 남·북한 직접 당사자가 북핵문제 관련하여 회동한 것 자체가 역사적 의의가 클 뿐만 아니라, 북핵문제 타결시 장차 남북평화협정체제 실현시의 국제적 보장가능성의 측면에서도 6자회담은 필히 성공해야 될 것임.
- 특히 노무현 대통령이 취임사를 통해(2. 25), 마지막 냉전지대인 한반도를 「세계를 향해 평화를 발신하는 평화지대」로, 그리고 「유라시아 대륙과 태평양을 잇는 동북아의 평화관문」으로 거듭나게 해야 한다는 대명제를 천명한 사실을 감안할 때,
 - 북핵문제의 평화적 해결이야말로 최우선적으로 넘어야 할 큰 山이 아닐 수 없음.
 - 이 山은 한국 혼자 넘을 수 없으며, 북한과 미국, 중국, 러시아, 일본 등과 함께 넘어야 함.
- 다행하게도 지난 10월 25일 부시 미국 대통령이 제안한 「다자틀 내에서의 서면안전보장」 방안을 북한측이 “고려할 용의가 있다”며 수용의사를 밝히고, 또 미국측이 이를 환영함에 따라 2차 6자회담의 조기개최 가능성과 북핵문제 해결의 돌파구가 마련될 공산이 커지고 있는 형국임.
 - 아무튼 3차 베이징회담의 탐색전과 1차 6자회담을 통해 미국과 북한은 이제 위험한 핵 치킨게임을 거두고 조심스럽게 Big Deal 협상의 국면으로 들어서고 있는 것으로 판단됨.
 - 벼랑끝 곡예로 자폭할 바보집단이 아닌 북한, 군사적 강경조치를 능사로 살지 않는 미국일진대, 6자회담의 장은 우여곡절은 거치겠지만 열매맺는 협상으로 기록될 것으로 기대됨.
 - 또한 중국을 비롯한 일본, 러시아도 한반도의 비핵화를 공공연히 지지하고 있고, 북핵

문제의 평화적 해결(특히, 다무적 안전보장 방식에 긍정적)을 강조하고 있는 상황을 북한측은 결코 간과할 수 없을 것임.

□ 우선 본 토론자는 6자회담 당사자들에게 다음과 같이 권고하고자 함.

- 값진 협상은 완승·완패보다는 공동우승을 지향함으로써 결실을 맺게 된다고 할 것임.
- 이를 위해서는 역지사지(易地思之 : 상대방의 입장에서 문제를 보는 것)의 관점과 자세를 상호 견지해야 한다고 봄.
- 미국은 북한이 가장 두려워하고 있는 「미국의 압살정책」(즉, 김정일 정권은 「악의 축」, 「실패한 독재정권」으로서 무너뜨려 버려야 한다고 봄으로써, 김정일 정권의 붕괴작전으로 두려워 함)에 대한 의구심을 불식시켜야 함.
- 부시 대통령의 문서보장과 의회의 결의안 방식의 보장의지, 중국·러시아·일본·한국의 보장조치는 2중 3중의 실질적 보장임을 설득함.
- 한편, 북한은 핵무장의 길이 생존권 보장보다는 스스로 위험을 자초하는 화근이며, 오히려 과감한 핵프로그램 포기과 핵무장 폐기야말로 정권안보는 물론 북한주민의 인민경제 회생 및 북·미 국교정상화의 첩경임을 인식해야 함.
- 중국의 「건설적 역할」 자임과 관련, 이런 류의 조용한 설득·경고가 매우 중요함.

□ 6자회담은 결코 지연작전, 속임수나 잔꾀로 얻을 것은 아무 것도 없음을 북한측이 깨닫고 있다는 전제에서 볼 때, 특히 미국과 중국은 비공개 막후 접촉을 통해 Big Deal 과 단계적 이행에 대한 확실한 보증을 신뢰할 수 있도록 진솔한 대화를 나눌 필요성이 있음.

□ 긴밀한 한·미·일 국제 공조하에(물론 중·러와의 사전 협조 포함) 합의된 협상카드에 따라 6자회담을 주도하게 될 때, 「줄 것은 주고, 받을 것은 받는」 공동우승의 결과를 얻게 될 것임.

□ 다음, 6자회담을 통해 북핵문제의 큰 산을 넘게 될 때, 우리는 단 하나의 큰 산을 넘어야 함. 즉, 정전협정체제를 평화협정체제로 전환하는 것임.

□ 한국전쟁 후 지난 50년간 불안정한 휴전선을 사이에 두고 군사적 대치상태를 지속해온 남·북한은 남·북한 평화협정을 합의함으로써 한반도의 냉전체제를 종식시켜야 함.

- 북핵문제의 타결은 이를 위한 결정적 전환점을 형성하게 될 것임.
- 남·북한은 우선적으로 제2차 남북정상회담을 개최, 이 문제를 집중적으로 협의, 해결해야 할 것임.

- 특히 「남북화해·불가침·교류협력에 관한 합의서」(남북기본합의서, 1992)(제5조 : “남과 북은 현 정전상태를 남북사이의 공고한 평화상태로 전환시키기 위하여 공동으로 노력하며 이러한 평화상태가 이룩될 때까지 현 군사정전협정을 준수한다”)의 이행 또는 수정·보완 및 이행방안이 협의되어야 함.
- 남·북한이 현 휴전선(DMZ)을 불가침 경계선·평화선으로 바꾸고 남북교류협력을 촉진하게 됨으로써 남북간 군사적 대치상태 해소 및 군비통제, 군축으로의 길을 트게 될 것임.
 - 군사당국자 회담 관련, 한·미 사전협의체제 긴밀화가 필수적임.
- 남북간에 평화협정이 합의될 때, 6자회담에 참여한 4강의(미·중 양자도 가함) 국제적 보장조치가 바람직함.
- 남북평화협정의 실현은 한반도 냉전종식의 길이요, 평화정착의 제도화를 의미함. 동시에 이는 동북아 지역안보 협력체제의 현실화를 촉진하는 발판이 될 것으로 기대됨.
- 마지막으로 한 가지 첨언하고자 함.
 - 북핵문제의 山, 남북평화협정의 山을 넘는 과정에 있어서 정부당국 대표간의 대화와 병행, 유력한 정치인들의 회합이 마련되어야 함.
 - 특히 남북국회회담은 DJ정부 시기에도 추진되지 않았는데, 지금이야말로 남북국회회담을 통해 한반도 평화를 위해 책임있는 정치지도자들의 의견을 나눌 때라고 봄.
 - 또한 국회 차원의 결의안을 초당적으로 성안하는 방안도 검토할 만함.
 - 국제적 차원에서도 6개국 관련 정치인 회합과 「고위군사당국자포럼」도 추진할 만함.
- 끝으로, 앞으로 북핵문제 타결시, 또 남북정상회담시와 동북아정상회담시 이 곳 ‘평화의 섬’ 제주, ‘Asia의 Geneva’ 제주의 컨벤션센터에서 개최되기를 바라는 마음 간절하다.

감사합니다.

6 Party Talks and Northeast Asian Peace

Hwa-Kap HAHN

Member of the National Assembly of Republic of Korea

1. Peace and Security on Korean Peninsula is the foundation for Co-Prosperity in Northeast Asia Region

The Korean peninsula, the last bastion of the Cold War era, is drawing worldwide attention now. The situation on the Korean peninsula created by the North Korean nuclear issue since October last year is requiring international cooperation in order to achieve peace in the region. I hope that North Korean nuclear issue is resolved peacefully through the 6 party talks and thereby fundamentally remove security threat on the Korean peninsula. I believe that the 6 party talks will be successful in spite of serious differences between North Korea and the U.S.

Here are some grounds for my belief.

● First, all of the six nations are in agreement over the principle of resolving North Korean nuclear issue peacefully. The nations involved also share the view that the war on the Korean peninsula will lead to the catastrophe not only on the Korean peninsula but throughout the Northeast Asian region and that it will not help in securing security for other nations in the region.

● Second, there is a clear sign of development towards reconciliation and cooperation between two Korea. There is no turning back now from deepening North-South reconciliation, which has set its course under the consistent implementation of the Sunshine Policy under the last administration

● Third, each participating nations in the 6 party talks is not representing the cold war division but they share common interest of achieving co-prosperity through peaceful means. The peace on the Korean peninsula is the foundation for realizing prosperity and maximizing the national interests of the countries in the region.

2. 'Northeast Asia Peace Conference'

The success of resolving North Korean nuclear issue peacefully through the 6 party talks will herald the beginning of the new multi-lateral security cooperation system in the Northeast Asian region. Given the complexity of the region there is a need to build a new order to bring about co-prosperity and peace in the region through new security cooperation system based on multi-lateral egalitarianism.

I am aware that we do have the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) to serve as the multi-lateral security system for Asia as a whole. However, what is needed in addition to ARF is a separate institutionalised framework that supports cooperation over security issues in the Northeast Asian region, particularly with reference to issues over the Korean peninsular. The discussion concerning cooperation in the Northeast Asian region among the civilian groups is currently undergoing through North East Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) since it was established in 1993. However, NEACD has its limits as it is a civilian-led institution and because North Korea is not a member.

This is why I'd like to propose that we launch 'Northeast Asia Peace Conference.' The leaders from governments and parliaments of all 6 nations, including South and North Korea, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia, should participate in such organization and carry out responsible discussions regarding achieving peace and co-prosperity. I will provide my best to support to the organization through the US-Asia Network, of which I am a founding co-chair.

3. The solution for the North Korea nuclear issue is already out there.

Diplomacy is a game in which players exchange political interests for substantive national interest. All the nation-states involved in the talks may have different interests at stake. Nevertheless, the participants for the 6 party talks clearly share the principle of "Peaceful Resolution of North Korean nuclear issue." Moreover, the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is more or less out there. That is because North Korea has already put their demand on the table: they want 'security guarantee and economic support.' North Korean threat to develop nuclear is only a tool to achieve such demand. Therefore, we, the six nations, should find ways to satisfy the interests of all six nations involved.

First of all, I would like to share my view on how to guarantee North Korea's security needs. North Korea is demanding non-aggression pact with the U.S. I understand that President George W. Bush is moving from negative stance to a positive one on this issue. The core of North Korean demand for the non-aggression pact is in realizing diplomatic normalization with the U.S. and Japan. I believe that the normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. and Japan, respectively, is an issue that cannot be avoided in order to make multi-lateral security cooperation system a success.

North Korea should totally abandon nuclear ambition in verifiable ways. Then, it would be appropriate for other participating nation in the 6 way talks to guarantee North Korea's security. If we can materialize such package deal we can then boldly move towards providing economic assistance to North Korea. For that, I can suggest establishing 'North Korea Peace Development Fund.' Of course, I don't rule out participation from the US and Russia in creating such a fund. Inducing changes in North Korea's economy is imperative in using peaceful Korean peninsula as a momentum in creating prosperity in Northeast Asia. The fund will serve to accelerate economic liberalization and reform in North Korea and thereby help to assimilate economic systems in the region.

Of course, all these ideas are just the beginning.

The future of Korean peninsula is bright. But, it is also true that there are many obstacles ahead. I believe that the problems Korean peninsula faces today are the steps leading to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Korean nation will overcome such difficulties. I would like to ask for your advice and support for Korean peninsula, which will contribute to the peace co-prosperity.

Thank you for your attention.

A Failed State : Challenges Posed by North Korea

W. Robert Warne
Former President, Korea Economic Institute of America
Visiting Professor, Korea University

One of the most pressing international issues of this century is how to respond to the challenges presented by some 50 failed nation states around the world. One-quarter of world's states suffer from impoverishment, weak public health programs, rampant disease and malnourishment, corruption, lack of law and order, criminal activities and human rights violations. These failed states lack the resources, leadership, outside assistance and sound policies to improve their depressed conditions. Indeed, nearly one billion people worldwide live in abject poverty, many of whom are in these failed states. Their frustration, civil disorder and lawlessness breed challenges for their neighbors and the world community: terrorism, regional insecurity, weapons proliferation and an unwillingness or inability to abide by international rules.

Most of these failed societies are in tropical zones, especially southern Africa where national incomes have fallen by 20 percent in recent decades. Asia has several such states: Nepal and Cambodia—remember the “killing fields” . East Timor might have also fit into this category but effective UN police action and trusteeship arrangements combined with nation building have turned it around. The prime regional example is North Korea : its economy has virtually collapsed : there is severe repression, international criminal activity, serious malnourishment, broken public services, the development of weapons of mass destruction and corruption among the elites. It poses profound insecurity problems and its prospects are dismal. North Korea's continued isolation, sense of insecurity and determination to be self sufficient indicate that its economy and social conditions will likely continue to spiral down, intensifying the potential threat and possible collapse of the regime.

How to respond to these challenges? So far South Korea's engagement policy has led the way in seeking constructive solutions. Progress has been uneven and marginal,

however. Instead of being receptive and cooperative, North Korea has sought to maximize assistance while offering little in return. A broader regional effort is needed. The emerging six-power talks may be the start of a process to develop a coordinated, effective response to the DPRK's challenge to regional stability. The most alarming threat is its determination to develop a nuclear weapons stockpile and the capability to deliver these weapons against its neighbors and others. Another potential threat is regime collapse that could come about by any number of possible scenarios. The five parties seeking to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the crisis should focus on the immediate threat of nuclear weapons.

As the five nations consult and work together, they also should turn to the long-run issues of the failed DPRK economy and society. For example, what actions might be taken should the state collapse so as to prevent internal conflict and chaos, the intervention of third parties and mass migration? Drawing on the example of East Timor and other trusteeships, the five could plan on working through the UN to set up a transitional government, develop state institutions, check hostile influences and begin the process of rebuilding a civil society and the economy. South Korea, of course, should take the lead in any such coordination and address the long term issue of possible reunification of the two Koreas. The nascent grouping of the five regional powers—South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the U.S.—, of course, first needs to make considerable headway on security issues but it should recognize that North Korean long-term issues will not be resolved without their joint cooperation and problem solving.

The unexpected collapse of East Germany is an example of the quick, effective response of the international community. The framework for cooperation had been established. When confronted with a crisis that could have led to regional instability, the nations concerned agreed to prompt, appropriate actions that led to the relatively smooth, peaceful reunification of Germany. Hopefully the five powers within the framework of the United Nations would be prepared to take similar positive steps should North Korea's growing, immense problems result in an unforeseen catastrophe. A great deal is at stake, especially for South Korea.

외교관 라운드테이블
북한과 새로운 다자 공조의 틀

Diplomats' Roundtable
North Korea and a New Framework
of Multilateral Cooperation

The North Korean Nuclear Problem :

The Australian perspective

Colin Heseltine
Ambassador of Australia to the ROK

Australia's stake

I would like to offer an assessment of the North Korea nuclear problem from the point of view of a non-participant in six party talks which nonetheless has significant interests at stake. Australia has taken an assertive stance on the North's nuclear program for clear and compelling reasons.

Three of Australia's top four trading partners are located in this part of the world, Japan, China and of course the Republic of Korea. Billions of dollars worth of Australian exports are absorbed by these three economies every year.

This enormous economic stake intersects with deep political and security interests. We have strong political relationships with the ROK, China and Japan - indeed they rank amongst our most important partners anywhere in the world. And of course the United States is Australia's key defence alliance partner, as well as its largest overall trading partner. Even though Australia and the Korean Peninsula stand at opposite ends of Asia, our long-term national security is shaped by developments in this region.

This direct stake in the stability of northeast Asia is reinforced by Australia's strong commitment to non-proliferation. We have been at the forefront of international non-proliferation efforts for decades, believing that the spread of weapons of mass destruction will undermine the security of all of us. There can be no doubt of course that North Korea's nuclear program represents a serious threat to the global non-proliferation regime. It is more likely that other countries will go down the WMD road if the North retains its nuclear program.

This is all the more frustrating because a country will weaken, not enhance, its own security by developing weapons of mass destruction. North Korea is making a fundamental mistake: it is turning away from the outside world which it so desperately needs to chase a chimera.

Australia has done its own bit to encourage North Korea to make a different choice. We have been a strong supporter, politically and financially, of KEDO since its inception (Australia has been the largest single financial contributor outside the Executive Board members). After re-establishing diplomatic relations in 2000, we launched a range of aid and training programs. We did this because we hoped North Korea would respond in the right way and engage with the international community. We were deeply concerned then when it was revealed last October that the North had been running a secret highly enriched uranium program in flagrant breach of its international obligations.

Six party talks

That is why we were encouraged when North Korea participated in the first round of six party talks in late August. Nobody wants another war on the Korean Peninsula, the consequences of which would be unthinkable. Everything must be done to resolve the nuclear problem via peaceful dialogue. But getting a satisfactory settlement requires political will. Unfortunately, North Korea is not yet demonstrating that political will. Instead, it has engaged in yet another round of highly provocative statements since the end of the six party talks, once more indulging in brinkmanship rather than thinking through, hardheadedly and realistically, its own long-term national interest. This can only seem perverse to the onlooker.

Pong Su

There are other factors that make this mix even more complicated. North Korea's exports of missiles and the involvement of North Korean entities in illicit activities are unacceptable and must stop. Australia has had its own direct experience this year of such activities. In April, a North Korean vessel, the Pong Su, was intercepted off the southern coast of Australia trying to smuggle a large quantity of heroin into the country. The members of the Pong Su's crew have been held in custody since the

interception and will soon face trial. If they are found guilty, they will be duly punished. The Australian Government has made it clear that it will not tolerate illegal activities of this kind. And North Korea must realize that its future cannot be secured by such means.

There are some who see cases such as the interception of the Pong Su as the application of pressure on North Korea to compel it to come to a settlement in the nuclear standoff. This is misleading. This vessel was intercepted for straight law enforcement reasons, not to serve a political agenda. If North Korean entities continue to engage in such activities, they will meet the same response.

Scenarios

Where is the North Korean problem heading? War is unthinkable and thankfully unlikely at this juncture. All the main players, including the United States, have stressed that they do not want a military confrontation. Even though such a horrendous eventuality is unlikely, normal prudent planning suggests that we should be properly prepared for all contingencies.

At the optimistic end of the spectrum, we could see a negotiated settlement where the North abandons its nuclear program completely, verifiably and irreversibly and addresses other outstanding issues in return for economic assistance and a multilateral security guarantee. Getting such a result will not be easy and we will have to expect periodic setbacks. But this process more or less depends on the North's willingness to engage in real and sustained negotiations and to cease its provocations.

It may be necessary to bring some pressure to bear on North Korea to ensure that it understands that trading in illegal items or WMD components is unacceptable to the international community. Some analysts argue that such measures are incompatible with a peaceful, negotiated settlement. This dichotomy is misleading in several ways and does not serve our interests. Australia is fully committed to dialogue, but believes that calibrated pressure is a necessary part of demonstrating the international community's collective resolve, of making North Korea realise that it must come to a proper and enduring settlement.

Unless this message is conveyed clearly to North Korea there is a risk that North

Korea will come to believe that it has nothing to lose by playing for time and we will therefore face a long-running stalemate. North Korea would be foolish if it assumes that a protracted stalemate would be in its interests. Such a standoff would be inherently unstable, with a risk that the situation could get out of control. And the North would not get the assistance which it desperately needs to rebuild its economy. So a stalemate is ultimately dysfunctional and North Korea has no choice if it looks at its own long-term future. Australia will continue to play its part, where it can, in finding a solution to this problem, sending a clear and firm message to North Korea. And the message is that North Korea confronts a clear and compelling choice: it can engage with the international community in a normal manner or it can lock itself further and further into isolation and estrangement.

Head of Delegation European Union European Commission Delegation to the Republic of Korea

Dorian PRINCE
EU Ambassador to Korea

The EU strongly supports the principles of consensus announced by the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the end of the first round of 6-party talks a peaceful dialogue on the nuclear problem realizing a nuclear free peninsula while taking into consideration the security concerns of the DPRK exploring an overall plan in a just manner and in a simultaneous, incremental way – avoiding actions or words that may aggravate the situation and continuing to establish trust.

These principles provide the basic framework to which further progress towards a peaceful solution can be built. The only lasting solution to the nuclear problem is through dialogue.

The EU is deeply concerned by recent messages from North Korea that it may be bolstering or about to display its nuclear deterrence forces. We urge the DPRK to refrain from any statement or action that could escalate the problem.

The EU has sought to play an appropriate supporting role in efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the nuclear and other security issues on the Korean peninsula.

The EU has always argued that dialogue is the means to gain a solution to the nuclear crisis. In 2001 while the then new US Administration was reassessing the existing policy towards North Korea a high-level EU Delegation visited North Korea to try and assist in keeping the South North reconciliation process on track.

Since the announcement by the US that North Korea had admitted to having a uranium enrichment programme the EU has called on Pyongyang to dismantle all of its nuclear programmes. This has been requested through several public declarations by EU leaders and in private letters to the North Korean Foreign Minister Paik

Nam-sun. The EU intends to send senior officials at Regional Director level from the governments of Italy and Ireland and the European Commission the current EU Troika- to Pyongyang in the next few weeks for discussions on the nuclear issue.

In regard to KEDO, the EU is a Member of the KEDO Executive Board and has contributed € 115 million in financial aid to the project. The EU is in close consultation with other Board members on the future of the project.

The EU has a principle of not linking humanitarian aid with political issues. As such, our relief programmes to North Korea have continued at a similar level to before October 2002. The Food Security Programme concentrates on the supply of fertiliser and the provision of agricultural inputs. European NGOs funded by the Commission are also working in a number of areas with an emphasis on the health sector and in improving sanitation and clean water supplies.

Specific development assistance to the DPRK had been planned for the period 2001~2004. This would initially have been composed of training and capacity building in principles of the market economy and in improving efficiency in the energy sector. It was decided in November 2002 that such cooperation could not go forward until the DPRK addresses international concerns in regard to its nuclear programme.

Even at a time of great change and internal developments inside the European Union, the security and prosperity of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia remain of critical importance to Europe. It is essential to our own security to maintain and strengthen international non-proliferation instruments. In addition to this, any instability or conflict in this region would have obvious political and economic ramifications around the world.

Dialogue with the DPRK remains the most effective means of bringing about a peaceful, lasting solution to the problem. With a visible and verifiable end to the DPRK's nuclear programme the EU stands ready to assist the DPRK in improving the lives of its people and finding an effective place in the regional economy.

North Korea and New Structure of the Multilateral Cooperation in the NEA

Alexander Timonin
Minister-Counsellor of the Russian Embassy

Excellencies,
Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour and pleasure for me to participate in the Second Jeju Peace Forum and to present my views during the Diplomats Roundtable on the topic “North Korea and a New Framework of Multilateral Cooperation”.

For those who have been involved professionally in Korean affairs for many years this topic is hardly a new one.

Throughout the last decade numerous attempts were made aimed at creation of multilateral structures of cooperation in the Northeast Asia, which would include the DPRK. Unfortunately almost all those attempts failed. The beginning of the 6-party talks in Beijing in August 2003 revived the debates related to the involvement of Pyongyang into the multilateral regional cooperation in politics, and perhaps later, in economy. Though the prospects of the continuation of the discussion are still uncertain some policy-makers and analysts have rushed to declare that there is actually a possibility to use this 6-party talks to set up a new system that would preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula. Certainly we can admit that such a scenario could take place. However, speaking from the point of view of the real world politics we should say that it is a little early to discuss the setting up of a new structure of regional cooperation in the NEA in which the DPRK could also take part. We can recall “a breakthrough” of the relations of the DPRK with the EC countries, Philippines, Australia, the DPRK joining the ARF (regional forum of the ASEAN), inter-Korean summit in June 2000, Japan Prime Minister’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, active development of highest level contacts between Russia and the North Korea, China and North Korea. However it is common knowledge that Pyongyang is still cautious as for the proposals concerning multilateral cooperation in

the sphere of regional security maintenance. Nowadays the DPRK has turned its full attention to the normalization of bilateral relations with the interested states. That is why the North Korean high-level officials numerous times rejected the proposals to participate in various international conferences and forums held to discuss the Korean peninsula issues. The only exception was the DPRK's participation in the 4-party talks on Korea (DPRK-ROK-USA-PRC) that were held in 1996 and had achieved few results.

The recent attempts of the world community to vitalize major multilateral economic programs with the North Korea also can hardly be estimated as successful. Some success was achieved only in the Tumangan project ran by UNDP.

The question is: what is the rationale behind such a slow and complicated process of engagement of the DPRK into the regional cooperation in politics and economy. Why the world community's efforts pursuing the creation of the reliable security system in the NEA proved to yield so little fruit. Why the successful pattern of the cooperation in the frameworks of such forums as ARF, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 cannot still be used in full swing in the settlement of the situation on the Korean peninsula, including the North Korean nuclear issue?

We believe that biased and excessively-ideologically approach to the North Korea by a considerable number of countries still hinders more efficient regional cooperation with the DPRK. There are still plenty of policy-makers and businessmen who incline to the Cold War vision when they face issues related to the North Korea. However there are also abundant examples of the successful realization of the large-scale international projects and programs of the efficient cooperation between the countries in the modern world history. Those countries have managed to break away from the ideological stereotypes and political inclinations to focus on tackling the specific issues related to the securing of the stable development of the states that for some reasons found themselves in predicament.

We believe that the engagement of the DPRK to the process of multilateral cooperation would be more successful provided that some states and policy-makers could find the resources to abstain from the vision of the North Korea as of the "unwanted political regime" suggesting that the relations and contacts with the DPRK are one-way, advantageous only for the North Korean leaders. The DPRK should be treated as an equal partner in all political and economy activities in the NEA, APR and in the world in general. I should emphasize that this approach is a cornerstone of the current policy of Russia towards the DPRK. We believe that it is important to proceed from the fact that any mode of political and economic cooperation with the DPRK, realization of various multilateral projects on the Korean

peninsula will eventually benefit all related countries not only the DPRK as some skeptics speculate. Peace and security of the Korean peninsula can be achieved only through the efforts of all the world states involved.

In this regard I would like to emphasize a constant and multi-purpose importance of the peace process taking place all around Europe, the activities of the OSCE, applying of Confidence and Security Building Measures on the Korean peninsula. Recently an international workshop was held in Seoul. Its theme was “Applicability of OSCE CSBMS in the Northeast Asia”. The participants of the workshop convincingly argued that there was an opportunity to apply some elements of the European pattern in Korea. We could hardly disagree with the vision that the way to resolve issues on the Korean peninsula, like in Europe, lies in expanding contacts, communication, exchange and cooperation from easy non-sensitive areas to hard sensitive areas: gradual approach toward peaceful coexistence. Continuity, reciprocity and transparency must become the guiding principles of political and economic integration process in this area.

We believe that now we have all the prerequisites to build a more favorable background for the settlement of security issues in the NEA. It is imperative not to lose this chance. Russia is ready to cooperate with all interested countries to arrange mutually beneficial structure of the cooperation aimed at integration in the NEA based on the principles of “security through the coordinated mutual development”. One of the major elements of this structure should be normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula. The realization of a number of multilateral programs in energy and transport sphere using the energy resources and territory of the Russian Far East and East Siberia could provide ground for the regional cooperation for integration.

The most promising areas of the multilateral cooperation are as follows:

1. Cooperation in the sphere of marine bio-resources. The Russian Federation has agreements in this field with 11 countries of the APR, including the Republic of Korea. However we are not satisfied with the present situation. Export of fish products from Russia totalled 1,1 million tons in the previous years. More than 90 percent of it low processed products. We believe that it is necessary to develop this traditional area into the deep processing of the maritime resources on the Russian plants, and developing of the information and technology exchange.
2. The joint production, processing and transportation of oil and natural gas from Russia to the APR. Today liquid natural gas (LNG) dominates the gas market of the

APR countries. However 75 percent of the overall volume of the LNG in the world is imported to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

The LNG remains a basic form of the natural gas imported by the ROK. Taking into account the policy pursued by the ROK aimed at diversifying of the LNG import channels the Russian gas could find a niche on the Korean market after the current agreements expire. The gas will likely come from the “Sakhalin-2” deposits.

Republic of Korea is also one of the most important future markets for the import of gas from the “Kovykta” deposit in the Irkutsk region. The government-related organizations and the State Gas Corporation of the Republic of Korea together with the relevant organizations from Russia and the PRC have started the preliminary feasibility study of the construction of the main gas pipeline. We cannot exclude the possibility that the DPRK could join the project.

3. Cooperation in the transportation area. The main objective here is to form a competitive and efficient transport route Europe-Asia. The creation of the trans-continental main roads will bring positive impetus for the international trade. The setting up of the trans-Korean route will open the transit gateway for the container traffic from the South Korea to Europe through the territory of the DPRK and Russia (TransSiberian railroad). The transit route will go all the way through Pusan harbor in South Korea to the North Korea the Far East Siberia Europe. We estimate the volume of the container transportation to surpass 600 thousands containers annually by 2010.

The economic benefits of this program for the would-be partners is more than obvious:

- the Republic of Korea will get a mainland route to the European countries for the time-saving and cost-effective transportation of goods;
- the DPRK will have a modern technically equipped arterial railroad with the opportunity to collect profit coming from the transit transportation;
- the traffic of goods that can be transported in containers from the Republic of Korea to the West Europe and a share of goods coming from Japan to the APR countries could be shifted to the TransSiberian railroad.

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, you all are aware of the importance of the development of the economic and trade relationships aimed at improvement of the overall atmosphere in the international and bilateral relations. We believe that the

involvement of the DPRK into the large-scale programs in the Northeast Asia will contribute to the step by step integration of Pyongyang not only into the frameworks of the inter-Korean dialogue, but also into the regional economy and political systems. That would also make a difference in the actual strengthening of the security on the Korean peninsula.

국제언론인 라운드테이블
노무현 정부와 남북한 관계

Foreign Correspondents' Roundtable
The New Korean Administration
and Inter-Korean Relations

Paul ECKERT

Reuters

※ This is not for media citation and reflects my personal views and not those of Reuters.

The metaphor of a swinging pendulum has long been used to describe the changes of political fortunes in China, whose ancient society formed the model for its neighbours. The pendulum has swung dramatically in the time since I was invited to attend the Jeju Peace Forum. In fact, fast-breaking events on the North Korean nuclear issue that is the topic of our panel have forced me to revise these remarks even this week. We have gone from dark North Korean hints that it might test a nuclear weapon to signs that it will come out for talks before the end of the year. In Washington, the Bush administration has shown more flexibility and moderation than in the past.

The larger swing of the pendulum on the Korean peninsula is the one that I have been privileged to witness during my roughly 15 years of direct or indirect involvement here. I lived here first from 1987~89, during the pro-democracy upheaval and the Olympics. I then watched the peninsula during the 1990s from my posts in Japan and in China. The biggest swing of the pendulum has been in the South's attitude toward North Korea. As one who has long thought South Korea should be far more assertively confident of the strength of its society vis a vis North Korea, I'm sure that shedding some of the trappings of the Cold War mentality here were no doubt long overdue. I can recall the first opening to ordinary Koreans of access to the Rodong Sinmun in 1989, and I spent several years in Tokyo monitoring KCNA when it was illegal to do so in South Korea. Now, we get our first crack at KCNA via Yonhap and quite a lot of sympathetic portrayals of North Korea's regime in on-line media, the Hankyoreh and the new KBS. While I celebrate the freedom of local outfits to do this, I'm not sure that the about-face we have witnessed is in step with reality. Has North Korea EARNED the gentle treatment it now gets? Is hope triumphing over experience? In August, when North Korean journalists and probably secret agents posing as reporters attacked and beat up South Korean human rights activists at the Daegu student games, the ATTACKERS received a groveling apology from city officials.

At the end of 2002, the year when dramatic North Korean refugee escapes to foreign embassies in Beijing dramatized the plight of those people and the hardships back home, what was voted the year's number one human rights issue in an online survey of netizens and civic activists that have become a powerful force in South Korea? The tragic though accidental deaths of the two schoolgirls crushed by the U.S. Army minesweeper near Tongduchon. Even accounting for the political mood at the time, my thoughts then -- and I wasn't the first or only one thinking this-- were that the Sunshine Policy HAS changed a Korea, but it changed the wrong Korea: South Korea. I fear that the policy that Kim Jong-il was widely said to dislike because he understood the Aesopean sunshine fable and feared a South Korean Trojan horse on his doorstep has in many ways been a Trojan Horse in THIS society. I believe a well-conceived and reasonable policy that had the potential to change the North was hijacked by the North Korean regime and turned into a life-support system. Say what you will about their governance skills, their diplomatic etiquette or their economic management, the North Koreans are past masters at extracting tribute and turning disadvantage to advantage.

The new government of Roh Moo-hyun inherited the sunshine policy (transformed into the Peace and Prosperity Policy) as well as the nuclear issue, which broke just over a year ago. After a less than promising start -- during which he once suggested Seoul should mediate between North Korea and the United States -- Roh has enjoyed some success -- or luck -- diplomatically and appears largely on the same page as his diplomatic partners. The pendulum has swung back in other ways, as evidenced by more insistence by Seoul on reciprocity from Pyongyang and by the pragmatic decision to allow Hwang Jang-yop to visit the United States. I don't know if this is positive, but in the past year since it got caught cheating on the 1994 nuclear agreement, North Korea has gone from claiming -- implausibly -- that a nuclear reactor with no wires connecting it to the country's power grid was for peaceful power generation, to openly asserting -- more plausibly -- that it has a nuclear deterrent.

No one should be little the huge risks and complexity involved in the nuclear issue, which will probably involve ugly compromises by South Korea and its allies and might even merely postpone the problem another decade, like the 1994 accord did. But the one area that South Korea, now with two consecutive governments led by recognised human rights activists, will come to regret is its silence on the grave

rights problems in North Korea and its lukewarm attitude toward the refugees. South Korean leftwing civic groups -- and I would bet there are more leftists in the South than in the North -- seem to spend more time and energy chasing parking ticket violations by the U.S. Army than they do worrying about the brutal conditions up North. Those of us who write about the subject from Seoul cannot avoid noticing the silence and the strange priorities. Just Tuesday, the Unification Minister told the Foreign Correspondents Club in Seoul that he hadn't seen the huge new report on North Korea's gulag system. The latest word from the North Korean refugee community is that North Koreans prefer U.S. broadcasts like Radio Free Asia to South Korean media because it is too polite to Kim Jong-il's government. They feel abandoned.

What may be expedient today could be awfully embarrassing tomorrow, when the pendulum next swings.

The Roh Administration and Inter-Korean Relations

Gordon Fairclough
The Wall Street Journal

President Roh Moo Hyun said in the run-up to last year's election that he would continue his predecessor Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea. But Mr. Roh has taken a distinctly less dogmatic approach to relations with Pyongyang than Mr. Kim and has shown himself to be quite pragmatic in balancing his pursuit of reconciliation and cooperation with the North against Seoul's interest in preventing its neighbor from possessing nuclear weapons. The Korean government has also had to contend with the demands of a U.S. administration intent on pressuring North Korea to disarm.

North Korea's repeated provocations and its declarations in international negotiations that it already has nuclear weapons and could test one have prompted South Korea to take an increasingly hard line toward Pyongyang. In ministerial meetings between the North and South, delegates from Seoul have delivered strong messages that South Korea "could never accept North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons," in the words of a government spokesman. Mr. Roh himself has said that South Korea "cannot tolerate North Korea's nuclear program" and warned Pyongyang that it must choose between nuclear weapons and economic assistance. In recent months Seoul has continued to work on joint projects with the North, such as efforts to rejoin rail and road links between the two halves of the divided peninsula. And it has pledged to keep up humanitarian shipments of rice and fertilizer. But Seoul has made it increasingly clear that further provocations by North Korea would affect the continued flow of aid and progress on economic cooperation with Pyongyang.

All of that has brought Mr. Roh, who rode to power on a wave of anti-Americanism, closer to the U.S.'s position on North Korea - applying economic and political pressure while at the same time trying to engage Pyongyang diplomatically and negotiate an end to its weapons programs. Mr. Roh, while stressing the importance of finding a diplomatic solution to the standoff, has said that "dialogue and pressure must proceed in parallel." And he has expressed confidence Washington's handling of the crisis, which began in October 2002 after U.S. officials said North Korea

acknowledged having a covert nuclear program in violation of a 1994 agreement between the two countries. "As a rule, we both see carrots and sticks as part of the diplomatic process," he said.

North Korea's own belligerent behavior is a major driving force behind the policy shift and has caused significant consternation in Seoul. North Korea, for example, initially insisted that South Korea be excluded from talks in Beijing, even while calling for food and other assistance from Seoul. (They have since acquiesced to the South's participation.) Public opinion in the South is becoming more amenable to a harder line with Pyongyang. The reputation of Kim Dae Jung has been tarnished and the public's views of the utility of his Sunshine Policy have been colored by revelations that South Korea's intelligence service secretly helped ship hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea ahead of the 2000 Inter-Korean summit meeting in what investigators say amounted to a pay off to Kim Jong Il. As accusations about the payments surfaced this year and Pyongyang made a series of nuclear provocations, "public-opinion polls have shown a much cooler attitude towards the North" among South Koreans, said Scott Snyder, Korea representative of the U.S.-based Asia Foundation. "The effect is already being felt."

The effect of the nuclear standoff on the South Korean economy is also shaping the Roh administration's policies. A convergence of economic and geopolitical stresses has put the brakes on gross-domestic-product growth, which many analysts predict will be less than 3% this year, compared with a growth rate of more than 6% in 2002. Foreign direct investment in Korean factories and businesses also has been declining since a boom in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. It has dropped sharply since last autumn, when the crisis with North Korea started heating up. And the North's actions often have an immediate impact on South Korean markets. After news broke that North Korea had told U.S. diplomats in April that the country possessed nuclear weapons and could test or export them, the leading index of the South Korean stock market fell nearly 3.7%. And the South Korean currency, the won, weakened against the U.S. dollar. "Our economy is very open, so it's very vulnerable," said Cho Yoon Je, an economic adviser to the president. "It's affected a lot by the international community's response to the North Korean nuclear issue and the Korean peninsula's security problems." All of that is helping drive the country's policy on North Korea into closer alignment with the harder-line views of the Bush administration.

The South Korean desire to stay on good terms with the U.S. and to reassure the outside world, especially foreign investors, that the alliance between the two countries remains strong, has also contributed to Seoul's decision to send its soldiers to Iraq. Immediately after the end of major combat in the U.S.-led war against Saddam

Hussein, President Roh urged the National Assembly to dispatch troops, saying: “I have concluded that a strong alliance between South Korea and the United States is the way to resolve” the nuclear standoff “peacefully.” South Korea sent more than 600 medics and military engineers and pledged \$60 million in aid.

More recently, reassured by a new United Nations Security Council resolution on the reconstruction of Iraq, Seoul said it would send more troops to assist the U.S.-led stabilization effort in the occupied country. South Korea also said it would contribute an additional \$200 million during the next four years to help rebuild Iraq. Washington had been pressing Seoul to send thousands of soldiers to help restore security in Iraq, where lawlessness and continuing assaults on American forces are hindering recovery efforts. Both of these moves run significant political risks for Mr. Roh. Korean public opinion is sharply divided on the dispatch of more troops. Many of Mr. Roh’s supporters vehemently opposed the U.S.-led war in Iraq and have mounted frequent protests against sending soldiers.

The Korean Administration and Inter-Korean Relations: Foreign Press Coverage of North-South Talks

Donald Kirk

Former Seoul Correspondent, International Herald Tribune

For foreign journalists, coverage of the events that form the mosaic of relations between North and South Korea is problematic. From the outset, the job has been difficult for two reasons. The first is the obvious restraint placed by North Korea on coverage of meetings and visits, and the second is the imposition of a strict system of pool reporting by South Korean journalists beginning with the precedent set during the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in June 2000.

It was during that summit that the government, with the complete agreement of the Korean media, decided that all reporting from Pyongyang would be on a pool basis. There was no independent reporting during the summit, simply pool reports that were available to the entire media, Korea as well as foreign. While foreign journalists could read the pool reports, there was never a chance that they would be able to go to contribute to any of them. There was no notion of demanding that foreigners receive permission to go to Pyongyang with or without access to any of the pools.

Since then foreigners have had no direct access to the sources that are open to Korean journalists through pool coverage. For that matter, they have not been able to cover the briefings, for Korean reporters, in advance of coverage of inter-Korean talks on a number of different levels, ranging from ministerial to technical. In general, foreign journalists have gained access to North Korea only for occasional visits such as the opening of the road to the Mount Kumkang resort region or the beginning of construction of facilities for the lightwater nuclear reactors at Kumho.

The mention of Mount Kumkang evokes the memory of still greater disappointments for foreign journalists. When the first inter-Korean family visits were held after the 2000 summit, foreigners could interview South Koreans as they received their long-lost relatives from North Korea in elaborately staged settings in Seoul. Under

the pool system, foreigners also were able to cover the opening minutes of semi-private meetings among family members and could even ask questions of visiting North Koreans. Of course, foreigners were not able to cover the journeys of South Koreans to visit relatives in Pyongyang, but at least they got some first-hand impressions by seeing the North Koreans in action in Seoul.

As part of the development of the Kumkang resort region, however, North Korea persuaded South Korea to agree that Kumkang would be the site of all family visits. No longer would North Koreans be able to go to Seoul to see their relatives. Nor would South Koreans go to Pyongyang. All the visits would be covered by pools as before. For foreign journalists, however, the great difference was that they no longer were able to cover any visits first-hand.

The governments of both President Kim Dae Jung and President Roh Moo Hyun have never recognized this problem. Questions about access for foreign journalists to cover important events in Pyongyang and Kumkang go unanswered. Several journalists working for foreign news organizations were given pool access to Kaesong in August to accompany businessmen from small and medium South Korean enterprises to the site of a proposed industrial park, but they were able to stay only a few hours.

Under present circumstances, the closest that foreign journalists are able to come to covering any of these events is a press room at the Korean Red Cross headquarters in Seoul. There they can watch pooled TV coverage, pick up pool reports and ask questions of information officials from the unification ministry, the Red Cross and other organizations. The general sense, however, is that officials of North and South Korea view foreign press coverage of developments in inter-Korean relations as, at best, a nuisance and, at worst, a possible obstacle to progress in talks. There does not appear to have been any change in this position under the current administration. Although foreign journalists have been given the right to accreditation to events at the Blue House, this privilege does not extend to relations between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Undoubtedly, Blue House policy toward foreign press coverage of inter-Korean relations is driven in large measure by the refusal of Pyongyang to recognize the need to give access to foreign journalists. So far, the Blue House has seen no need to dispute this policy or to suggest a role for foreign journalists. The South Korean

government, like the one in North Korea, appears to view the issues as too sensitive, too delicate, as to risk intrusion by troublesome foreign reporters who might upset the North Koreans with difficult questions or, worse, critical coverage that Pyongyang would view as insulting.

Then again, from Pyongyang's viewpoint, perhaps too much association with foreigners might contaminate the few North Koreans who would be likely to have contact with them. In any case, foreign journalists, puzzling over their exclusion from covering the process, might get the impression that Korean leaders, both North and South, saw isolation from foreign observers as desirable for North-South understanding. While there was no way to avoid the humiliation of multilateral talks involving phalanxes of foreign officials, journalists and others in Beijing, North and South Korean officials could collaborate on excluding the foreigners from their own private, often secret, deliberations.

재계 리더 라운드테이블
동북아 허브 국가와 재계의 역할

Business Leaders' Roundtable
A Northeast Asian Hub and Private Sectors
: Architecture, Concepts, and Strategies

동북아 허브 국가와 금융의 역할

이 덕 훈
우리은행 은행장

I. 동북아 금융허브 육성의 필요성

□ 자금수요 역내 지원 필요

- 동북아지역의 급속한 경제성장과 물류중대로 투자자금 수요 크게 증가 전망
 - 북한 : 한반도 긴장 완화시 교역 증가 전망
 - 중국 : 최근 서부지역 대개발 계획을 수립·추진 중이며 향후 중국에 대한 투자수요 꾸준히 늘어날 전망
 - 현재 정부가 추진을 계획하고 있는 물류 중심지 건설계획이 보다 원활하게 이루어지기 위해서는 물류지원센터의 설립, 시베리아 철도와의 연계 등 대규모의 투자자금이 필요
- 동북아 금융허브의 육성은 저비용의 자금을 역내에서 조달하게 함으로써 대규모 투자가 원활하게 이루어지도록 할 것임

□ GDP 증대에 기여

- 우리나라 GDP 규모 세계 13위 경제대국이나 고부가가치를 창출하는 금융산업이 차지하는 비중이 선진국은 물론 경쟁국에 비해 낮음
 - 싱가포르 : 2002년 금융산업, GDP에서 약 11% 비중(1996년 약 7%)
 - 우리나라 : 2002년 6.9%
- 싱가포르 사례처럼(GDP 7% 쉼 11% 증대) 금융허브 육성은 경제발전과 국민소득 증대시키는 경제 선순환 및 고급 노동인력 흡수 기여 효과
 - 우리나라 높은 교육열로 많은 고급인력 노동시장에 나옴

□ 향후 금융허브 구축 및 육성과정에서 고급인력의 경제활동 참여 확대 예상

□ 전세계적인 금융허브 육성 정책 확산

- 미국, 유럽 등 선진국뿐만 아니라 아시아 지역으로도 확산 중
 - 중국 : 상해를 21세기 중국경제의 중심지 및 태평양 서안의 금융·무역센터 육성 계획
 - 홍콩 : 국제금융센터로서의 현재의 위상을 유지하기 위한 투자 확대
 - 싱가포르 : 자국경제를 금융 및 서비스부문에 특화된 중심지로 발전시키기 위해 정부

의 집중 지원

- 대만 : 2008년까지 자국의 국제비즈니스 센터 육성 위한 장기적 계획 수립

II. 동북아 금융허브 구축을 위한 선결과제

기업, 금융관련 법률, 제도 및 관행 획기적 정비

- 한국에 진출한 다국적 기업들이 국제적 수준의 서비스 수혜 혜택 가능
- 기업투명성과 국제적 신인도 향상을 위해 필요
- 시장중심적이며 국제기준에 부합하는 금융인프라 구축

노동시장 유연성 확보

- 외국금융기관들, 금융업종 특성상 M&A나 구조조정 등 유연한 경영활동을 위해 유연한 인력조정 요구

감세 면세 등 국제금융센터 육성에 필요한 획기적인 조세 유인책 도입

- 다국적 금융기관 유치 위해 경쟁국인 홍콩(12%), 싱가포르(20%) 등 보다 높은 조세부담률(28%) 하향 조정 필요

외환관련 잔존규제 점진적 완화

- 금융의 국제화와 다국적 기업의 투자유치를 위해 점진적 완화 필요
(2007년 외환관련제도의 완전 철폐 예정)

홍콩, 싱가포르, 도쿄 등과 경쟁하기 위해 원화의 국제화 추진

국제금융, 법률, 회계 부문 등에 전문인력 양성 및 정보 인프라 구축 필요

- 외국인 투자유인을 위해 하부구조 구축을 위한 투자 선행

국제금융의 중심지로 성장하기 위해 사회전반 언어 소통 수준 향상 필요

- 외국인 문화적 동질감 분위기 조성에 기여

III. 추진방법

국가적 차원의 동북아 물류기지 및 산업클러스터 육성정책과 연계 추진

- 최근 국제 물류업이 화물처리 뿐만 아니라 제조업적 기능과 무역·금융·보험 등 서비스적 기능까지 결합한 고부가가치 창출하는 방향으로 발전

- 물류 중심지로서의 역할 수행을 위해 철도, 항만 등 물류지원시설 건설 불가피
- 물류지원시설건설에는 막대한 자금 지원이 필요하는데 금융허브는 저비용으로 자금을 조달하는 창구 역할 담당
- 물류허브와 금융허브는 상호 배타적이기 보다 동시에 추진시 시너지 효과 큼

□ 우리나라 금융산업 및 금융시장의 국제화와 연계 추진

- 역내 국제적인 경쟁력을 갖춘 일류 국내 금융기관 육성 필요
- 국내 금융기관에 대한 해외 투자자의 전략적 제휴 및 M&A 활성화 검토 (특히 중국 및 일본의 주요 금융기관과의 전략적 제휴 필요)
- 국내 금융기관이 동북아 전지역에서 영업할 수 있는 능력 배양
- 국내 금융시장의 국제화 추진 및 원화의 국제화 추진

□ 정부 재정부담 최소화, 민관합동 추진 및 외국 금융기관 참여 확대

- 금융허브 구축은 막대한 규모의 매몰비용(sunk-cost)을 유발하는 물리적 시설이 반드시 필요하지는 않음
- 금융허브는 일정수준 이상의 조세유인책, 법체계의 선진화, 규제완화 및 감독기능의 투명성 제고 등 제도개선을 통해 구축되는 부분이 크므로 재정부담의 최소화 가능
- 동북아 역내 경쟁력을 갖춘 일류 국내 금융기관을 육성하고 각종 투자유인책을 통해 외국 금융기관 참여 확대

IV. 금융의 역할

□ 필요 금융서비스의 충분한 지원

- 물류 허브의 원활한 구축을 위해서는 막대한 자금 소요
 - 물류 허브 구축에는 막대한 규모의 외국 자본 유입 필요
 - 외부 자금 조달 등 금융서비스의 지원 역할 담당
 - ※ 홍콩, 1990년대 중국의 경제개발시 금융지원 창구 역할 담당
- 국내 금융기관과 세계적 금융기관간 전략적 제휴
 - 국내 금융기관이 국제금융시장에서 주도적 역할을 담당하기에는 어려울 전망
 - 자금 동원능력 및 국제적 Marketing 능력 한계
- 이러한 한계 극복 위해 우수 금융기관과 협력하여 자금조달, Marketing 능력 보강 필요

□ 기존 축적된 국제금융기법과 경험으로 외국인 투자 유치시 주도적 역할 담당

- Syndicated loan, Project financing 등 외국인 투자 유치시 거래 외국계 금융기관과 협조체제 구축
 - 국제 금융시장에서 보다 유리한 조건으로 자금을 조달하기 위해 선진 기법 및 경험 활용

□ 동북아지역 국제 금융업무에 특화

- 동북아 지역 관련 정보 수집 및 분석 능력 우위
- 북한 경제개발, 북중국 및 시베리아 지역 자원개발 위해 막대한 규모의 국제자본 조달 예상
- 국내 금융기관, 북한 관련, 북중국, 시베리아 정보 수집시 한인교포 활용 등 외국 금융기관에 비해 우위
- 정보 수집 및 분석능력 우위를 바탕으로 동북아지역 경제 및 자원개발 위해 Syndicated loan, Project financing 등 국제 금융 업무는 국내 금융기관이 주도적 역할을 수행해야 함

□ 국제 자금중개 및 이종통화간 거래기반 확충

- 국제 자금중개 활성화 유도
- 금융허브 육성을 위한 국제자금 중개기능 활성화 필요
- 이종통화간 외환거래 규모 확대
- 국내금융기관 IB 업무 확대
- 국제증권발행, 국제 M&A 등 IB 업무확대 유도

V. 기대효과

□ 국내 금융기관의 자발적인 생존력 및 경쟁력 배양

- 국내외 금융기관간 치열한 경쟁관계 유지로 국내금융기관 경영 효율성 제고

□ 국내 금융제도 및 환경의 국제기준 수렴을 통한 금융산업 선진화

- 금융허브 구축 과정에서 금융감독 및 법체계 정비
- 규제완화가 지속되면서 국내 금융제도 및 환경이 국제기준으로 발전
- 금융시스템의 안정성 확보로 외부충격에 대한 대응력 제고

□ 신규 고용창출 및 실물경제 성장지원, 국제금융시장에서의 국가신인도 제고

- 금융허브 구축은 다양한 고용기회 창출효과
- 기업금융비용 절감과 투자기회 확대로 기업 성장에 기여
- 대외 이미지 및 신용도 제고를 통한 국제사회 위상 강화

□ 국내 금융시장의 효율성 증대 및 다양한 자금조달 및 비용 축소 기여

- 자금 중개 및 배분의 효율성 제고에 따라 전반적인 경제 시스템 효율성 증대

VI. 맺 음 말

□ 은행 동북아 허브 구축에 기여

- 우리나라를 세계에서 성장잠재력이 큰 동북아 경제권의 금융센터로 육성하기 위해 은행이 주도적 역할 담당할 것임
- 동북아 허브 구축은 시너지 효과 극대화를 위해 물류허브와 금융허브 동시 추진 필요
- 금융허브 육성은 국내 금융산업의 질적·양적 발전을 통해 국내 산업구조를 현재의 제조업 중심에서 고부가가치를 창출하는 서비스 및 지식기반산업 중심으로 전환을 촉진하는 기회를 제공할 것임

□ 자본시장발달에 따른 Risk Sharing System 필요

- 동북아 금융허브 육성을 위해서는 자본시장 발달이 전제조건임
- 자본시장의 발달을 위해서는 민간부문의 확대 필요
- 민간 금융부문의 확대를 위해서 Commercial Bank의 참여 필요
- Risk Sharing System 필요
- 최근 시장 변동성이 급변해짐으로 Risk 커짐
- 동북아 프로젝트(북한관련 등)는 참여규모와 Risk가 커짐에 따라 Commercial Bank의 적극적 참여를 위해서는 위험을 공유하는 제도적, 정책적 방안이 모색되어야 함

KOHSAKA Setsuzo
Director, Japanese Association of Corporate Executives

During the mid 1960s, after the conclusion of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and Republic of Korea, as a staff in charge of chemical industrial plant for ITOCHU CORPORATION, I had the chance to export minimum commercial unit of acrylic fiber plant and polyester fiber plant to South Korea. Further, in 1997, during the economical crisis, I again visited South Korea to discuss with joint enterprise company regarding its operating funds and financial matters. Now, this year in August, the Asia Pacific Conference was held in Awaji Island, Japan, and the Conference invited Mr. Jong-Yong Yun, the CEO of Samsung Electronics, as the main speaker. While listening to his speech, I recognized that Japan may have had many advises for South Korea till the beginning of '80s, but now, there may be more things to learn from South Korea, which is constantly developing after overcoming the '97 currency crisis. Regarding my business experience with China; I was fortunate to be able to consolidate generous amount of contracts for petroleum and petro-chemical plant units after the Reformation and Open Economy Policy by China during 1978. Many of my staff members at that time are now active in China, but the main proportions of their business have shifted to the participation of joint enterprise management. What I hear from them is that the time now is not to sell products from Japan, but to promote investment from Japan. From the last year's economic statistics, China has pushed over United States and became the number one country to receive foreign investment. My relationship with Russia has been long in regard to the Sakhalin Development Project. I am pleased to know that the Project is now starting to form more concrete structure. It is encouraging knowing that these regions are also taking a role in East Asia economy and joining in the development.

Even from my limited experience, it is easy to realize that there has been a great change in the East Asia area during last few decades. I believe the speed of this change is faster than any other changes the world has ever experienced. Once called Eastern Asia's Flying Geese Pattern (or follow the leader pattern) of development form have vanished, and this region has advanced into horizontally in line development formation that is drawing world's utmost attention. It is possible to say

that the development form has now changed into Horizontal Division-of-Labor Network.

The KEIZAI DOYUKAI (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), which I am a member of, released a proposal this April called "Toward East Asian Economic Solidarity with a Free Trade Agreement at Its Core: The Need for Japan to Promote a Proactive Action." I would like to pick up some figures from this proposal. "If the world were a village with 100 residents, 33 of them would be East Asians. In economic terms, East Asia accounted for 22% of world GDP in 2001. The world GDP growth contribution ratio of the region was 45% in 2001, which represents a substantial increase over the corresponding contribution ratio figure for 1998 of 16%. It is clear that most of the countries of East Asia have fully regained the level of vitality they enjoyed previous to the currency crisis. In addition, trade interdependency within the region has been increasing rapidly, climbing from 40% in 1990 to 48% in 2000." White Paper on International Trade 2002, by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, explains this situation of regional trade linkage of East Asian region as follows, "Behind the convergence and growing sophistication of industrial structures in Japan and East Asia lie increasingly close regional trade and investment ties." Further, the report continues that "The US and Europe have seen their share gradually decline since the mid-20th century, a period conversely representing a historical turning-point for East Asia, which has since rapidly expanded its own share." In order to enhance this regional trade linkage, the national economy management system of each regional country must be somewhat at a same level, and shares the prescribed ground rules. From this perspective, the adjustment to the market economy by our neighboring China holds great factor to the trade linkage.

It is also desirable to know that South Korea is holding up the plan to "make Korea the focal point of East Asia" under the leadership of President Roh. The 2001 statistic shows that the handling volumes of container cargoes of Pusan port alone exceeds the added volume of Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe, and the airport passenger volume of Incheon is measuring up to Narita's. Further, the development speed and vast commercial utilization of IT (information technology) and communication in South Korea is surpassing Japan. Historically, the Korean peninsula has been the joining knot for Japan-China cultural exchange, and it is pleasing to know that the mutual exchange between Korea-China is expanding rapidly. It will be beneficial for Japan, Korea, and China to develop together as an equal partner.

In the past there has regrettably been a lack of efforts to see East Asia as a single region, due to excessive focus on the diversity and unique characteristics of its constituent countries. One reason for this is surely the way that the ties between the nations of the region have inevitably been vertical rather than horizontal due to factors such as the existence of a distinctive traditional culture in each country; subtle ethnic sentiments, arising from the experiences of the colonial period and the Second World War, impeding efforts at mutual solidarity; Japan's leading role in the post war growth and subsequent economic development of the region; and the formation by Japan and by other countries in the region of bilateral relationships with the United States.

Although, as I have mentioned before, the form of the economic development of East Asia countries has changed from Flying Geese Pattern to Horizontal Pattern, and constituent countries (except for North Korea) have advocated the market economy system, therefore the situation of the region has changed. Thus, Mr. Satoshi Iue; the CEO of Sanyo; invited Mr. Yun, CEO of Samsung Electronics, to the Asia Pacific Conference as the main sponsor of the conference, and Mr. Iue understands that it is time to learn from the once student Mr. Yun, therefore, he is promoting a joint development project for fuel battery and air-conditioner with the Samsung Electronics. At the same time, he has consolidated inclusive joint cooperation with the rapidly growing Haier of China in vast field of technology, manufacturing, and sales. This truly is the model of the horizontal and cooperative development. Even though each corporation faces the harsh competition of world market, this situation is occurring because there is the demand for new added value products by utilizing each corporation's strong point. Contemplating the forward mentioned perspective, there is the need to establish common goals with the aim of forming an agreement between the countries of East Asia to work toward the realization of "East Asian Free Trade Agreement." At the same time, there are expectation to weave a network of free trade agreements that will embed multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements that are individually tailored to the Asian characteristics.

Although, there is an issue we must consider at this point. That is; if East Asia continues to accumulate the economical power, then the impact on the world economy will be extensive. To be more specific, after the Second World War Japan promoted the export intensive economic order to acquire foreign currency to purchase raw material from the world. South Korea has also adopted the export intensive economic order and performed "The miracle of the Han River." China, after the Reformation

and Open Economy Policy, has managed the acute economical growth, focusing around the coastal area, with the export intensive economic order and has become the new “workshop of the world.” Furthermore, Latin America and East Europe, which has been taking import substitute economic policy, have awoken from its policy’s inefficiency, and they are shifting to the export intensive economic order too. As a result, many countries of the world are now taking oversupply mode, and worldwide wave of deflation is at our hands. Under these situations, voices are rousing for the leadership and self-control of fastest growing East Asia region. I believe that there is need for us to hold an equal standpoint as East Asia within the whole world, and have the determination to send out message out to the world under mutual concept.

China's "Fourth Growth Pole" and Private Sectors

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Since reform and opening up, China has taken some key economic strategic initiatives for its regional development, among them are the creation of special economic zones, coastal economic development strategy (Pudong new area in Shanghai included), and the great western development etc. Nowadays, reviving the northeastern part of China is becoming a new national policy and a hot topic. It is hoped that the northeast will catch up and become China's fourth "growth pole", following the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and Beijing-Tianjin area, and start a "new northeast era".

For many years the northeast has been China's key industrial base and has been given a central place in China's national economic system. From the 1950s to the 1980s the region of 107 million was China's leading industrial base, providing much of the steel, coal, and petrochemicals. Administratively, there are three provinces in China's northeast: Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. At present the output of crude oil in the northeast makes up two fifths of the country's total oil production, the output of wood amounts to one second, automobile output accounts for one fourth, and shipbuilding one third. Since the early 1990s, compared with coastal developed areas, the rhythm of reform in northeastern China has been relatively slow, competitiveness has been decreasing, the pressure of unemployment is heavy, and lead industries of the cities with rich natural resources are declining. While the speed of development slows down, the gap between the northeast and the coastal areas is becoming wider. People often refer to statistics indicating that when reform got started, the GDP of Liaoning Province was twice that of Guangdong Province in the south, but now the GDP of Guangdong Province is twice that of Liaoning Province, exactly the reverse.

Against this backdrop, the 16th Party Congress held last November put forward a strategic policy of reviving the northeastern region of China, the traditional industrial

base. In late May and early June, Premier Wen Jiabao made his second trip to Liaoning Province this year and at the end of the trip he gave an address. For the first time he has made it clear that the strategy of reviving the northeast is at the same level with the strategy of developing China's west, and they are the two wheels interacting with each other, one in the west and the other in the east. Although the situation of one region is quite different from the other, both are major areas in the national economic development strategy. In August, Premier Wen visited Heilongjiang and Jilin Province to investigate large-scale state-owned enterprises there. That was the third time that he went to the northeastern region this year. Up until then, the initiative of reviving the northeastern traditional industrial base, which was proposed in the 16th Party Congress, was put on the agenda of the new State Council.

Why is the northeast increasingly lagging behind China's southern part, especially the coastal provinces? What is the bottleneck of development in the northeast? It has been acknowledged that the fundamental reason is the lack of market mechanism. Why is that? It seems because the state-owned enterprises have been so dominant in this part of the country. By contrast, private-invested enterprises are so few and weak that this is unable to encourage robust private drive for the economy. In Jilin Province, foreign-invested ventures, including those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, account for but 10% of the whole investment, which is lower than the national average level of 10.2%. The percentage of private-invested enterprises is even lower. Therefore, a consensus has been reached that the reform strategy for the northeast has to activate private investment, and to make the structure of the ownership system more diverse.

The three provinces in China's northeast, which are geographically a part of northeast Asia, have various advantages such as rich natural resources, cheap labor and relatively well-educated population. Their geographical neighbors such as Russia, South Korea, and Japan respectively have their own advantages in economic resources, market, capital, technology and advanced management skills, which could be combined and will hopefully lead to business cooperation in the region and to achieve a win-win situation.

Since the development strategy of China's northeast has shifted from government-driven investment to a market-oriented system, the northeastern provinces will try to show the world its potentially numerous business opportunities

and to encourage foreign investment in the region. Based on a preliminary analysis, there are probably following demands and opportunities:

1. Demand for enterprise merger and acquisition(M&A) and technological upgrade. There are at least two-thirds of enterprises in the northeast that need to be reorganized and reformed.
2. Demand for the development of various new industries. New industries such as new-style education, entertainment facilities, and tourism industry are all in need of development.
3. Demand for infrastructure building. Transportation and communication systems and environment of the cities need to be built or improved.
4. Demand for environmental protection industries. River cleaning, sewage disposal and waste gas reprocessing, clean water provision system and so on all need a great deal of investment.

China's strategy of reviving the northeast provides a great opportunity of investment to South Korean business community that is interested in creating a northeast Asia era. Many cases have testified that China's economic development is more and more important for South Korean businessmen. Thanks to the late entry into the Chinese market, South Korean investors have smaller market share in many industries than the European, American and Japanese companies. If they can make full use of the above opportunities that China's development and change is providing, South Korean investors will hopefully catch up and even surpass other people!

Meanwhile, the strategy of reviving China's northeast also requires further cooperation among Northeast Asian nations. In October, the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea held the fifth meeting during the "ASEAN+3" Summit in Indonesia. In that meeting, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made four suggestions for cooperation among the three countries, including one that China will host a forum next year to discuss China's northeast development strategy and Northeast Asian cooperation. I believe that the implementation of Chinese new strategy of reviving the northeast will spur further cooperation among China, South Korea, and Japan.

제3패널

공동평화와 번영을 위한 참여정부의 이니셔티브

: 평가와 전망

Panel 3

Participatory Government and the Peace and Prosperity Initiative

: Assessments and Prospects

공동 평화와 번영을 위한 참여 정부의 이니셔티브 : 평가와 전망

김 방 회
경 제 평 론 가

1. 공동 평화와 번영 정책의 내용

- 참여 정부가 추진하는 공동 평화와 번영 정책이 구체적으로 무엇을 말하는지 잘 모르겠음. 상당수 국민들이 비슷하게 느낄 것임. 특히 지난 국민의 정부 시절 이른바 ‘햇볕 정책’ 과 어떤 점이 다른지 불분명함.
- 이 점은 동북아 중심 국가 구상도 마찬가지임. 시장이 그렇게 느낄 것임. 무엇보다도 공동 평화와 번영 정책이라는 이름부터가 논란거리임. 정책 수단이 아니라 궁극적인 목표가 어젠다의 이름으로 적당한가부터 논란거리.
- 다만 한 가지 그 동안의 참여 정부 외교 정책을 고려해보면, 햇볕 정책이 주로 긴장과 갈등을 중심으로 한 과거 남북 관계를 화해와 협력 중심으로 재설정하는 데 초점을 뒀다면, 공동 평화와 번영 정책은 전통적인 한미 관계 외에도 일본·중국과의 관계도 미래지향적이고도 종합적으로 고려하고 있다는 점이 진일보한 것으로 여겨짐.
- 평화와 번영 정책은 아직 구체적인 내용과 단계까지 확정돼 있는 정책이라기보다는 계속해서 모습을 갖춰가는 정책이라고 봐야 함. 예를 들어 노무현 대통령의 외교에 관한 태도는 취임 후 미국 방문과 ASean+3, APEC 등의 정상 회담 참석 후 전향적이고 개방적이며, 실용적으로 바뀌고 있다고 보임.

2. 노무현 대통령의 국정 어젠다와 우선 순위

- 노무현 대통령은 대통령 취임 후 공동 평화와 번영 정책, 동북아 중심 국가 구상, 그리고 국민소득 2만달러 시대 준비 등의 국정 어젠다를 공표했지만, 진짜 그런 어젠다에 전념하고 있다는 모습을 보여주지 못했음. 관련 위원회를 만드는 데 그치는 것이 아니라, 무엇보다도 대통령 자신이 해당 어젠다에 대해 몰입하고 자주 언급하고, 관련 정책

의 집행 여부에 대해 직접 챙겨야 함.

- 오히려 노무현 대통령은 정치 개혁, 그 가운데서도 전국 정당을 건설하는 데 최대의 관심을 기울이는 것으로 보임. 그래서 ‘김대중 대통령이 남북 문제에 지나치게 관심을 기울였다면, 노무현 대통령은 온통 동서 문제에만 관심을 기울이고 있다’는 지적이 나올 만함.
- 보다 실무적으로 보자면, 외교 정책의 입안 과정에 있어서도 청와대 내 주도 세력이 남북 문제에만 관심을 가진 비교적 젊고 폐쇄적인 그룹들로, 외교 전반에 대한 이해나 국제 경험, 그리고 국민의 합의를 수용하는 능력에서 한계를 드러내고 있음. 이라크 파병을 둘러싼 외교안보 팀 전반의 잡음과 내부 분열상이 좋은 예임. 정책을 수립하는 과정에서는 다양한 의견을 수렴하고, 공표·집행하는 과정에서는 확고한 모습을 보여야 하나 지금은 정반대임. 국민의 합의에 관계없이 수립하고 공표·집행하는 단계에서 이견을 드러내고 있음.
- 앞으로도 해당 어젠다에 대한 대통령의 신뢰부터 국민과 시장으로부터 얻지 못할 경우, 공허한 얘기로 끝나버릴 수도 있음.

3. 공동 평화와 변영 정책의 전망

- 미국과 북한 사이의 줄타기는 양쪽 모두의 신뢰를 얻는 대신 양쪽 모두의 신뢰를 잃을 가능성이 현재로서는 더 높음. 이라크 파병 문제에서 미국의 요구를 들어줬지만, 그 과정에 북한 문제에 대한 한국의 이니셔티브를 반대 급부로 요구해 미국의 신뢰를 잃었음. 북한에 대해서는 햇볕 정책을 유지하겠다고 공언했지만, 미국과의 관계에서 안달하는 모습을 보여 신뢰를 잃었음. 그보다는 이라크 전쟁의 명분과 전통적인 한미 관계의 형식을 중시하는 쪽이 국익 면에서 더 득이 됐을 것임.
- 동북아 이해 관계국들이 ‘다자 틀 내에서 북한 안전 보장’에 합의하고 북한 역시 이해법에 관심을 보이면서, 북한 핵 위기가 일단 평화적 해결의 수순을 밟게 된 것은 다행스러운 일임. 그러나 이것은 참여정부의 공이라기보다는 다분히 행운이라고 해야 할 것임. 더욱이 북한이 거듭 언급하고 있는 ‘동시 행동의 원칙’은 평화적 해결 수순에서 계속해서 트집거리와 시비를 제공할 소지가 다분한 것이어서, 최종 해결까지는 여전히 험난한 과정들이 남아 있다고 해야 할 것임.
- 참여 정부가 최근 들어 일본과 미국과의 자유무역협정(FTA) 체결에 대해 적극적으로 나서는 것도 공동 평화와 변영 정책의 구체화와 관련한 긍정적 신호임. 다만 중국과의

관계 설정에 대해서는 여전히 모호한 부분이 있으며, 이는 동북아 중심 국가 구상의 첫 단계에서부터 중국과 외교적 마찰을 불러 일으킨 부분임. 현재 북한 핵 위기뿐만 아니라 미국을 제치고 한국의 최대 수출 시장으로 떠오른 중국 경제의 위상을 감안할 때, 중국과의 관계를 재설정하는 전략은 평화와 번영 정책의 핵심 요소가 돼야 함.

- 설상가상으로 재신임 여부가 미국과 북한의 신뢰를 좌우할 중요한 변수로 작용할 것임. 대통령이 재신임을 받게 되면 이 정책도 추진력을 얻겠지만, 재신임을 못 받으면 참여 정부의 대북, 대동북아 정책은 사실상 폐기되는 것임. 재신임 투표 자체가 불가능해지는 상황이 오더라도 정책에 힘은 실릴 수 없음.

4. 공동 평화와 번영 정책의 과제

- 미국과 북한의 신뢰를 얻기 전에 먼저 국민들에게 공동 평화와 번영 정책을 충분히 설명하고 동의를 구할 필요가 있음. 특히 어떤 점이 햇볕정책의 $\pm\alpha$ 인지를 구체화하고 알려야 함. 그리고 정책의 집행 과정에서 모든 외교 정책, 특히 대미 외교 관계를 남북 문제에 연계하는 우를 범해서는 안됨.
- 그 출발점은 어떻게 하면 붕괴 일로에 있는 대통령의 리더십을 원상 회복할 것이냐 하는 것임. 대통령이 제안한 재신임 투표 절차 자체를 의회가 반대하는 상황에서 해법은 무엇인가? 이것을 거둬들이면 정치적 리더십 자체가 결코 회복될 수 없으며, 의회는 자신들이 패배할 재신임 절차에 동의할 생각이 없음. 이 딜레마를 푸는 것이 대통령의 리더십을 회복하고 공동 평화와 번영 정책을 비롯한 국정 어젠다를 추진할 힘을 얻는 출발점임.
- 최근 이라크 파병 결정에서 드러나는 것과 같이 점차 실용주의적이 되고 있는 참여 정부의 외교 정책과 노선을 고려할 때, 공동 평화와 번영 정책은 현재 국제 정세를 고려하는 가운데 한국의 이니셔티브를 구현하는 실용적인 것이어야 함. 특히 아시아 지역이 일본에 대해서는 과거 때문에, 중국에 대해서는 미래 때문에 강한 거부감을 표현하고 있는 점을 십분 활용해 동북아의 균형추가 될 수 있어야 함.
- 특히 다자 틀 안에서 북한 핵 위기를 평화적으로 해결해나가는 과정을 통해 균형추로서 한국의 역할을 재발견, 학습하고 이를 토대로 전통적인 한·미·일 동맹 체제를 대체할 동북아의 평화와 번영 체제(북, 중, 러 포함)를 갖추도록 함. 이런 구도 하에서 주한미군은 동북아 평화 유지군이 될 수 있으며, 북한 체제 문제 역시 동북아 평화와 번영의 장애가 되지 않도록 관리할 수 있으며, 통일 비용을 이해 관계국들이 공동으로 부담함으로써 낮출 수도 있음.

A New Initiative on Peace and Prosperity in the Era of Northeast Asia

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I. Background on the New Initiative on Peace and Prosperity in the Era of Northeast Asia

Advent of the Era of Northeast Asia

- The rapid growth of Northeast Asian countries in the latter half of the 20th century, China's increasing importance at the end of the 20th century, the geopolitical and geo-economic reorganization of the post-cold war global order in the 21st century provide increasing potential for Northeast Asia to take a leading role as a dynamic force in the formation of the global order.
- In the midst of accelerated integration, the reality of Northeast Asia already involves well-established regional trade, importance put on industry within the global economy, a highly regarded reputation in the international community, etc.
- Before the penetration of Western powers in the 19th century and Japanese imperialism that led to a structure of mutual aversion, Northeast Asia was actively engaged in cultural and organizational exchange and functioned as one organic whole.
- In accordance with the strong impulse in the 21st century toward regional economic integration and intercommunication, the era of Northeast Asia is ready to commence with collective prosperity for all on a foundation of peace.

What is Northeast Asia?

- Northeast Asia represents “a new spatial imagery” that includes not only South

Korea, China, and Japan but also North Korea, Russia, and Mongolia.

- The notion of Northeast Asia is distinguishable in the sense that the existing concept of “East Asia” has more of an economic connotation and the concept of the “Asia-Pacific” focuses more on the Pacific Rim.
- Northeast Asia puts an emphasis on Continental Asia that consists primarily of the Korean peninsula, China, Japan and also includes Mongolia and the Russian Far East.
- East Asia generally indicates the countries of Korea, China, Japan, and Taiwan but when used more broadly it includes Southeast Asia as well.
- The Asia-Pacific is widely used in the U.S. and Japan to emphasize Oceanic Asia.
- Under the Roh Moo-Hyun government the notion of Northeast Asia is more open, flexible, and value-oriented than the past notion of Northeast Asia which was frequently used with regard to security.

The Need for a New Epistemology of the Era of Northeast Asia

- The Idea of ‘the era of Northeast Asia’ requires a different epistemological understanding from the notion of “the Northeast Asian Hub State” or “the Northeast Asian Business Hub.”
- Besides economy, the era of Northeast Asia incorporates other domains and it intends to link the Korean peninsula problem with Northeast Asia as the era of Northeast Asia opens with the aim of overall integration in Asia on the basis of peace and prosperity.
- The era of Northeast Asia seeks a new historical epistemology and a new world-view.
- Overcoming the “Power Shift” in the 19th century between Europe and East Asia and Europe’s ethnocentric historical understanding and world-view to aim at the “Restoration of Asia” within our own framework of thinking.
- Overcoming ‘the history of periphery’ and preparing a foundation for the making of autonomous history and resolving the inter-Korean conflict, making East Asia a hub of peace and prosperity and establishing friendly relations

amongst the countries of Northeast Asia.

Korea's Role in the Era of Northeast Asia

- Initiative is needed to move in a unified direction with integrated historical experience and a future vision as Korea is the only country that can serve as a mediator to help neutralize the rivalry consciousness and historical misfortune between Japan and China.
- Korea's role should be fully carried out to open the vision of the era of Northeast Asia and help merge the continent and the ocean to form an Asian Union.
- However, the Korean peninsula still suffers from the burden of division and overcoming this with peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula is precondition for collective prosperity and security in Northeast Asia.
- Realistically, Korea is the country that can develop a socio-economic program to bind East Asia into one community.

II. Goals and Strategy of the New Initiative on Peace and Prosperity in the Era of Northeast Asia

1. Goal

Constructing a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asian community with the ultimate aim of forming of an Asian Union

Freeing the Region from the threat of war

- Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
- Build mutual trust and the basis of verification for the establishment of regional peace and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

Regional Cooperation and the Maximization of Growth Potential

- Maximize the dynamic of growth potential through regional cooperative enterprises.
- Construct the foundation for formation of community through establishment of complementary system of division of labor in the region.

Promotion of Intercommunication and Mutual Understanding

- Discover and diffuse the shared values of the Northeast Asian Region.
- Reinforce peace education for future generations in order to raise peace consciousness.

The Comprehensive Realization of Regional Peace, Social Justice, Economic Development and Environmental Protection

- Solve poverty and the relative sense of deprivation through guaranteeing a mutual support system.
- Increase regional cooperation in the areas of energy and environment in order to promote 'sustainable development' .

2. Strategy

Lessons of European Integration

- Starting with an interest in security and peace
- Developing the community through synergy of dialogue-cooperation- trust
- Beginning with cooperative projects in the area of resources (eg., ECSC)
- Invent a strategy aimed at the concrete promotion of small-scale projects and creation of a justifiable vision with increasing support from the people as a basis for the expansion of large-scale, long-term projects.
- Invent a strategy for achieving an appropriate level of cooperation between civil society and the government.

- Mobilize the nation through internal social reform and achieving the dynamic of social integration through discourse on the “Era of Northeast Asia” or a Northeast Asian Business hub.
- In order to meet financial needs for Northeast Asia related projects, a “Northeast Asia Foundation” should be established to allow not only governments but the private sectors to contribute.
 - To launch concrete projects regarding the New Initiative, a ‘Northeast Asia Peace & Prosperity Foundation’ should be established under the umbrella of PCPP.
- Declaration of the “Roh Moo Hyun Initiative” at the 2004 New Year’s Address.

III. Contents of the New Initiative on Peace and Prosperity in the Era of Northeast Asia

1. Security Cooperation

Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula

- Make and Consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula through a peaceful resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue.
- Bridge regional peace building efforts through the institutionalization of an international cooperative regime within the process of establishing peace on the Korean peninsula.

Idea of a Peace Community in Northeast Asia

- Establish collaborative international security in the new era of Northeast Asia by moving beyond the cold war concept of a zero-sum game in national security and strive to build a regional peace regime that includes the two Koreas.
- The foundation for the initiation of “Peace and Prosperity in the Era of Northeast Asia” is security on the Korean peninsula. The North Korea nuclear issue should be resolved through a framework of multilateral talks that can be developed into a

Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Council.

2. Economic Cooperation

Promoting a Strategy for a Northeast Asia Hub Economy

- Carry out a national development strategy by carving a niche in the competitive regional hub economy model which attempts to develop a cluster of finance, logistics, and R&D.
- Develop the free economic zones into Northeast Asia regional business hub, advance finance-related institutions and elevate the Korean financial market to a Northeast Asia international financial hub.
- Promote inter-Korean economic cooperation and develop an economic cooperative hub with the formation of inter-Korean industry, distribution, and information exchange.
- Envision speedy development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, advancement of inter-Korean enterprise, and promotion of Incheon as a world market logistics hub.

Preparing a Foundation for Northeast Asian Economic Integration

- Deepen economic cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan, and promote friendly diplomatic relations within Northeast Asia, and foster commerce and trade via conclusion of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA)
- Build an overarching regional logistics and communications network within Northeast Asia.
- Build institutional infrastructure through a sustained reformation of economic institutions and business practice.
- Promote regional energy and environmental cooperative projects.

3. Cultural Exchange

Promoting the Cultural Identity of Northeast Asia

- Utilize the shared Confucian cultural heritage of Northeast Asia to form a cultural community that corresponds to that of Europe.
- Promote Northeast Asian cultural cooperation to create cultural identity and maximize the cultural dynamics of Northeast Asia.

A Guiding Paradigm of Reciprocity and Cooperation

- Make efforts to develop the capacity of Northeast Asia that will embrace diverse cultures.
- Promote intercommunication and mutual understanding on the basis of cultural openness to overcome exclusive and detrimental national ethno-centerism.
- Establish an institution to promote human and cultural exchange for the benefit of future generations.

Cultural Cooperation and Joint-development of the Culture Industry

- Expand current bilateral cultural cooperation between Korea and Japan, and Korea and China to trilateral (Korea, Japan, China) cultural cooperation.
- Increase Northeast Asian consciousness by promoting the joint-development of history curriculum and through this process provide future generations with the possibility for the “Restoration of Asia” .
- Increase cultural industry cooperation by advancing the popular culture industry through the promotion of joint-development and distribution of cultural works (film, popular music, etc.)

Peace and Prosperity Initiatives of Roh Moo-hyun Administration: Characteristics and Prospects for Realization

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The Peace and Prosperity Initiatives of the new government have six characteristics. First, peace and security on the Korean peninsula are at the center of this plan. The reason for this is clear. With the disappearance of the Cold War, the only remaining area of serious confrontation is the Korean peninsula. There has been meaningful progress in exchange and cooperation between the North and the South. Progress on the continuation of six-party talks on the nuclear issue may provide the basis for a breakthrough in increasing the possibility for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

Second, the peace and prosperity initiatives are based on the notion that cooperation as well as competition should be part of the new paradigm of Asian relations. Competition among the economies in this region is the key to development and prosperity. At the same time, because of geographical proximity and the complementarity of natural endowments and industrial structures, the nations in this region have a lot to offer to each other, and can stimulate mutual growth through open relations and strategic cooperation.

Third, these initiatives are based on a broad institutional framework developed during the late 1980's and the 90's. In addition to the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations with China and Russia, the ASEAN plus-three framework enabled the emergence of annual summit meetings among Japan, China, and Korea. Collaborative projects in areas including trade and investment, information technology and environment protection have created a new model of cooperation.

Fourth, the geographical definition of Northeast Asia is rather flexible. Sometimes East Asia is used as a substitute for in the narrow sense. ASEAN may be included in the region when appropriate, and even the United States plays a necessary role in security as evidenced in the ARF.

Fifth, the peace and prosperity initiatives are not framed as an abstract ideology. They include very specific and concrete projects. Trade and investment drive growth by enhancing wealth and prosperity. Korea and Japan announced to start of FTA negotiations from 2004 and are putting forth their best efforts to finish the negotiations by the end of 2005. The Korea-Japan FTA has been studied since 1998. It took 5 years to translate the study into actual government-level negotiations through various levels of the consensus-building process. Business-level and business-government-academia level discussions were conducted before intergovernment negotiations were announced. China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN FTAs should be concluded by 2010 and 2012, respectively. A trilateral China-Japan-Korea FTA will also be studied. In addition to investment and trade, cooperation in transportation including the connection of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Trans-Korean Railroad will be discussed by joint teams formed among North and South Korean and Russian experts, which was agreed upon at the summit meeting between South Korea and Russia. And proposed projects concerning environmental protection will also serve as common ground for cooperation.

Lastly, Korea's diplomatic initiatives, and initiatives at the civil society level, will enhance the possibility of realizing these initiatives. President Roh's strong commitment to these initiatives is already showing results. Korea's unique role as a facilitator in realizing these initiatives will gain the region's attention. Korea's vibrant civil society formed through the process of building its free and open democracy will play an important role in cooperation with other civil societies in the region.

In conclusion, the "Peace and Prosperity" initiatives of the Roh Moo-hyun administration have a clear vision and a concrete roadmap. They are supported by strong Korean diplomatic efforts. They have a high probability of being realized. However, a precondition to their realization is peace on the Korean peninsula. This will require successful coordination of multilateral international efforts, and must be spearheaded by South Korea.

Thank you.

제4패널

동북아 공동체 구상과 제주도의 위상

Panel 4

The Jeju Island

in the Context of a Northeast Asian Community

동북아 평화공동체와 제주

- 동북아 다자간안보협의체와 제주 평화의 섬을 중심으로 -

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I. 서론

냉전종식에도 불구하고 동북아시아에는 핵확산 문제, 영토문제를 둘러싼 분쟁, 한반도의 불안정한 안보 상황, 그리고 일본과 중국의 패권 경쟁 등 동북아시아의 안보를 위협할 수 있는 요인들이 상존하고 있다. 이러한 위협 요인들을 어떻게 슬기롭게 해결할 것인가가 21세기 문턱을 넘은 현 시점에서 우리가 직면하고 있는 중요한 과제이다. 특히, 동북아시아는 탈냉전적 요소와 냉전적 요소가 병존하고 있고, 통합과 분열의 흐름이 중첩되어 나타나고 있다. 한반도는 2000년 6월 역사적인 남북정상회담으로 냉전적 대결이 완화되고 남북교류·협력의 물꼬가 트이기는 했으나, 북한이 지속적으로 장거리미사일과 핵무기 개발을 추진하고 있어 이러한 화해의 무드에 부정적인 요인으로 작용하고 있는 것도 사실이다.

경제적인 측면에서 동북아시아는 동북아경제공동체를 논의할 정도로 상당한 정도의 상호의존관계가 이루어져 오고 있다. 하지만 안보 면에서는 냉전의 유산인 자본주의와 사회주의체제간의 경쟁이 잔존하고 있을 뿐만 아니라, 유일 초강대국인 미국의 패권적 지도력의 약화 가능성이 있고, 이러한 힘의 공백을 이용하여 지역패권을 노리는 중국과 일본의 군비경쟁의 강화, 북한의 핵 개발로 야기된 한반도의 불안정한 안보 상황 등 분열의 요소들이 상존하고 있음을 부인할 수 없다.

더욱이 냉전종식 이후에는 강대국간의 전쟁 가능성은 매우 약화되었으나, 또 다른 유형의 안보위협 요인들이 도사리고 있다. 예컨대, 대량살상무기 확산문제, 테러방지문제, 환경문제, 에이즈의 확산문제 등 개별국가의 힘만으로는 풀 수 없는 문제들이 새로운 도전으로 나타나고 있는 것이다. 따라서 오늘날의 안보 개념은 군사전략문제만이 아니라 비정치적인 경제, 환경, 테러문제를 종합적으로 다루는 종합안보 또는 협력안보의 개념이 더욱 필요해지게 되었다.

강대국과 중진국, 그리고 약소국이 병존하고 있는 동북아시아에서도 이제 평화질서가 어느 한 두 국가의 힘에 기대어 유지되는 시대는 지나가고 있다고 해도 과언이 아닐 것이다. 동북아의 모든 국가들은 공동 노력을 통해 평화질서를 이룩해야한다는 점을 인식해야 하며, 이는 동북아국가들간의 대화와 협력을 통하여 상호신뢰를 구축해감으로써 이룩

될 수 있을 것이다.

동북아의 평화공동체는 과거 냉전시대처럼 군사적인 수단에 의해 유지될 수는 없다. 평화적인 수단에 의해 평화공동체를 이룩해가야 한다. 우선은 협력안보에 기초하여 동북아국가들간의 '다자간안보협의체'와 같은 평화협력레짐을 결성하여 풀어가야 한다. 이러한 협의체 안에서 서로 투명성을 확보할 수 있고, 대화의 습관과 경험을 배워갈 수 있을 것이다. 이러한 대화의 습관이 점차 제도화된다면 동북아의 평화공동체의 구상도 더욱 가시화될 가능성이 높다고 하겠다.

세계화의 지방화의 시대가 도래함에 따라 평화질서의 구축의 문제는 이제 중앙정부의 전유물이 아니다. 지방정부나 대학 및 시민단체들도 평화구축을 위해 다양한 아이디어와 참신한 전략을 제공할 수 있다. 이런 맥락에서 제주 '평화의 섬' 구상의 아이디어가 제기되었다. 동북아 평화공동체를 이룩하는 데 제주인들이 참신한 아이디어를 내고 동북아 평화질서 구축에 일익을 담당하고자 '평화의 섬' 구상을 추진하게 된 것이다.

제주인들은 평화를 주장할 의무와 권리가 있다. 제주인들은 '4·3'이라는 엄청난 희생을 치렀고, 그 쓰라린 고통을 안고 살아왔다. 희생을 당한 자들이 평화의 필요성을 더욱 절감할 수 있다. 희생을 강요당했던 지난날의 쓰라린 역사를 다시는 되풀이하지 않기 위해서도 평화질서를 이룩하는 데 적극 나서야 하는 것이 제주인들의 사명감이다.

이러한 문제의식에서 이 글에서는 동북아평화공동체를 이룩하기 위한 전제로서 동북아 다자간안보협의체를 검토해보고, 이와 관련하여 제주 '평화의 섬' 구상의 유형과 그 구체적인 실천전략들을 분석해보고자 한다.

II. 동북아평화공동체 결성의 전제

: 다자간안보협의체의 결성 가능성과 제주 평화의 섬

1. 평화의 의미와 동북아다자간안보협의체

동북아시아의 평화공동체를 논의하기 위해서는 우선 우리가 지향하는 평화의 의미에 대한 검토가 필요하다. 오늘날 일상적으로 쓰고 있는 평화는 대체로 두 가지 측면에서 그 의미를 고찰할 수 있다. 하나는 소극적 측면에서 평화를 전쟁이 없는 상태와 동일시하는 것이며, 다른 하나는 적극적 측면에서 평화를 단순히 전쟁이 부재한 상태만을 뜻하기보다는 인간이 자신의 능력을 개발시킬 수 있고, 나아가 다른 사람과 조화를 이루면서 모든 갈등과 분쟁을 힘에 의해서가 아니라 토론과 타협을 통해서 해결할 수 있는 인간공동체를 창조하는 과정으로 규정해 보려는 입장이다.¹⁾

1) 평화의 의미를 소극적 평화와 적극적 평화로 구분한 것에 대해서는 Johan Galtung, "Peace," in David L. Sills(ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 11 (The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1974), pp. 487-496 ; Johan Galtung, "Peace Research: Past Experience and Future Perspectives," in Galtung, *Peace and Social Structure Essays in Peace*

평화는 국가간에 조직화된 폭력 사태가 발생하지 않는 경우만을 의미하는 것이라고 규정할 수는 없다. 비록 전쟁이 일어나지 않는다 할지라도 개인이나 집단 및 국가들간의 관계에서는 크고 작은 대립과 충돌이 일어날 수 있으며, 이런 의미에서 평화는 보다 더 넓은 의미로 파악할 필요가 있다. 럼멜(R. J. Rummel)은 적극적 평화(positive peace)는 이를 통해서 인간이 행복과 만족을 발견할 수 있는 질서(order)를 의미한다고 한다. 즉, 적극적 평화란 단순한 폭력으로부터의 평화만이 아니라 인간의 자존심을 만족시켜 주는 마음의 평화를 의미한다는 것이다.²⁾

이런 점에서 본다면, 우리가 추구하는 평화는 소극적 의미의 평화가 아니라, 적극적 의미의 평화이다. 적극적 평화는 단순한 폭력 배제의 상태만이 아니라, 인간다운 품위를 지킬 수 있는 자유까지가 확보된 상태를 의미한다.³⁾ 이것은 인간이 타인의 자의에 의해 간섭받지 않고 품위를 지키며 자유롭게 자기 발전을 추구할 수 있는 질서가 보장된 위에서 가능하다. 따라서 개인이나 집단이 다른 개인이나 집단에 의해 폭력을 동반한 강제적 방법으로 자기발전의 기회를 제약받는 상태는 모두 비평화의 상태로 해석된다. 결국, 평화 질서란 폭력적 수단에 의한 타인의 자의적 지배가 배제된 질서이다. 더 나아가 이것을 제도적으로 보장된 질서를 의미한다

이러한 시각에서 본다면, 국제평화질서란 한 국가가 자의적으로 폭력적 수단(전쟁 및 테러 등)을 동원하여 타 국가를 침략할 수 없는 상태가 제도적으로 보장된 질서를 의미한다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 평화질서는 전쟁 없는 상태란 소극적 의미와 그것의 제도적 보장이라는 적극적 의미를 동시에 포함하는 것이다. 여기에서 전쟁을 예방할 수 있는 제도적 보장은 국가간의 법률이나 조약 등의 합의를 통해서 가능할 수 있다.

이런 점에서 동북아평화공동체를 이룩하기 위해서는 우선적으로 동북아국가들간의 갈등과 분쟁을 힘에 의해서가 아니라 대화와 타협과 같은 평화적 수단에 의해 해결할 수 있는 다자간안보협의체와 같은 국제레짐을 결성하는 것이 필요하다. 무정부상태인 동북아시아에서 개별 국가들에게 어느 정도의 규범을 제시해 줄 수 다자간안보협의체를 구축할 수 있다면, 이는 동북아국가들간의 갈등을 해소하는 것은 물론 더 나아가 동북아공동체를

Research, Vol. 1 (Atlantic Highland: Humanities Press, 1975-80), pp. 244-262 참조.

2) 럼멜은 적극적 평화는 정부의 힘을 극소화시켜, 각 개인이나 집단이 자신들의 이익을 최고도로 성취할 수 있을 경우 가능하다고 주장한다. 더 나아가 세계평화도 각 국가의 힘을 최소화시켜 여론의 견제로 분쟁에 개입되지 못하게 하고, 이를 바탕으로 인간의 가치를 최고도로 실현시킬 수 있는 공동체를 조성할 수 있을 때 달성될 수 있다고 주장한다. R. J. Rummel, *In the Minds of Men: Principles Toward Understanding and Waging Peace* (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1984), pp. 265-274.

라고스는 적극적 평화를 “인간의 삶의 질을 보장하는 기본 가치들이 보장되는 종합적 가치”라고 한다. 소극적 의미의 평화, 복지, 사회정의, 참여, 인간과 자연간의 조화 및 자유를 종합적 가치의 구성요소로 예시하고 있다. Gustavo Lagos, "The Revolution of Being: A Preferred World Model," in Heraldo Munoz (ed.), *From Dependency to Development: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 123-160 참조. 이상우, 『럼멜의 자유주의 평화이론』 (서울: 신아세아질서연구회, 2002), p. 168 에서 재인용.

3) 이상우 교수는 평화를 “공존에 대한 구성원의 자발적인 합의가 이루어진 상태”라고 정의한다. 동등한 격(格)을 인정받는 구성원[平]이 자발적으로 공존을 합의[和]한 상태가 곧 평화라는 것이다. 이상우, 같은 책, pp. 30-31.

결성하는 데에도 진일보의 계기가 될 수 있을 것이다. 따라서 동북아국가간의 행동의 투명성을 보장할 수 있는 다자간안보협의체와 같은 국제레짐(international regimes)의 구축을 통해서 동북아평화공동체가 이룩될 수 있다고 하겠다.

국제레짐이란 크래스너(Stephen D. Krasner)에 따르면, 국제관계의 어떤 특정 쟁점영역에 있어 행위자들의 기대가 수렴되는 묵시적 또는 명시적인 일련의 원칙(principles), 규범(norms), 규칙(rules), 정책결정절차(decision-making procedures)의 총체라고 정의한다. 원칙이란 사실, 인과관계, 정직(rectitude)에 대한 믿음이며, 규범은 권리와 의무의 견지에서 정의된 행위기준이다. 규칙은 행동을 위한 특정한 규정이나 금지규정을 의미하며, 정책결정절차란 집합적 선택을 하거나 이를 수행하기 위해 널리 받아들여지는 관례를 말한다.⁴⁾

러기(John Gerard Ruggie)는 국제레짐의 개념을 처음으로 사용했는 바, 그는 “행위자들을 지배하는 상호기대, 규칙, 규제, 계획, 조직적인 에너지, 그리고 재정적인 공약들의 집합”이라고 레짐을 정의한다.⁵⁾ 코헤인(Robert O. Keohane)과 나이(Joseph S. Nye, Jr.)는 국가간의 상호의존 관계에 영향을 주는 “일련의 국가의 행위들을 지배하는 협정(the sets of governing arrangements)”을 국제레짐이라고 보고, 이 지배적인 협정들은 규칙의 네트워크, 규범 및 절차를 가지고 국가의 행동을 규제하고 그 행위의 결과를 조절한다고 주장한다.⁶⁾ 특히, 코헤인은 레짐을 국제관계에 있어서의 특정문제들과 관계된 정부들이 인정하는 명시적인 규칙들을 의미한다고 하며, 이것들은 협상 결과 질서를 부여해 준다고 보고 있다.⁷⁾ 맥(Andrew Mack)과 라븐힐(John Ravenhill)은 레짐을 단순히 “국제협력 촉진을 창출할 수 있는 다자간의 협정”이라고 정의하고 있다.⁸⁾

이와 같은 주장을 종합해 본다면, 국제레짐은 특정영역에 있어 국가간의 관계를 조정하여 협력하게 하는 명시적인 협정들인데, 이것에는 원칙, 규범, 규칙, 결정절차가 있으며, 그리고 레짐은 국가간의 관계에 질서를 부여해 준다고 할 수 있겠다. 국제레짐은 국가의 힘과 이익 따라 쉽게 변화할 수 있는 일시적인 협정과 다르다. 협정은 임시적(ad hoc)이며, 종종 일회성으로 끝날 수 있으나, 레짐은 오히려 협정을 촉진하는 규범과 기대를 의미하며, 더 나아가 단기적인 자국의 이익을 넘어서는 협력의 한 형태이다.⁹⁾ 따라서 국제레짐은 국가가 공식적으로 가입하고 사무국을 갖고 있는 국제기구와는 다르다. 오히려

4) Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Stephen D. Krasner(ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2. 이 논문은 원래 *International Organization* (Spring, 1982)에 실려 있다.

5) John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," *International Organization*, Vol. (Summer, 1975), p. 570.

6) Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 5, 19.

7) Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 4.

8) Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, "Economic and Security Regime in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill(eds.), *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) p. 1.

9) Krasner, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

제도화된 국제기구로 발전할 수 있는 과도기적인 형태라고 할 수 있을 것이다. 오늘날 국제레짐이 있음으로 해서 국제관계의 행위자인 국가들은 이기적이며 협소한 이익에 따라 행동하기보다는 좀더 큰 이익을 위해서 협력하려 하며, 레짐의 원칙과 규범을 지키려 한다. 레짐에 참여함으로써 자신들의 이익도 달성할 수 있기 때문이다. 또한 레짐은 개별 국가 정책의 의도와 투명성을 알게 해주기 때문에 불필요한 오해나 의심을 서로하지 않게 되며, 상호 협력을 촉진해갈 수 있다.

예컨대, 국제무역이나 통화 영역에서 GATT, WTO, IMF와 같은 명시적으로 합의한 협정들은 국제무역레짐 및 국제통화레짐이라고 할 수 있다. 안보 면에서는 핵무기 확산을 방지하려는 NPT 등도 국제안보레짐이라고 볼 수 있을 것이다. 따라서 동북아국가들이 합의에 의해 서로간의 분쟁을 해소하기 위한 원칙, 규범, 규칙, 정책결정절차를 가진 다자간안보협의를 구성한다면 이는 동북아 평화협력레짐이라고 할 수 있을 것이다.

이와 같은 국제레짐은 냉전 종식 이후 국가들 사이에 새롭게 전개되고 있는 안보면의 협력관계를 설명하기 위해 대두된 ‘협력안보’(Cooperative security)라는 개념 하에서 논의 되어 오고 있다. 오늘날 핵무기의 확산과 환경문제의 대두 등으로 세계평화와 안보는 어느 한 국가만의 문제가 아니라 모든 국가들이 공동 노력으로 해결해야 할 필요성이 매우 절박한 시점에 있다. 협력안보는 이러한 절박한 상황에서 국가간의 대화와 협력을 통하여 상호 신뢰를 구축해감으로써 공동으로 안보를 달성하자는 아이디어에 기반을 두고 있다. 그러므로 협력안보는 예방외교 활동을 중시하며, 쌍무적 관계보다는 다자적 관계를 더욱 선호한다. 그리고 국가간의 대화를 습관화하고 이를 제도화하는 데 역점을 둔다.¹⁰⁾

다자간의 조약 및 협약과 같은 제도적 장치는 물론 국가간의 정기적인 대화체의 결성이나 비정부간의 교류를 정례화 하는 것 등은 이러한 협력안보의 틀 속에서 대화의 습관을 만들어 가는 것이다. 결국, 이런 과정이 좀 더 구체화되고 제도화된다면, 이는 바로 평화협력레짐을 구축해 가는 과정이라고 할 수 있을 것이다. 예컨대, 아시아지역에서 발전되고 있는 아세안지역포럼(ARF), 아태안보협력회의(CSCAP) 등은 대표적인 평화협력레짐이라고 할 수 있겠다.

10) 호주의 외무장관 가레스 에반스는 협력안보를 안보에 대한 포괄적 접근으로서 그 영역이 다차원적이고 점진적인 문제 해결을 시도하는 것이라고 정의하고 있다. 구체적으로 협력안보는 억지보다는 서로 상대방을 안심시키는 것을 강조하며, 배타적이기보다는 포용적이고 참여국가에 제한을 두지 않는다. 또 협력안보는 양자적인 접근법에 비해서 다자적인 접근법을 선호하고 군사적인 해결보다 비군사적인 해결책을 우선시한다. 그리고 안보체계에서 국가가 주된 행위자라는 것을 인정하지만 비국가적 행위자도 중요한 역할을 수행할 수 있다고 본다. 또한 반드시 공식적인 안보제도의 수립에 집착하지는 않지만, 그러한 제도의 수립에 반대하지는 않는다. 무엇보다도 다자적 차원에서 대화하는 습관을 만들어 나가는 것을 중요시하는 것이다. Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace* (Maryborough, Victoria: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 6.

에쉬톤 카터에 의하면, 협력안보의 목적은 성공적인 침략수단을 차단하여 전쟁을 예방함으로써 위협받은 국가들이 그들 자신이 스스로 조치를 취할 필요가 없도록 하는 것이라고 한다. 협력안보는 전통적인 집단안보의 개념과는 다르다고 한다. 즉, 협력안보는 조직된 침략행위가 어떠한 규모로라도 시작될 수 없도록 하는 것인데 반해, 집단안보는 침략행위가 발발했을 때 그것을 저지하고 패배시킴으로써 침략을 억지하는 데 목적을 두고 있는 것이라는 것이다. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 7.

2. 동북아다자안보협의체의 필요성

동북아평화공동체의 구축은 안보 면에서 다자간안보협의체의 결성을 전제로 함은 물론 경제면에서도 동북아국가간의 경제협의체의 결성을 필요로 한다. 경제와 안보는 밀접히 관련되어 있다. 일반적으로 경제협의체의 결성은 안보협의체의 결성을 가능하게 할 여건을 조성시켜 준다. 안보협의체의 구축이 가능하게 된다면 이는 경제협의체의 발전을 더욱 가속화시켜 준다. 따라서 양자는 상당히 상호 작용하는 보완적인 성격이 짙다고 할 수 있다. 동북아시아에서 경제협의체는 APEC, 동북아경제권의 구상, 한·중·일의 자유무역지대에 대한 논의 등과 함께 점차 구체화되고 있으며, 이러한 경험을 기반으로 하여 북한 핵문제의 해결이 다자간 협상틀 하에서 해결될 경우 다자간안보협의체의 구축도 점차 가시화될 가능성이 높다. 또한 동북아에서의 다자간안보협의체가 성공적으로 발전하게 된다면, 이는 동북아경제공동체의 발전에 더욱 긍정적인 영향을 미치게 될 것이다.

그러면 동북아시아에서 평화협력을 위해 다자간안보협의체가 필요한 이유는 무엇인가?

그 이유는 첫째 냉전 종식 이후에 동북아시아의 안보 면에 있어 불확실성이 오히려 더 커졌다는 데서 찾을 수 있을 것이다. 미국은 탈냉전시대에도 아시아의 안전보장자로서의 소임을 다 하겠다는 공약을 하고 있지만, 러시아와 중국의 위협이 약화된 상황에서, 그리고 미국의 경제력이 냉전기처럼 강하지도 않은 상황에서 이 지역에서 미국이 장기적으로도 안전보장자로서의 역할을 지속할 것인지에 대해서는 불확실하다.

미국이 9·11테러 이후 국방력을 배가하고 “테러와의 전쟁”을 선언하면서 이라크와의 전쟁을 적극 수행하고 세계경찰로서의 패권적 역할을 강화하고 있으나, 군사비의 확장에 따라 경제력의 손상은 불가피할 것이므로 미국 경제의 상대적 쇠퇴에 다시 직면할 가능성이 높다. 이처럼 미국의 경제력이 상대적으로 약화되고 있는 상황 하에서는 다음 두 가지 점에서 미국이 패권적 지도력을 떠맡을 의지는 점차 줄어들 가능성이 높다고 보인다.¹¹⁾ 하나는 클린턴 대통령의 당선에서도 이미 나타났듯이, 앞으로 20년 정도는 미국의 정치지도자들이 40년대와 50년대의 제2차대전과 냉전의 시작을 경험한 세대보다는 오히려 대부분 60년대와 70년대의 시민권 운동과 베트남 전쟁, 그리고 데탕트 등의 사건에 의해 형성된 견해를 가진 사람들이 주도할 것이라는 점이다. 이들은 대외문제에의 개입에 회의적이며, 이전세대나 이후세대보다도 국내개혁에 더 관심을 갖고 좀 더 낙관적인 세대들이다. 따라서 이들이 주도하는 미국 정치는 이전보다 고립주의적인 성향을 띠 가능성이 높다.

다른 하나는 냉전 종식 이전에는 소련이라는 명백한 적이 있었기 때문에 미국의 적극적이고 확장적이며 지속적인 세계경찰로서의 대외적 역할이 국가적 생존을 위해 정당화될 수 있었으며, 그러므로 국민들을 설득할 수 있었다. 그러나 이제는 그러한 위협을 대신할 마땅한 것이 없어 대외적인 역할을 정당화하기가 매우 어려워져 가고 있다. 다만 “테러와의 전쟁”이 미국의 대외적인 역할을 정당화시키고 있으나, 이라크전쟁이 유엔 안전보장이

11) 이 점에 대해서는 Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of American Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 18-19 참조.

사회의 동의를 얻지 않고 미국 독자적으로 수행되었다는 점에서 미국의 군사력에 의한 패권적 일극주의는 강화됐으나 도덕적 정당성면에서 세계 여러 나라들의 지지가 필요한 정치적인 패권적 지도력은 오히려 약화된 점이 없지 않다. 이런 점에서 미국의 대외적인 역할의 지속, 강화는 미국 내외에서 그 정당성을 얻기가 더욱 어려워질 것이다. 이렇게 될 경우 국내문제의 해결과 경제력 향상을 최우선과제로 삼게 될 것이므로 미국이 세계적인 지도력과 책임을 져야 한다는 주장은 점차 국민적 합의를 끌어내기가 어려운 일이 될 것이다. 세계공공재를 제공하는 패권적인 지도력의 행사에는 비용이 많이 들기 때문이다.

이러한 이유로 해서 냉전 종식 이후에 아시아에서는 오히려 군비경쟁이 더욱 증대되고 있는 실정이다.¹²⁾ 그리고 일본의 정치·군사대국화 노선과 미국의 힘의 공백을 이용하려는 중국의 패권 추구 야욕도 점증하고 있는 것이다. 예를 들면 남사군도를 둘러싼 중국과 동남아시아국가들간의 분쟁과, 일본의 북방 4개섬의 반환과 관련한 일본과 러시아간의 갈등, 일본의 직선기선 설정으로 인한 한국과 일본간의 해양분쟁 가능성, 그리고 북한의 핵개발로 인한 불안정 등이 냉전 종식 이후에 점차 노정 됨으로써 동아시아지역 내의 안보면의 불안정을 점증시키고 있는 것이다. 이러한 점에 장기적인 대응을 하기 위해서는 동북아시아지역에서도 다자간안보협의체와 같은 동북아 평화협력레짐을 결성할 필요가 있다. 상호신뢰와 투명성을 확보할 수 있는 다자간안보협의체가 결성된다면 역내국간의 안보적 불안감을 해소시킬 수 있을 것이기 때문이다.

둘째, 오늘날의 문제들은 국경을 초월하여 형성·발전되기 때문에 국가들 사이의 협조를 통하지 않고서는 그 해결책을 찾기가 쉽지 않다는 점이다. 핵무기 확산문제, 해로(sea lane)문제, 테러방지문제, 환경문제, SARS 및 에이즈 퇴치문제, 그리고 마약문제 등은 개별 국가의 힘과 노력만으로는 풀 수 없는 문제들이다.¹³⁾ 이러한 이유에서도 오늘날의 안보개념은 군사전략문제만이 아니라 비정치적인 경제, 환경문제들을 종합적으로 다루는 상기한 바의 협력안보의 개념으로 전환하고 있다. 따라서 군사개념 위주의 양자간 동맹관계에 입각한 기존의 안보장치만으로는 동북아시아지역의 광역화되고 있는 새로운 안보개념에 대처하는 데 부족하며, 종합적으로 이러한 문제를 논의할 수 있는 다자간안보협의체가 필요하다고 하겠다.

3. 다자간안보협의체의 결성 가능성

그러면 현 시점에서 동북아다자간안보협의체의 결성은 가능한 것인가? 북한 핵문제를 6개국의 다자간협상틀 내에서 해결하려는 움직임에서 볼 수 있는 것처럼 동북아시아 관련 강대국들의 다자간안보협의체에 대한 반응은 부정적이지는 않다.¹⁴⁾ 북

12) 한 분석에 의하면, 1991년에 전 세계국가의 주요 무기 총수입액 중에서 아태지역이 35%를 차지했다고 하며, 이는 유럽을 포함한 어느 지역보다도 높은 액수라고 한다. Gerald Segal, "Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), p. 83.

13) 이서향, "동북아 다자간 안보대화·협력의 모색: 한국의 입장," 『지역연구논총』, 제5집 (1993), p. 170 참조.

한의 경우는 좀 소극적이기는 하지만, 주변 4강의 의사가 적극적일 경우에는 계속 반대하기가 쉽지 않을 것이다. 한국은 1993년 5월 말 서울에서 열린 제26차 태평양경제협의회(PBEC) 개막 연설에서 국내의 개혁추진을 바탕으로 역내 안보협력 추구의지를 천명한 데 이어, 한승주 외무장관이 다자간안보협력을 주요 내용으로 하는 지역협력의 모색을 ‘신외교5대기조’ 중의 하나로 밝힘으로써,¹⁵⁾ 다자간안보협의체의 결성에 대한 적극적인 의지를 드러내었다. 노무현 정부도 “동북아 중심국가”로의 부상을 핵심 국정과제로 설정하고 있어 동북아에서의 안보적 불안감을 해소할 수 있는 6자회담과 같은 다자간안보협의체에 긍정적인 입장을 견지하고 있으며, 이를 적극 추진하려 하고 있다. 더욱이 북한 핵문제의 평화적 해결을 위해서도 이는 매우 필요한 것이다. 한국은 다자간안보협의체가 결성된다면, 이를 통하여 북한의 호전성을 약화시키고 개방을 유도함으로써 남북한 관계개선과 한반도의 통일환경 조성에 긍정적인 역할을 할 것으로 기대하고 있다.

로버트 저비스(Robert Jervis)는 안보레짐의 형성 조건으로 다음의 것을 주장한다.¹⁶⁾ 첫째는 강대국들이 안보레짐의 수립을 원해야만 한다. 즉, 모든 국가들이 개별적으로 행동하는 것보다 좀 더 조절적인 환경을 선호해야 한다는 것이다. 이는 모든 국가들이 현상유지에 만족해야 한다는 의미이다. 둘째, 여타 행위자들이 상호안보와 협력에 입각한 가치를 공유하고 있다고 모든 행위자들이 믿어야만 한다. 셋째, 어느 한 행위자라도 안보가 팽창에 의해 달성될 수 있다는 믿음을 가져서는 안 된다. 넷째는 전쟁 및 개별적인 안보의 추구가 비용으로서 간주되어야 한다. 즉, 오늘날에는 전쟁이나 군비확장에는 엄청난 비용이 많이 소요되기 때문에, 모든 행위자들이 이러한 비용을 줄여 자국의 경제발전에 투자하는 것이 이익이라는 데에 동의해야 한다는 것이다.

냉전 종식 이후의 동북아시아의 안보환경은 이러한 네 가지 조건들을 어느 정도 만족시키고 있는 것으로 보인다. 강대국들이 다자간안보협의체의 설립에 긍정적인 반응을 보이고 있으며, 어느 국가도 현상타파를 원하지 않고 있다. 그리고 협력안보의 가치를 어느 정도 인정하고 있는데, 이는 모든 국가들이 국내 경제발전을 중시하고 있어 안보유지에 비용이 너무 많이 소요된다는 데에 동의하고 있기 때문이다. 따라서 동북아시아에서도 다자간안보협의체의 결성은 가능성이 높다고 할 수 있을 것이다.

더욱이 북한 핵문제의 해결을 위한 6자회담이 이미 지난 8월말 북경에서 1차회담이 열렸다는 점에서도 북한 핵문제의 평화적 해결 가능성은 높다고 하겠다. 북한 핵문제가 대화를 통한 외교적 해결로 타결될 경우 북핵문제의 해결을 위한 동북아시아국가들간의 다자간협의체의 결성도 가시화될 수 있을 것이다. 더 나아가 이러한 다자간 협상이 성공한다면, 이는 동북아시아국가들 사이에 안보협력에 대한 중요한 경험과 교훈을 주게 될 것이다. 따라서 이러한 다자간 협상들이 계속되어 제도화된다면 동북아다자간안보협의체 결

14) 동북아 4강의 다자간안보협의체에 대한 반응에 대해서는 홍현익·이대우 공편, 『동북아다자간안보협력과 주변4강』(성남: 세종연구소, 2001) 참조.

15) 외무부, “한국 신외교의 기조 - 세계와 미래지향의 신한국외교,” 『외교정책해설자료』, 1991년 5월 31일, p. 14.

16) Robert Jervis, “Security Regime,” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regime, op. cit.*, pp. 176-178.

성이 구체화될 가능성도 배제할 수 없을 것으로 생각된다.

4. 다자간안보협의체의 추진과 제주 평화의 섬

그러면, 어떠한 방법으로 추진해 나갈 것인가?

첫째, 앞에서 상술한 바와 같이 레짐의 형성에는 패권적 리더십을 가진 국가들이 적극적인 역할을 해야 한다. 미국의 클린턴 전 행정부는 ‘신태평양공동체’를 제안할 정도로 다자간안보협의체에 대해 긍정적인 반응을 보였으며, 부시 행정부도 북한의 핵문제를 다자간협상틀 속에서 해결하려 하고 있기 때문에 이를 좀 더 구체화 할 수 있도록 분위기를 조성하는 것이 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 한국과 같은 패권의 야망이 없는 국가가 기업가적 또는 지적인 리더십(intellectual leadership)을 발휘하는 것이 매우 유용할 것이다.

한국은 다자간안보협의체 구성의 필요성을 지속적으로 역설해야 하며, 협의체의 구성원칙과 규범, 규칙 및 의사결정절차에 대한 아이디어를 개발하여 적극 제의해야 한다. 특히, 협의체에서 다룰 의제내용에 대해서도 모든 참여국들이 공감할 수 있는 이슈들을 중점적으로 개발하여 제안하는 것이 필요하다. 예컨대, 난민, 테러방지, 마약, 환경보전, 오염방지, 해상안전감시, 공동해양개발, 그리고 해적퇴치 등과 같은 모두가 공감할 수 있는 비정치적 이슈들을 먼저 내걸고, 이것을 통해 점차 협력의 관습을 축적한 후에 영유권 중재문제, 군축문제, 핵확산방지와 같은 정치·군사문제들을 제의해야 한다. 이러한 점에서 동북아시아에서의 다자간안보협의체의 구축은 다자적 대화와 비정치적 부문이 선행하는 ‘연성다자주의’(soft multilateralism)의 방식으로 단계적, 점진적으로 추진되는 것이 바람직하다. APEC의 결성에 있어 호주가 행한 역할을 참조하는 것이 좋을 것이다.

둘째, 안보 면에 있어 정부간의 공식적인 대화나 협력은 상호불신이 완전히 제거되지 않은 상황에서는 쉽지 않기 때문에 비공식적인 민간단체나 민간기구를 활용하여 정부간의 안보대화 및 협력을 유도하는 제2트랙(track two)의 방식을 사용하는 것이 효과적일 것이다.¹⁷⁾

예를 들면, 민간인간의 교류를 중심으로 하는 태평양경제협력회의(PECC)가 아태경제협력회의(APEC)를 위하여 다양한 회의를 개최하고 실질적인 문제에 관해 보고서를 작성, 제출하는 기능을 함으로써 APEC의 활성화에 크게 기여하고 있으며, 아태안보협력회의(CSCAP)도 아세안지역포럼(ARF)의 활성화를 위해 민간인 차원에서 자료를 축적하고 연구기능을 수행하고 있다. 이러한 민간단체들의 적극적인 역할이 공식적인 정부간의 대화와 협력을 이끌어내는 데 매우 효과적일 수 있는 것이다. 특히, 레짐의 질서구성 원칙들을 개발하여 제공하는 지적인 리더십(intellectual leadership)은 상호의존적인 오늘의 세계에서는 민간단체와 지방자치체 등도 제공할 수 있으므로, 관련국의 학자 및 민간 연구소, 지방자치체들의 활발한 연구와 참여가 필요하다. 미국 샌디에고 캘리포니아대학 ‘세계갈

17) 신옥희, “다자주의의 동아시아 적용의 문제,” 『한국과 국제정치』, 제13권, 제1호 (1997년 봄/여름호), pp. 259 참조.

동협력연구소'의 주관하에 1993년부터 추진되어 오고 있는 '동북아시아협력대화'(NEACD)가 더욱 활성화할 수 있도록 한국은 적극적인 지원을 아끼지 않는 것이 중요하다. 이들의 연구를 통해 동북아시아의 다자간안보협의체에 대한 공감대가 형성되어 각 국가의 여론이 이에 적극적으로 지지하게 된다면, 정부들도 결국에는 협의체 결성을 서두르게 될 것이기 때문이다.

셋째, 냉전기간 중에 역외국가들 특히, 강대국들과의 안보협력이나 안보대화에 소극적인 태도를 보였던 ASEAN이 냉전 종식 이후에 ARF와 같은 다자간안보대화체 출범에 적극적인 이니셔티브를 취했는데, 이러한 ASEAN의 경험과 태도로부터 지역협력에 대한 전략을 배울 필요가 있다. 이와 같은 ASEAN의 태도 변화는 예상보다 빨리 이루어진 필리핀내 미군기지의 철수, 소련연방의 붕괴, 불투명한 미일관계 전망, 중국의 대아시아 외교 공세와 남중국해역에 대한 영향력 팽창 기도, 그리고 미군감축에 따른 힘의 공백이 초래될 가능성 등 매우 유동적인 지역안보 상황에 기인한 것이다.¹⁸⁾

이러한 불안정한 안보 상황은 동북아시아의 경우도 비슷하기 때문에 동북아시아에서도 ARF와 같은 다자간안보대화 정도라도 우선 시작하는 것이 매우 필요하다. ARF처럼 매년 고위급 회담을 개최하여 공통의 이해와 관심이 있는 정치·안보문제에 대한 건설적인 대화와 협의의 습관을 기르고, 동북아시아의 신뢰구축을 축적해 나가는 것이 매우 필요할 것으로 보인다. 그리고 ARF처럼 회원국을 너무 한정하지 말고 참여를 원하는 국가들은 읍저버로라도 참여할 수 있도록 유도하는 것이 바람직하다. 예컨대, 캐나다와 같은 경우는 동북아다자안보대화를 제안한 적도 있으므로 참여시켜, 지적인 리더십을 발휘하도록 하는 것도 효율적일 것으로 생각된다. 이러한 문제를 담당하는 부서를 외교통상부 내에 상설하는 것도 매우 유용할 것이다.

넷째, 동북아시아의 다자간안보협의체는 기존의 양자관계를 해치지 않고 보완하는 방향으로 추진되는 것이 바람직하다. 미국과 일본이 그 동안 다자간안보협의체 구성에 소극적인 태도를 보인 가장 큰 이유가 바로 이 구상이 미일안보조약을 대체하는 것으로 잘못 인식했기 때문이다. 따라서 이 같은 우려를 불식시키기 위해서도 다자간안보협의체는 동북아시아에 이미 확립되어 있는 쌍무관계나 앞으로 전개될 양자협상의 중요성을 부정 또는 잠식하지 않도록 추진되는 것이 바람직하다.

다자간안보대화체의 구축 또는 안보협력의 추구가 전통적인 양자관계에 부정적으로 영향을 미치지 않으며, 오히려 상호보완적인 사례는 많다. 예컨대, 미국과 영국은 북대서양 조약기구(NATO)의 틀 속에서도 전통적인 우호관계를 유지하고 있으며, 유럽연합(EU)의 결성이 기존 회원국간의 다양한 쌍무관계를 전적으로 대체하지 않았음은 다자간안보협의체가 기존 양자관계와의 상호 보완 가능성을 실증하고 있는 것이다.¹⁹⁾

다섯째, 동북아시아의 다자간안보협의체가 제도화되기 위해서는 참여국 정상들간의 정

18) 전황수, "지역협력기구로서의 ASEAN," 『한국과 국제정치』, 제12권, 제2호 (1996년 가을/겨울), pp. 290-291 참조.

19) James E. Goodby, "Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia," *Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, United Nations Disarmament Topical Paper 11 (1992), p. 79. 이서향, 앞의 글, p. 177에서 재인용.

례회합, 안보·외교관계 장관급회의 개최, 외교·안보고위실무자 접촉, 사무국 설치, 분쟁방지센터의 설치 등을 추진해 볼 수 있으며, 이러한 사항들은 하나의 문서로서, 이를테면 ‘동북아국가간 기본관계합의서’의 형태로 명문화하는 것이 바람직하다. 또한 지역안보 문제를 전담하여 처리할 수 있는 사무국을 설치하고 분쟁방지센터, 분쟁중재재판소, 군축위원회, 검증·사찰팀 등이 구성되어야 한다. 이들 사무국, 분쟁방지센터, 분쟁중재재판소 및 군축위원회 등을 유럽안보협력기구(OSCE)의 경우와 같이 참여국에 분산 배치하여 역내국가간의 안보와 관련된 제반문제에 대한 다자협력을 긴밀히 도모해 나가야 한다.²⁰⁾

이와 같은 방식을 적용하여 동북아다자간안보협의체가 구축되게 된다면, 그것은 곧 동북아의 안정과 평화를 위한 견고한 토대가 될 것이다. 레짐은 불확실한 행위자들 사이에 투명성을 높여주어 상호신뢰를 구축하게 해 주기 때문이다. 또한 동북아의 안보협의체의 결성은 곧 경제협의체를 발전시키는 밑거름이 될 것이며, 따라서 이러한 협의체의 결성을 통해 점차 동북아공동체도 가시화될 가능성이 입증될 것이다.

한국으로서는 동북아다자간안보협의체의 결성이 한반도의 안정과 평화에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 것이고, 더 나아가 평화통일에도 적극적인 기여를 할 것이므로 이것이 성사될 수 있도록 모든 노력을 아끼지 말아야 한다. 북한 핵문제의 평화적 해결을 다자간대화틀 안에서 해결하도록 외교적 노력을 기울이는 한편, 지속적으로 6자회담과 같은 다자간협의를 추진해야 한다. 이러한 협의가 성사된다면 이를 더욱 확대시켜 다자간안보협의체로 발전될 수 있도록 하는 것도 좋은 방법이다. 그리고 궁극적으로는 이러한 다자간안보협의체가 더욱 발전되어 아시아의 집단안보기구로 성장하는 것이 한국으로서는 가장 바람직하다고 할 수 있다. 왜냐하면 강대국 사이에 끼어 있는 약소국은 강대국의 행위를 공동으로 대처할 수 있는 집단안보기구에서 가장 확실한 안보를 보장받을 수 있으리라는 믿음 때문이다.

냉전 종식 이후에 동아시아 국가간의 경제협력이 확대됨에 따라, 이를 더욱 활성화하기 위해 지방자치제간의 교류협력과 경제협력도 한층 더 활발하게 전개되고 있다. 이에 따라 동북아시아의 중심에 자리하고 있는 제주도의 위상과 지리적 이점에 대해서도 새로운 눈으로 보게 되었다. 즉, 새로운 동북아시아의 주체적인 참여자로서 제주도가 동북아시아의 경제협력과 안보협력에 주도적인 역할을 할 수 있다는 비전이 생겨난 것이다. 평화에 대한 지방적 차원의 접근이라고 할 수 있다. 이러한 점에서 제주도는 동북아의 경제협력에 적극 참여하고자 제주국제자유도시라는 정책적 비전을 설정, 추진해오고 있으며, 안보협력에 능동적으로 대처하려는 비전이 구체화된 것이 바로 제주의 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상이다. 동북아시아의 경제 및 학술교류와 협력의 장으로서, 분쟁해결센터로서, 그리고 각 국 정상들의 회담장소로서 제주도의 미래는 매우 밝다고 아니할 수 없다. 이런 것들이 활발히 전개된다면 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 더욱 구체화될 것이다.

이러한 ‘평화의 섬’ 비전을 구체화하기 위해 제주도는 2001년부터 “세계평화포럼”을 정례화 하여 평화에 대한 지속적인 관심과 아이디어를 제안하려 하고 있다. 북한 핵문제의 해결을 위한 다자간협상이나 이를 포함하는 6자회담과 같은 다자간협상이 구체화되도록 한국 정부가 적극 아이디어를 제공하고, 이의 개최지로서 제주를 선택한다면 ‘평화의 섬’

20) 김인곤외, 『동북아 평화체제 조성방안』 (서울: 민족통일연구원, 1996), pp. 193-194.

으로서의 제주의 이미지는 세계인들에게 더욱 각인될 것이다. 따라서 제주도의 지방자치 체도 이러한 다자간협상에 대비하여 이에 대한 준비를 면밀히 하는 한편, 중앙정부에 대한 로비 활동을 가일층 가속화해야 할 것으로 생각된다. 제주 ‘평화의 섬’에 대한 구체적인 분석은 이하에서 논하기로 한다.

Ⅲ. 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 유형에 대한 검토

1. 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상의 당위성 및 필요성

그 동안 제시되어 온 제주 ‘평화의 섬’의 필요성과 당위성은 다음과 같이 요약될 수 있을 것이다:

첫째, 제주 지역에서의 국제적 무력충돌의 가능성을 제거하기 위하여 제주를 ‘평화의 섬’으로 지정해야 한다는 것이다. 제주도의 지정학적 위치를 고려할 때, 제주도민이 일심 단결하여 제주를 ‘평화의 섬’으로 가꾸어 나가지 않는다면, 제주도가 동북아 군사대결의 소용돌이 속으로 말려 들 가능성이 상당히 높은 것이 사실이다. 정부의 국토방위 전략 및 미국의 동아시아 군사전략상 제주도의 군사기지화 가능성이 자주 논의되어 왔던 것이 사실이다. 이러한 움직임에 효율적으로 대처하기 위해서 제주를 ‘평화의 섬’으로 선포해야만 한다는 것이다.

둘째, 제주 평화의 섬 구상은 제주도의 문화·역사적 전통 및 유산과 관련이 있다. 제주의 삼무정신(三無精神)은 평화 이념의 원초적 정형을 의미한다.²¹⁾ 이러한 문화적 유산을 복원한다는 점에서도 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 의미가 크다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 지난 날 ‘4·3 사건’이 남·북 분단의 상황 속에서 발생한 것을 고려할 때, 이러한 역사적 비극이 다시는 일어나지 않도록 하기 위해서도 ‘평화의 섬’ 지정이 필요하다는 것이다.

셋째, 제주 사회를 정의로운 복지공동체로 발전시켜 나가기 위해서 제주를 ‘평화의 섬’으로 만들 필요가 있다는 것이다. 특히 21세기 제주도의 발전 전략과 관련, 평화 지향적인 제주지역 개발 모형과 전략을 수립·추진해 나가기 위한 전제로서도 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 매우 의미가 크다고 하겠다. 이러한 의미에서 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 장기적으로 제주인의 삶과 제주 발전의 이념적 방향을 제시하기 위한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 따라서 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 제주로 하여금 자연과 인간의 조화로움을 추구하는 지속 가능한 개발을 이룰 수 있도록 하고, 지역과 중앙 그리고 세계와의 조화를 통한 교류의 거점이 될 수 있도록 하며, 도민간의 갈등과 대립이 극복되고 인간으로서의 기본적인 생활권이 보장되는 복지공동체로 만들어 나가는 것을 의미하는 것이다.

넷째, 남북 화해·협력 및 교류의 활성화와 관련하여 ‘평화의 섬’으로서 제주도가 적극

21) ‘三無’란 盜無, 乞無, 그리고 大門無를 의미하며, 이러한 문화적 전통에 입각하고 있는 제주인의 정신은 ‘평화지향적’라는 특징을 가지고 있다고 한다. 양중해·현용준 외, 『제주도민의 삼무정신』, 제주도, 1983, p. 16 참조.

적인 역할을 수행할 수 있도록 해야만 한다는 점이다. ‘평화의 섬’으로서 제주도는 (가) 제주는 지속적으로 갈등과 대립을 보여 왔던 남북의 당국 사이에 대화와 교류의 장소를 제공함으로써, 남과 북이 상호 신뢰를 회복하고 평화체제를 구축하며 나아가서 남북통일을 앞당기도록 하는 데 공헌할 수 있을 것이다. (나) 제주는 동북아 및 한반도의 갈등과 대립을 조정하고 해결하는 지역분쟁해결센터 또는 평화에 관한 연구와 훈련을 행함으로써 지역적 평화체제를 유지·강화하는 ‘동북아’ 내지 ‘남·북’ 평화센터가 될 수 있을 것이다. 그리고 (다) 남북 민간교류 및 협력의 주무대가 됨으로써 제주도는 남북의 ‘사회통합’(social integration)을 앞당기는 데 크게 기여할 수 있을 것이다.

사회통합이란 “양쪽 체제가 상호의존적 일관성을 갖게 되고, 남북한 지역의 주민들이 동류의식을 형성하여 합일된 상태”를 뜻하는 것이다. 통일(unification)이 “단순히 정치적으로 하나가 되는 것”을 의미하는 데 대하여 사회통합은 “사회의 모든 구성요소들이 상호 관련되어 하나의 전체를 이루는 과정 혹은 그 전체성의 정도”를 의미한다고 본다.²²⁾ 사회통합의 핵심적 목표는 남북한 주민 모두가 한민족으로서의 공동체 의식을 회복하는 데 있다. 이는 경제적·문화적·인적 교류 등을 통하여 점진적으로 확산되어질 수 있는 것이다.

다섯째, 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 제주의 지정학적 위치와 평화 이미지에 입각한 국제 교류·협력의 거점화를 통해 제주의 위상을 세계에 각인시키고 세계 평화에 실천적으로 기여하도록 할 수 있는 포지셔닝(positioning) 전략 및 평화실천 프로그램으로서의 의미를 가지고 있다. 이를 통하여 제주는 국제 교류·협력의 거점으로서 지역 평화 및 발전에 기여함으로써 스스로의 이익과 국제사회의 공동 이익을 조화시키고 이를 극대화하는 데 기여할 수 있게 될 것이다.

2. 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 유형에 대한 검토

가. 개별적 접근 모형

우선 다양한 평화 개념에 근거하여 설정 가능한 ‘평화의 섬’ 유형에 대한 개별적 접근 방법에 관하여 검토하기로 한다.

1) 평화지대화 모형(중립화 또는 비무장화)

이론상 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 제주도의 중립화 또는 비무장화가 주변국의 협력 내지 국제적 보장을 통하여 조성되고 이를 기초로 스스로의 평화를 구축함은 물론 지역 평화를 위한 일종의 ‘완충지대’(buffer zone)로서의 역할을 수행할 수 있는 ‘평화지대’ 형태로

22) 배규한, “남북한 사회통합의 과제와 전망,” 『6·15 선언 이후의 남북한 관계와 주변국의 한반도 정책』 (국민대 사회과학연구소·제주대 동아시아연구소 학술세미나 자료집), 2000. 12. 9, pp. 24-25 참조.

추진될 수도 있다.

그러나 전통적 의미에서의 ‘평화지대화’를 통하여 동북아 국가간의 이념적·군사적 대립 구도의 역학관계 속에서 제주가 군사적 대립과 전쟁 개입 가능성을 예방하고 한반도 내지 동북아의 평화체제를 구축하는 데 중심적인 역할을 수행하기 위해서는 최소한 제주의 ‘중립화’ 또는 ‘비무장화’ 문제가 중요한 과제로 등장하게 된다.

따라서 이러한 평화지대의 개념을 곧 바로 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상에 적용하기에는 현실적으로 한계가 있다고 본다. 원래 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상 및 ‘평화의 섬’ 운동은 정부의 국가안보 전략이나 국제적 합의에 기초하여 논의되기 시작한 것이 아니라 제주 지역의 시민단체와 학자들에 의하여 그 필요성과 당위성이 제기되었던 ‘시민주도형’(civilian-initiated)이기 때문에,²³⁾ 불가피하게 중앙정부의 의도 및 관할권에 대한 제약을 초래할 수도 있다는 점이 그 법·제도화의 걸림돌로 작용할 수 있다는 것이다.

비록 제주 ‘평화의 섬’이 지금은 법적 근거를 갖게 되었다고는 하지만 언제라도 이러한 문제와 관련하여 정부와의 갈등이 야기될 가능성도 배제할 수 없다고 본다. 특히 정부로서는 국내법은 물론 ‘한미상호방위조약’, 남·북 분단 및 휴전협정체제와 관련된 국제관계적 법·제도의 제약이나 한계를 효과적으로 해결하기 어렵다는 점, 그리고 주변국들의 합의를 도출하기 어렵다는 점 등 여러 가지 문제점을 제기할 가능성이 있다.

따라서 정치적·군사적 차원에서 제주를 ‘평화지대’로 조성하는 데는 국내·외적으로 많은 어려움이 있다고 본다. 다만, 제주도를 적극적 평화관에 입각한 ‘평화학’이나 ‘평화운동’의 중심지로 육성하고 또한 제한적 범위에서 군축이나 지역적 분쟁해결 또는 동북아 지역의 ‘다자간안보협의체’ 구축을 위한 논의를 비롯한 평화·안보 관련 회의 및 회담의 개최를 유치함으로써 제주도로 하여금 한반도 및 동북아 평화 질서를 구축하는 데 기여할 수 있도록 하는 것은 가능하리라고 본다.

2) 경제특구화 모형(국제자유도시화)

제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 정치적인 성격에서 탈피하여 오로지 경제적인 관점에서 번영과 복지의 요소가 중시되는 ‘평화·번영·복지의 섬’(zone of peace and prosperity) 구상으로 추진될 수도 있을 것이다. 최근에 들어와 보다 획기적인 제주 발전전략이 모색되고 있으며, 이와 관련하여 ‘제주국제자유도시’(Jeju Free International City) 전략이 구체적으로 추진되고 있다. 이러한 시도는 특히 경제적 측면에서 한편으로는 국가간 또는 지방자치단체간 경쟁이 심화되고 또 한편으로는 중국과 북한을 포함한 동북아 국가들간의 개방 및 협력의 분위기가 점차 고조되어지고 있는 상황에서 그 설득력이 강화되고 있다고 본다.

제주도는 지정학적으로 환황해 경제권과 환동해 경제권을 연결하고, 동북아 경제권과 동남아 경제권, 나아가 아시아·태평양 경제권간의 연계지로서의 역할을 수행할 수 있는

23) Majid Tehranian, “Creating Spaces for Peace (A Comparative Overview of Zones of Peace),” 『동아시아연구논총』 제2집, 1991, pp. 217-231.

최적의 위치에 있다. 따라서 제주가 스스로의 경제 발전을 도모하고 지역적 경제 협력체제의 활성화를 위한 역할을 수행할 수 있도록 법·제도적 기반을 구축하는 것을 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상과 연계하여 추진할 수 있다고 본다.

국제자유도시로서의 제주 ‘평화의 섬’은 제주의 평화·번영·복지를 달성하는 것을 목적으로 설정되어질 수 있는 것이다. 이와 같이 경제적 관점에서 설정된 제주의 ‘평화·번영·복지 섬’ 구상이 실현되기 위해서는 무엇보다도 중앙정부의 법·제도적 정비 지원과 더불어 충분한 재정적 지원이 있어야 한다.

‘비무장·중립화’를 기초로 한 ‘평화지대화’ 모델에 비하여 경제적 관점에서 접근하는 ‘경제특구화’ 모형은 경우에 따라 과도한 경제적 경쟁을 유발할 수도 있으며 정치적·군사적 긴장을 초래할 수도 있다는 점에서 문제가 있다는 지적도 있는 것이 사실이다. 그러나 경제적 번영이 부의 형평한 분배를 가능하게 하고 국제적으로도 빈국과 부국의 차이를 좁히는 효과를 가져올 수 있다면 궁극적으로 평화에 대한 경제적 접근은 인권신장과 국제적 긴장 완화를 동시에 보장할 수 있는 방안이 될 수 있다. 현재 제주도가 ‘평화의 섬’ 전략과 ‘국제자유도시’ 전략을 병행하여 추진 중에 있다는 점을 고려한다면 양자를 통합할 수 있는 ‘평화의 섬’ 모형 정립이 특히 필요하다는 근거를 이러한 차원에서도 제시할 수 있을 것이다.

3) 국제교류·협력 거점 모형 (학술·문화·관광 중심지화)

제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 학술·문화·관광의 교류 차원에서도 추진될 수 있다. 학술·문화 차원의 ‘평화의 섬’ 유형은 제주도를 학술적 차원에서 ‘평화 사상’을 연구·전파하고 문화적 차원에서 ‘평화문화’를 확산시키고 ‘평화운동’을 활성화하는 데 중심적 역할을 수행할 수 있도록 하는 데 그 목적이 있다.

제주도를 ‘평화학’의 중심지로 육성하고 국제적 평화교류·협력의 거점으로 발전시키기 위하여 평화 관련 학술활동 및 국제회의를 주도적으로 개최하거나 유치하는 한편 제주의 전통적인 ‘삼무정신’(三無精神)과 ‘평화정신’을 ‘평화문화’로 정착시키기 위한 방안이 모색되어야만 한다. 4·3 관련 학술 연구 및 역사적 유물의 문화적 자원화도 체계적으로 이루어져야 한다고 본다. 이를 위해 ‘평화연구 센터’ 및 ‘평화연수원’ 등을 설립하고 ‘평화박물관’과 ‘평화공원’을 설립하는 것도 필요하다고 본다. 이러한 평화 관련 국제행사 및 문화적 자원은 곧 제주의 독특한 관광 자원으로도 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

국제교류거점으로서의 제주 ‘평화의 섬’은 관광의 활성화와 직결되고 있다. 국내외적으로 제주도가 관광의 중심지로 자리잡기 위해서는 ‘관광과 평화’의 통합 이미지 구축이 필요하며, 이러한 방향으로 이미지 홍보전략이 수립되어야 한다고 본다.

국제교류거점으로서의 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 모형은 정치적 또는 경제적 차원에서의 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상과 연계되어 추진될 수도 있지만 경우에 따라서는 그와는 별개로 우선적으로 추진될 수도 있다. 국제교류거점 또는 학술·문화적 차원의 ‘평화의 섬’ 유형은 제주도를 동북아의 ‘평화교류·협력의 거점’으로 발전시킬 수 있는 바람직한 접근 방법이라고 본다.

그리고 이러한 접근 유형은 정치적·군사적 차원이나 경제적 차원에서 평화의 섬 전략을 추진하는 것과 비교하여 관련 법·제도적 기반 조성에 큰 어려움 없이 실천해 나갈 수 있는 방안이 될 수 있다.

나. 통합적 접근 모형

통합적 접근 모형은 ‘적극적 평화관’에 입각하여 ‘평화의 섬’ 또는 ‘평화지대’를 포괄적·통합적 관점에서 바라보는 데에 근거를 두고 있다. 이러한 배경에서 제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 유형은 ‘국제 교류·협력 거점화’ 모형을 중심으로 ‘경제특구화’(국제자유도시화) 모형과 제한적 의미에서의 ‘평화지대화’ 모형이 복합적으로 추진되면서 단계적 또는 통합적으로 추진될 수 있다고 본다.

오늘날 ‘안보’의 개념은 전통적 의미에서의 군사안보 차원을 넘어서서 경제, 사회, 문화의 범위를 포함하는 것으로 확대되고 있다는 점에서 ‘종합안보’(comprehensive security)와 모든 수준 — 국제적, 국내적, 또는 초국가적 수준 —에서의 국제협력의 중요성을 더욱 강조하는 ‘공동안보’(common security) 내지 ‘협력안보’(cooperative security)의 개념으로 변화하고 있다는 점에서 세계공동체의 형성에 대한 지적 관심이 고조되고 있다는 점을 주목할 필요가 있다.²⁴⁾ 따라서 제한적 의미에서의 ‘평화지대화’ 모형은 자연스럽게 국제교류·협력 거점화를 목표로 하는 ‘학술·문화적 차원’의 평화의 섬 유형과 관련을 맺게 된다.

한편 이미 제주도와 중앙 정부는 제주도를 ‘국제자유도시’로 개발하기 위한 구체적인 계획과 법·제도를 마련하고 있다. 특별법을 비롯하여 시행령 및 조례가 이미 마련되었으며 관련법도 정비되거나 보완되는 과정에 있다. 제주 ‘세계평화의 섬’ 구상과 ‘제주 국제자유도시’ 전략은 모두 제주의 미래에 관련된 매우 중요한 비전과 발전 방향을 제시하고 있다.

현재 제주의 발전 방향을 제시하기 위한 비전으로 ‘평화의 섬’과 아울러 ‘즐거운 섬, 신선한 섬, 지식의 섬’ 또는 ‘기회의 섬’ 등이 다양하게 제시되고 있다. 때문에 제주의 비전과 발전 방향, 그리고 제주의 이미지 형성에 많은 혼란이 야기되고 있는 것이 사실이다. 따라서 제주의 이미지와 비전을 통합하고 발전 전략을 보다 효율적으로 추진하기 위해서는 ‘평화의 섬’ 전략과 ‘국제자유도시’ 전략을 연계하여 추진할 필요가 있다. 따라서 제주 ‘세계평화의 섬’ 지정 및 추진에 있어서도 경제적 접근과 기타의 접근 모형을 통합적으로 추진하는 것이 바람직하다고 본다.

24) 종합안보(comprehensive security)와 공동안보(common security)의 개념은 앞장에서 논의한 협력안보(cooperative security)와 유사한 개념으로서 안보를 달성하고 유지하는 데 있어 비군사적 수단의 중요성을 강조하는 것이다. 즉, 평화적 수단에 의한 문제해결을 약속하고, 경제협력과 여타 지역협력을 통한 상호의존과 신뢰를 촉진함으로써 효과적인 안보를 달성할 수 있다는 주장이다. 요컨대, 안보 관계에서 군사적 차원을 약화하고, 비군사적 요소를 강화함으로써 안보를 군사면의 좁은 개념에서 벗어나 종합적인 관점에서 접근하자는 것이다. 이에 대한 자세한 논의는 Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack and Paul Evans, "The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 252-254 참조.

국제자유도시 전략은 제주의 특성을 살려 우선적으로 국제 ‘관광자유도시’로 발전시키는 것을 기본적 방향으로 설정하고 있다. 이러한 의미에서 ‘평화의 섬’ 이미지와 실천 전략은 제주 ‘국제자유도시’ 개발 방향과 불가분의 관련을 맺게 된다. 따라서 제주 국제자유도시 전략을 성공적으로 추진하기 위해서 현실적으로 제주도가 ‘평화의 섬’의 이미지를 가질 필요가 있다고 할 수 있으며, 이념적으로 보면 ‘국제자유도시’ 전략이 ‘평화의 섬’의 완성을 지향하는 수단적 의미를 가지고 있다고 볼 수 있게 된다.²⁵⁾

이러한 통합적 과정은 궁극적으로 제주를 ‘정의로운 평화·복지 공동체’로 조성해 나가는 것을 의미한다. ‘세계평화의 섬’ 지정과 관련된 조항이 제주를 국제자유도시로 개발하기 위한 특별법에 포함되고 있다는 점, 특별법 제 12조 1항의 ‘세계평화의 섬’ 지정 조항이 일단 ‘적극적 평화관’에 근거한 ‘평화의 섬’의 실천을 염두에 두고 있다는 점, 그리고 2항에 규정되고 있는 관련사업들과 제 13조의 국제교류 관련 조항이 평화적 ‘국제교류·협력 거점화’를 지향하고 있다는 점과 상통한다고 본다.

IV. 제주 「평화의 섬」 전개와 실천전략

1. 세계평화의 섬: 논의의 전개와 지정 선포의 문제

가. 논의의 태동

91년 4월 18일 제주에서 개최된 한-소 정상회담은 제주도가 지정학적으로 한반도의 평화 정착과 동북아 질서의 재편성을 유도하는데 도움을 줄 수 있음을 보여주었다. 평화의 섬 제주에 대한 논의의 시작은 91년 5월 17일 미국 뉴욕에서 개최한 <태평양의 평화유지>를 위한 국제회의에서 당시 미 켄터키 대학의 문정인 교수(현 연세대 교수)와 제주대학교 고성준, 양영철 교수가 “신혼여행의 섬에서 평화의 섬으로”라는 주제 발표를 하면서부터였다.

나. 평화의 섬 구상 제시(1991년 6월-10월)

91년 6월 30일 제주국제협의회 창립기념 학술회의의 「제주의 지정학과 국제화: 과제와 전망」이라는 분과에서 “동북아와 제주도의 지정학적 위상”과 “동북아 질서와 제주도: 평화의 섬 구상을 위한 제언” 등의 논문이 발표되고 이에 대한 진지한 토론이 전개되었다. 이어 제주국제협의회는 ‘평화와 번영의 제주’라는 대주제 하에 91년 10월 15일부터 2일간 ‘평화의 섬 제주’에 대한 국제적인 논의의 장을 마련하여 미국, 중국, 러시아, 호주

25) 고성준 교수는 ‘평화의 섬’의 위상을 정립하기 위한 실천전략으로서 ‘국제자유도시’를 구상해야 한다고 한다. 고성준, “남북화해·협력 시대와 제주 ‘국제자유도시’ 건설,” 『제주발전연구』 제4호, pp. 16-17, 21-30 참조.

등의 저명한 전문가들이 참여하여 “동북아시아의 평화와 안정,” “냉엄한 현실, 요원한 평화,” “평화의 섬을 위한 제언” 등에 관한 활발한 논의가 전개되었다.

여기에서 평화의 섬 개념을, 첫째 제주도의 비무장화, 둘째 평화와 질서를 위한 중심지화, 셋째 갈등과 논쟁을 조정하고 해결하는 지역센터화와 평화에 관한 연구와 훈련의 장 넷째 평화의 섬을 행동화하는 데 능동적이고 지역적인 노력을 전개하는 제주도민, 다섯째 평화의 개념과 일치하는 균형되고 분권화되며 자생적인 발전을 위한 장소로 개념화하였다.

다. 대선공약으로 ‘세계평화의 섬’ 지정·선포 제시(97년 9월)

김대중 대통령후보는 제주를 세계평화의 섬으로 중앙정부가 지정·선포하여 외국 관광객들이 마음놓고 왕래할 수 있는 여건을 조성하겠다는 공약을 발표하였다. 김대중 후보의 세계평화의 섬 대선공약은 계속된 정상회담 이후 제주도민의 열망을 반영하여 한반도의 평화와 안정을 유지하기 위한 상징적 조치로 받아들여졌으며, 제주도가 세계적 관광지로 발돋움할 수 있는 계기를 마련했다.

라. 공론화의 첫 시도로 평화의 섬 선포를 위한 실천전략 세미나(98년 2월)

제주대학교 동아시아연구소는 98년 2월 27일 대선공약으로 제주를 평화의 섬으로 지정·선포하는 문제가 제기되는 여건을 토대로 실천전략에 대한 전문가 세미나를 개최했다. 이 세미나에서는 “제주 평화의 섬의 국제 정치적 배경과 구축전략”, “평화의 섬 선포를 위한 모델선정 및 법·제도적 검토”에 관한 주제발표와 제주의 각계 전문가들의 토론이 전개되어 도민들의 의견을 결집하는 공론화의 계기가 되었다.

마. 개정된 「제주도개발특별법」에 ‘세계평화의 섬’ 지정 조항 신설(99년 12월)

평화의 섬 구상에 대한 논의가 발전되어 중앙정부의 정책적 뒷받침을 가져오게 된 계기로서 99년 개정된 「제주도 개발특별법」에 ‘세계평화의 섬 지정(제9장)’ 관련조항이 신설되었다. 세계평화의 섬 지정 관련 조항은 “국가는 세계평화에 기여하고 한반도의 안정과 평화를 정착시키기 위하여 제주도를 세계 평화의 섬으로 지정할 수 있다”(제52조 1항)와 “국가와 지방자치단체는 세계 평화의 섬의 기능과 역할을 수행하는데 필요한 다음과 같은 사업-국제평화 및 협력기구 및 회의의 유치 등-을 시행할 수 있다”(제52조 2항) 그리고 “국가는 제2항의 사업시행을 위해서 행·재정적 지원을 하여야 한다”(제53조 3항) 등으로 구성되어 있다.

바. 제주 평화의 섬 추진위원회의 구성과 운영(2001년 9월)

제주를 한반도와 세계 평화에 기여하고 평화의 섬으로 발전시켜 나가기 위한 관·민 성

격의 기구로 제주 평화의 섬 추진위원회가 발족되어 제반 사업을 구상하고 실천하고 있다.

사. 제주평화포럼의 정례적 개최(2001년 6월 - 2003년 11월)

제1차 세계 평화포럼을 2000년 6월 6.15선언 1주년을 기념하는 시점에 개최하여 세계적으로 제주가 한반도 평화와 화해에 기여하는 중요한 논의의 장으로 역할하고 있음을 보여주었다. 2002년 6월에는 세미평화포럼을 개최하였고, 2003년 10월에는 제2차 제주평화포럼이 개최된다.

아. 노무현 대통령의 공약(2002년 12월)

노무현 대통령이 제주도를 세계평화의 섬으로 조직·지정하고 남북평화센터 설립, 4·3 평화공원 건립 등 평화의 섬과 관련한 사업추진과 평화관련 국제기구 유치, 제주평화포럼의 정례화를 지원·약속했다.

2. 제주 평화의 섬 추진실적

가. 동아시아 정상외교의 산실과 제주밀레니엄관의 건립

1) 세계 정상회담 개최지로서의 제주

1991년 소련의 고르바초프 대통령이 제주도를 방문해 노태우 대통령과 한-소 정상회담(1991.4.19-20)을 갖고 냉전해체의 중요한 기초를 마련한 이후 제주도는 동아시아에 있어 정상회담 개최지로서 자리 잡고 있다. 중국 강택민(江澤民) 국가주석의 방문과 김영삼 대통령과의 한·중정상회담(1995.11.16-17)은 한·중관계 개선을 크게 개선시켰으며, 일본 하시모토 류타로 수상의 방문과 김영삼 대통령과의 한·일 정상회담(1996.6.22-23)은 한·일 파트너십의 관계를 더욱 강화시키는 계기가 되었다.

무엇보다도 미국 클린턴 대통령의 방문과 김영삼 대통령과의 한·미정상회담(1996.4.16-17)에서는 한반도 긴장완화와 평화정착을 위한 '4자 회담'이 제안되는 큰 성과를 거두었다. 이 외에도 그동안 제주도를 방문했거나 제주도에서 정상회담을 개최한 세계 정상들의 수가 11개국 14명에 이르고 있다.(표1 참조)

세계 각국의 정상들이 제주도를 방문하고 많은 정상회담이 제주도에서 개최된 것은 제주도가 동북아 정상들이 휴식을 취하면서 대화를 나누기에 적절한 지정학적 위치와 인프라를 잘 구비해 있다는 점과 함께 그만큼 안전하고 평화로운 지역이라는 사실을 반증해주고 있다. 제주도는 한국의 분단 상황의 개선뿐만 아니라 동북아시아와 세계의 갈등해소 및 평화정착을 위한 국제정치적 과정에서 중요한 일부분을 담당해 오고 있다.

2) 제주 밀레니엄관의 건립

세계 정상들의 제주방문 자취를 담은 기념관을 건립하여 제주를 동북아와 세계 평화실천의 중심지로 육성하고자 하는 취지에서 건립 추진 중인 제주 밀레니엄관은 평화를 테마로 한 관광시설로서 제주관광의 시너지효과를 창출할 것이다. 2003년 3월 22일 착공하여 2004년 12월 완공을 목표로 하는 제주 밀레니엄관은 서귀포시 중문관광단지 2단계 지구(국제컨벤션센터와 인접)에 위치하며, 규모는 부지 8,434평으로 연건평 2,155평으로(지하 1층, 지상 2층) 평화관, 인물관, 기획전시관, 교육·연구실, 관리운영시설 등을 갖추게 될 것이다.

<표 1> 세계 정상 및 주요 인사들의 제주 방문 현황(1991~2003. 10월)

| 기 간 | 성 명 | 직 위 | 비 고 |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|-----|
| 1991. 1. 19 - 4. 20 | 미하일 고르바초프 | 구 소련 대통령 | 현직 |
| 1991. 10. 16 - 10. 19 | 보드앵 국왕 내외 | 벨기에 국왕 및 왕비 | 현직 |
| 1994. 11. 3 - 11. 4 | 리 평 | 중국 총리 | 현직 |
| 1995. 4. 1 - 4. 17 | 드쁘어이 | 베트남 공산당 서기장 | 현직 |
| 1995. 4. 21 - 4. 22 | 喬 石 | 중국 전인대 상무위원장 | 현직 |
| 1995. 5. 17 - 5. 18 | 나자르바예프 | 카자흐스탄공 대통령 | 현직 |
| 1995. 11. 16 - 11. 17 | 江 澤 民 | 중국 국가주석 | 현직 |
| 1996. 4. 16 - 4. 17 | 빌 클린턴 | 미국 대통령 | 현직 |
| 1996. 6. 22 - 6. 23 | 하시모토 류타로 | 일본 총리 | 현직 |
| 1997. 6. 5 - 6. 6 | 아스카르 아카예프 | 키르기즈공 대통령 | 현직 |
| 1998. 4. 29 - 4. 30 | 후진타오 | 중국 국가 부주석 | 현직 |
| 1998. 4. 29 - 4. 30 | 오부치 게이조 | 일본 총리 | 현직 |
| 1999. 10. 23 - 10. 24 | 라드나습베를린 곤치그도르지 | 몽골 국회의장 | 현직 |
| 2000. 3. 29 - 3. 31 | 부 시 | 전 미국 대통령 | 전직 |
| 2000. 6. 21 - 6. 22 | 라모스 | 전 필리핀 대통령 | 전직 |
| 2000. 9. 30 - 10. 3 | 나카소네 | 전 일본 총리 | 전직 |
| 2000. 10. 21 - 10. 22 | 주 룡 지 | 중국 총리 | 현직 |
| 2000. 11. 17 - 11. 19 | 케사이 노트 | 마셜아일랜드 대통령 | 현직 |
| 2001. 2. 14 - 2. 15 | 나차긴 바가반디 | 몽골 대통령 | 현직 |
| 2001. 10. 23 - 10. 24 | 마하티르 모하마드 | 말레이시아 수상 | 현직 |
| 2001. 11. 17 - 11. 18 | 미하일 고르바초프 | 전 소련 대통령 | 전직 |
| 2003. 10. 3 ~ 10. 9 | 나차긴 바가반디 | 몽골대통령 | 현직 |

나. 4·3특별법의 제정과 평화공원의 조성

1) 4·3 특별법의 제정

지난 반세기 동안 제주도의 역사는 ‘제주 4·3사건’이라는 뼈아픈 과거를 묻어둔 채 흘러왔다. 이승만정권 이후 계속된 군사정권의 질곡에서 제주 4·3 사건은 거론하는 것조차도 두려워하게 될 정도로 현대사의 금기로 치부되어 왔다. 제주 4·3사건이란 ‘1948년 4월 3일부터 1954년 9월 21일까지 제주도에서 발생한 좌우세력간의 무력충돌과 진압과정에서 수많은 주민들이 무고하게 희생당한 사건’을 말한다. 이는 좌·우 이데올로기의 극명한 대립으로 인한 민족분열의 비극을 잘 보여주는 사례이며, 제주도는 한국전쟁을 전후로 남북한 해계모니 다툼의 피해를 가장 심하게 겪은 지역이다.

4·3은 제주도민들의 정체성과 동질성에 많은 상처를 안겨주었고, 이것이 치유되지 못한 채 반목과 대립으로 이어져 왔다. 따라서 제주도민들은 4·3의 문제를 치유하지 않고서는 평화와 번영을 향한 제주의 발전은 기여할 수 없음을 인식하게 되었다. 4·3문제의 해결을 위한 제주인들의 노력은 지난 반공시대에는 심한 좌절을 겪을 수밖에 없었으나, 냉전 해체와 국내적 민주화의 진전에 발맞추어 본격적인 치유방안의 모색에 나서게 되었다. 처음에는 4·3의 해결 방법을 놓고 제주도민 사이에 대립과 갈등이 표면화되기도 했으나 서로 인내와 양보로 도민적인 치유방안을 만들 수 있었고 중앙정부에 문제해결을 촉구하기에 이르렀다. 그 결과로 정부는 2001년 1월 12일 「4·3관련 특별법」을 국회에서 여·야 만장일치로 통과시킴으로써 제주 현대사의 비극인 제주 4·3사건 해결의 기틀을 마련했다.

2000년 1월 12일 대통령에 의해 공포된 특별법에 의거 국무총리를 위원장으로 하는 4·3중앙위원회, 제주도지사를 위원장으로 하는 4·3실무위원회, 4·3진상보고서 작성기획단 및 4·3처리지원단이 발족되었다. 이에 따라 진상규명과 제주도민들의 명예회복을 위한 제반조치가 이루어지고 있다. 4·3 희생자 및 유족의 신고가 접수되기 시작했고, 정부의 공식문서인 4·3진상보고서가 2003년 10월 15일 확정되었다. 이 진상보고서에는 4·3의 진상에 대한 규명과 정부의 사과와 4·3평화공원 등에 대한 적극적 지원책이 담겨 있다.

2) 4·3평화공원의 조성

4·3의 비극을 겪은 제주도에 평화공원을 건립하여 희생된 사람들의 영혼을 달래고 제주지역의 역사와 관련된 평화의 섬 제주의 상징으로 삼을 필요가 제기되었다. 또한 평화공원은 관광자원이 되어 이 곳을 찾는 관광객들로 하여금 평화의 소중함과 느끼고 전쟁과 갈등의 비극을 동시에 체험하는 산 교육의 장이 될 것이다.

평화공원 안에 평화박물관, 4·3자료관 등을 설립하여 제주의 가장 구체적인 평화의 형

상인 ‘3무의 제주’를 입체적으로 형상화하여 제주도와 제주도민들의 평화정신을 보여준다. 또한 4·3의 모든 것을 역사적 사실성을 가지고 재현시킨 4·3자료관도 병행 설치해 평화에 대한 학습효과를 높이게 될 것이다. 평화공원의 조성은 이미 정부로부터 부지매입을 위한 재정적 지원을 받아 제주시 봉개동에 5만여 평의 공원부지를 매입했고, 4·3평화공원에 대한 기본계획이 도민의 참여 하에 수립되어 2003년 4월 3일, 고건 국무총리를 비롯한 정부대표가 참석하여 1단계 조성사업이 착공되었다. 2008년이면 완공되는 「4·3 평화공원」은 인권신장, 민주발전, 국민화합의 이념 아래 희생자의 위령과 그 유족의 위무, 역사적 교훈의 발견과 전승, 인권과 평화교육의 장으로 활용되게 될 것이다.

다. 남북화해협력사업의 활발한 전개

우리나라는 지구상에 아직도 동서냉전체제상의 유일한 분단지역이며, 여전히 남과 북이 가장 큰 군대와 막강한 화력으로 대치하고 있다. 이러한 남북대치 상황에서 세계평화의 섬 지정은 남과 북의 평화가 정착되지 않는 한 국제적인 공감대를 얻어내기 어렵다고 생각되기도 하지만, 동시에 역으로 남북대치의 현실은 더욱 더 향후 세계평화의 섬으로 지정될 제주도로 하여금 남북화해협력에 적극적인 역할을 해나가도록 요구하고 있다. 실제로 제주도는 지난 5년간 어느 타 도시보다도 활발한 활동을 지속적으로 전개해 왔다.

1) 남북회담 개최지로서의 제주

90년대 초부터 제주인들은 줄곧 제주도야말로 남북한간에도 냉전을 종식시키고 화해와 평화를 모색하는 남북회담의 적격지가 될 수 있다는 점을 주장하여 왔다. 왜냐하면 이전까지 주로 이용되어온 판문점이나 서울 또는 평양 등은 냉전적 대결의 상징일 수밖에 없으며, 회담에 임하더라도 그것은 제로섬게임의 법칙에서 벗어날 수 없을 것이라 보았기 때문이다. 제주는 “한라에서 백두까지”라는 상징성이 있을 뿐만 아니라 남북의 이해상충이 가장 적은 곳이라 판단된다. 6.15 남북정상회담을 계기로 제주가 본격적으로 남북회담의 개최지로 부상함으로써 남북화해협력시대를 열어 가는데 중요한 기여를 할 수 있었다. 제주에서 개최된 일련의 회담은 남북특사회담(2000년 9월 12일), 제1차 남북국방장관회담(동년 9월 25-26일), 제3차 남북장관급회담(동년 9월 27-30일) 등으로서, 이는 부분적으로는 북한의 제주에 대한 호의적인 정서에 기인하고 있다.

2) 감귤 등 제주도 농산물의 지속적인 지원

제주도는 IMF 경제위기에 처해 있었던 지난 98년부터 5년간 인도지원적 차원의 ‘북한 감귤보내기운동’을 지속적으로 전개해 오고 있다. 98년 감귤 100톤으로 시작된 감귤대북 지원은 2000년 남북협력제주도민운동본부(이사장 강영석)가 결성되는 등 도민운동화 되면서 활기를 띠기 시작하여 2002년 1월까지 17,572톤의 감귤과 6,000톤의 당근을 포함 총

23,572톤을 지원해 온 국내의 대표적 북한지원단체로 발돋움 하였다.(표2 참조) 어려움에 처한 북한동포들에게 제주도민의 정성과 사랑은 남북간의 화해의 물꼬를 트게 했고 평화의 무드를 조성하는데 크게 기여하였다.

<표2> 제주도민의 대북지원 현황

| 사업명 | 추진현황 | 비고 |
|-------------------|---|---|
| 감귤·당근보내기 | 1998년산: 100톤(감귤) 1999년산: 4,336톤(감귤) 2000년산: 5,031톤(감귤 3,031, 당근 2,000) 2001년산: 10,105톤(감귤 6,105, 당근 4,000) 2002년산: 4,000톤(감귤) | 총 23,572톤 (감귤 17,572톤, 당근 6,000톤) |
| 북한 어린이에게 겨울 옷 보내기 | 2002년: 5,000벌 | 광주 YWCA협조 |

3) 3차에 걸친 제주도민의 북한방문

지난 5년간 감귤·당근보내기운동을 통해 제주도민들은 북한에 화해와 사랑의 메시지를 보내왔으며 이에 북한은 제주도민들에게 특별한 고마움을 가지게 됨에 따라 지금까지의 신뢰를 바탕으로 제주도와 북한과의 다양한 교류협력사업을 전개하기로 약속하였다. 이렇게 이루어진 대표적인 성과가 3차례에 걸쳐 이루어진 대규모 제주도민의 북한방문이라 하겠다. 제1차 제주도민 대표단(253명)의 북한 방문은 2002년 5월 10일부터 5박 6일간의 일정으로 평양, 백두산, 묘향산 등을 둘러보는 것으로 이루어졌으며, 제2차 제주도민(257명) 북한방문은 지난해 11월에 실시되었다. 또한 제3차 제주도민(256명) 북한방문은 2003년 8월 25일부터 30일까지 이루어졌다.

북한의 민족화해협의회 초청으로 이루어지고 있는 제주도민의 북한방문은 몇 가지 중요한 의미를 가지고 있다.

첫째, 남북협력제주도민운동본부라는 순수민간단체가 정부의 중재 없이 감귤 대북지원으로 형성된 신뢰를 바탕으로 북한 측과 협의하여 총 760명이 넘는 대규모 방문단을 구성하고 제주↔평양이라는 직항로를 이용하였다는 점이다.

둘째, 지방 도민의 집단방북은 분단사상 최초의 일이며, 지역특산물을 통한 대북지원사업이 인도적 지원의 성격을 넘어 민족의 동질성을 회복하는데 크게 기여하는 민간교류·협력의 새로운 장을 개척했다는 점이다.

셋째, 제주도의 각계 인사로 구성된 방문단은 이데올로기나 체제의 대립의식이 크지 않기 때문에 정부차원의 교류협력보다 비정치적이어서 서로 간에 신뢰성과 지속성을 가질

수 있어 남북한관계개선과 통일에 기여할 수 있는 여지가 그만큼 컸다는 점이다.

넷째, 3차 방북단의 경우 우근민 제주도지사와 부만근 제주대총장 등 각계의 대표들이 참여하였는데 방북기간 중 북한민화협과 조평통관계자와의 협의를 통해 제주도와 북한사이의 다방면의 교류와 제주도에서 개최되는 국제회의에 북한대표의 참여 등에 관한 원칙적 합의를 이루었다.

4) 남북화해와 통일 한마당으로서의 <민족평화축전>의 개최

10월 23일부터 27일까지 제주도에서 ‘우리 민족이 만납니다’를 대회 슬로건으로 하여 <통일민족평화문화축전>(약칭 민족평화축전)이 열렸다. 한민족, 한 핏줄의 남북동포들이 반세기가 넘는 분단 역사의 굴레를 벗어 던지고 세계평화의 섬 제주에서 체육·문화 축제의 한마당을 펼쳤다. 체육선수와 문화·예술인 등으로 구성된 400여명의 북한대표단이 참가한 가운데 축구와 탁구 등 체육경기와 그네뛰기, 씨름 등 민속경기, 미술, 수공예품 전시회 등이 진행되었다. <민족평화축전>은 남과 북 동포들이 이념과 체제의 벽을 뛰어넘는 순수한 만남으로 한민족의 화해와 단합을 도모하고 민족문화공동체를 확인하는 한편 최근 북핵위기로 불거진 한반도 평화분위기조성에 크게 기여하게 될 것이다.

5) <한라-백두> 교류사업의 전개

제주도는 제3차 제주도민 방북을 계기로 <한라-백두> 교류사업을 다양하게 펼쳐나가고 있다. 제1차, 2차와는 달리 3차 제주도민 방북단은 2개조로 나누어 방북기간 중 백두산 천지를 관광할 수 있었다. 특히 이번 천지 방문시 우근민 도지사와 제주도 한라산연구소 관계자가 백두산 연구소 소장 등 북한 인사들과 향후 교류에 관한 협의를 가져 <한라-백두>공동학술탐사가 내년부터 이루어지게 된다.

또한 지난 2000년 6월 남북정상회담에서 <한라-백두 교차관광>이 합의되어 이미 백두산탐방이 이루어졌으나 아직 실시되지 않고 있는 한라산탐방도 예정되고 있다.

라. 제주평화포럼의 정례화

제주평화포럼은 제주도가 세계평화의 섬으로 나아가기 위해 추진하는 주요사업으로 평화를 염원하는 전·현직 국가수반, 정치지도자, 석학, 언론인 및 기업인들의 관심을 제주로 집약하여, 제주를 ‘한반도와 동북아에서 평화와 번영의 지식공동체’로 자리매김하려는 목적에서 이루어지고 있다. 2001년 6월 15-17일에 제1회 제주평화포럼이 개최된 바 있으며, 2002년 4월12-13일에 ‘세미제주평화포럼’이 개최되었으며, 제2회 제주평화포럼은 2003년 10월 30일- 11월 1일 개최된다.

3. 향후 계획 및 실천방안

가. 세계평화의 섬 지정 절차와 시기

1) 세계평화의 섬 지정의 법적 근거와 지정절차

「제주국제자유도시특별법」 제12조는 “국가는 세계평화에 기여하고 한반도의 안정과 평화를 정착시키기 위하여 제주도를 평화의 섬으로 지정할 수 있다.”고 규정하고 있다. 세계평화의 섬 지정에 대한 법률적 근거인 「제주국제자유도시특별법」의 소관부처는 건설교통부이므로, 제주도의 사업계획안이 제출되면 건설교통부에 의해서 ‘세계평화의 섬’ 지정건의가 이루어진다.

세계평화의 섬 지정에서 행정상의 절차는 제주도 요청 → 건설교통부장관 → 관련부처 협의(외교통상부, 통일부 등) → 국제자유도시추진위원회 심의 → 대통령의 승인의 순서로 진행된다.

2) 세계평화의 섬 지정 시기²⁶⁾

가) 2005년 제3차 제주평화포럼시

2003년에 제2차 평화포럼을 성공적으로 치른 후 2005년 제3차 평화포럼에서 제주도를 세계평화의 섬으로 지정하는 것이다.

나) 2004년 제주 4·3 희생자 범도민위령제 봉행시

2004년 제56주년 제주 4·3 희생자 범도민위령제 봉행시 노무현 대통령이 참석하여 4·3의 비극에 대한 정부 차원의 사과 표명을 하면서 과거의 모든 아픔과 비극을 청산하고 미래의 화합과 평화를 지향해 나가는 세계평화의 섬 지정 선언을 한다.

다) 2005년 제주밀레니엄관 개관시

2005년 초 제주밀레니엄관 개관식 때 대통령을 초청하여 평화의 섬 지정 행사를 갖는다.

26) 장원석, “세계평화의 섬 지정 개요 및 지정방안”. 제주대 평화연구소, 「세계 평화의 섬 지정 및 향후 추진과제」 (2003. 10) P.34

나. 세계평화의 섬 추진과제

1) 제주국제자유도시특별법의 세계평화의 섬 관련 조항

제주국제자유도시특별법제12조 2항은 “국가와 지방자치단체는 ‘평화의 섬’의 기능과 역할을 수행하기 위하여 국제평화 및 협력기구의 유치, 국제협력에 관한 연구소 설립, 국제평화 및 협력관련 국제회의 유치, 남북교류 및 협력에 관한 사업, 그리고 그 밖의 국제협력을 위한 사업을 시행할 수 있다”고 규정하고 있다.

동법 제12조 3항은 “국가는 제2항의 사업시행을 위하여 필요한 행정적·재정적 지원을 하여야 한다”고 규정하고 있다. 이어서 제13조는 “제주도는 대한민국과 국교를 수립하고 있는 외국의 지방자치단체와 경제·문화·교육·과학·기술·체육·환경·관광 등의 분야에서 상호협력·교류할 수 있다”고 규정하고 있다.

2) 국제평화 및 협력기구의 유치

유럽의 ‘유럽안보협력기구’(OSCE)처럼 아·태지역이나 동북아국가들 사이에 군비축소 및 긴장완화를 위한 안보협력기구가 조직될 경우 그 사무국이나 관련조직 사무소를 제주에 유치하기 위해 적극적으로 노력한다. 현재 네팔 카투만두에 위치하고 있으나 실질적으로 자신의 역할을 수행하지 못하고 있는 ‘유엔 아·태지역 평화군축센터’(United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and Pacific)의 제주유치를 추진 중이다. 유엔은 동 기구의 타 지역 이전을 희망하고 있으며 비공식적으로 한국의 유치를 사를 타진하고 있는 것으로 알려져 있다.

동북아 해역의 분쟁을 중재하고 어업자원의 관리 및 환경협력을 담당하게 될 동북해양협력기구의 설립이 현실화되는 경우 그 사무국이나 관련조직 사무소를 제주에 유치한다. 이미 한·중·일 3국은 개별적으로 어업협정체제를 유지하고 있기 때문에 포괄적인 해양협력을 내용으로 하는 다자간 해양협력기구의 출현 가능성이 높다.

3) 국제협력에 관한 연구소 설치

국제협력에 관한 연구소의 설립은 ‘제주밀레니엄관’ 및 ‘제주세계평화재단’ 계획에 구체화되어 있다. 제주밀레니엄관은 세계정상들의 제주방문자취를 담은 기념관으로서 전시시설 외에 평화연구를 위한 연구시설을 계획하고 있다. 제주밀레니엄관은 2003년 3월 기공식을 가졌으며 2005년 개관 예정이다.

‘제주세계평화재단’은 연구소의 운영을 지원할 뿐만 아니라 세계평화의 섬과 관련하여 각종 정책개발 및 평화관련 사업을 전담하는 포괄적인 집행조직으로 기능을 하게 될 것이다.

4) 국제평화 및 협력 관련 국제회의 유치

- 제주평화포럼을 동아시아의 평화협력협의체로 발전시켜 나간다. 현재 민간전문가 차원에서 추진되고 있는 평화포럼을 최소한 준정부차원(Track 1.5)의 협의체로 격상시킬 필요가 있으며 이를 위해 법적·제도적 기반을 확충한다. 또한 중국과 북한측 인사는 물론이고 노벨평화상 수상자 및 후보자들을 초청하여 회의의 성과를 높여나간다.
- 동북아평화 외상회의의 제주 개최를 추진해 나가며, 2005년 10월 한국에서 개최되는 아시아·태평양 경제협력체(APEC)를 제주에 유치하기 위해 노력한다.

5) 다양한 남북교류 및 협력에 관한 사업²⁷⁾

- 인도주의적 차원의 '북한감귤보내기운동'을 지속적으로 전개한다. 이에 필요한 재원은 감귤자조금이나 남북교류기금을 적극적으로 활용한다.
- 한라-백두 공동학술탐사 사업을 추진한다. 학술탐사의 내용은 민속, 지리 등 인문분야로부터 동식물, 토양, 기후 등 자연분야에 이르기까지 주요 영역을 포함한다. 비정치적 영역에서 남북한 사회의 동질성 회복을 위한 주요 계기가 될 것이다.
- 제2차 남북정상회담 및 남북한 장관급회의의 제주 개최를 추진한다.
- 농축산기술연수, 관광가이드 교육, 경영회계교육, 해양환경교육 등을 내용으로 북한주민에 대한 초청연수사업을 전개한다.
- 3차에 걸친 제주도민의 방북도 지속적으로 추진함으로써 북한 이해와 만남의 폭을 넓혀 나가며, 제주와 지역적 성격이 유사한 북한 지자체와의 자매결연 체결 및 다각적 교류사업을 추진한다.
- 2003년 10월하순 분단 후 최초로 제주에서 개최된 민족평화축전을 정례화 시킨다.

6) 그 밖의 국제 평화 및 협력을 위한 사업

가) 제주평화상 신설

기존의 평화상과 차별화 되는 '제주평화상'을 신설하여 시상식을 제주평화포럼이나 4·3 위령제와 연결시키는 것도 상호보완적 효과를 기대할 수 있다. 2004년부터 격년제로 시상하며, 초기에는 4·3의 평화적 해결에 기여한 국내외 개인 및 단체를 대상으로 하다가 점차로 한반도 및 동북아평화에 기여한 국내외 개인 및 단체로 범위를 확대한다.

27) 양길현, "세계평화의 섬 향후 계획 및 설치방안", 제주대 평화연구소, 「세계평화의 섬 지정 및 향후 추진과제」(2003. 10), P. 48.

나) UNESCO 평화도시상(Cities for Peace Prize) 신청

UNESCO 평화도시상(Cities for Peace Prize)을 신청하여 유네스코 평화도시 네트워크에 동참한다. 유네스코 평화도시상은 2년마다 세계의 도시조직을 대상으로 문화, 환경, 교육 등의 측면에서 삶의 질을 향상시키고 모범적인 공동체를 건설한 우수도시에게 수여하는 상이다. 5개 권역별로 대상을 선정하는데 아시아·태평양지역의 경우 현재 하노이를 비롯하여 7개의 도시가 평화도시로 지정되었다.

다) 히로시마시가 주도하고 있는 ‘도시연대세계평화회의’(World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-City Solidarity)에 가입

히로시마시가 주도하고 있는 ‘도시연대세계평화회의’(World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-City Solidarity)에 가입하여 동아시아 및 세계평화의 증진을 위한 국제적인 협력을 강화한다. 도시연대세계평화회의는 항구적인 인류평화의 실현을 위해서 도시 상호간의 교류를 증대하고 도시와 시민단체의 협력을 강화하는 것이 매우 중요하다는 인식하에 국제연합의 협조를 얻어 핵무기 폐기는 물론 기아와 빈곤, 난민, 인권 및 환경문제의 해결을 위한 도시 차원의 노력을 경주할 것을 천명하고 있다.

도시연대세계평화회의는 1991년 국제연합경제사회이사회 NGO에 등록되었으며 1995년에는 히로시마 국제회의장에서 아시아태평양지역회의가 최초로 개최되었다. 도시연대세계평화회의는 히로시마 시장이 의장이 되어 4년에 한번 회의를 개최하는데 히로시마 평화문화재단 내에 사무국이 설치되어 있다.

라) 평화 및 인권교육의 강화

세계적 교류의 시대에 제주를 평화의 섬으로 발전시켜 나감에 있어서 반드시 요구되는 것은 평화교육을 통하여 제주인이 스스로 평화에 대한 이해를 기초로 세계시민으로서의 자질을 갖추도록 하는 것이다. 세계시민은 하나의 가치나 문화 척도만을 절대적인 것으로 고집하지 않고 가치관이나 문화적 다양성을 수용할 수 있는 다원주의 및 관용과 평화의 정신이 내면화되어 있어야만 한다.

이러한 배경에서 지방자치단체는 각종 교육기관과 민간·사회단체에 위한 평화교육을 지원·장려하고 이를 기초로 평화운동이 확산될 수 있도록 해야만 한다. 평화교육은 기본적으로 정의, 인권, 민주주의, 그리고 갈등의 비폭력적 해소 방법 등을 교육함으로써 인류 공동의 가치인 평화를 지키고(peace keeping) 만들어 내며(peace making) 더욱 증진시키는(peace improving), 사람과 사회를 변화시키는 행위라고 정의할 수 있다.

특히 학교 교육 현장에서 ‘평화의 섬’ 교육 프로그램을 개발·교육함으로써 학생들로 하여금 비폭력적으로 분쟁을 해결할 수 있는 능력을 키우도록 해야 하며, 마음속에 내적 평화의 발전을 촉진시킴으로써 관용, 동정심, 공유, 배려의 자질을 확고히 형성할 수 있도록

록 해야 한다. 나아가서 장기적인 관점에서 국가 및 국제 차원의 평등의식과 연대감을 배양할 수 있도록 함으로써 ‘평화의 섬’ 교육을 통하여 제주인이 국제평화에 기여할 수 있도록 토대를 마련해야만 한다. 이밖에 각종 종교단체나 시민·사회단체도 자체의 사회교육 프로그램을 통해 평화사상을 확산시킬 수 있는 정책을 마련하고 이를 실천해 나갈 필요가 있다.

4. 세계 평화의 섬 홍보전략

가. 세계 평화의 섬 이미지 구축

- 세계정상들의 정상회담장소로 이용되었던 여러 사례들과 매년 개최되고 있는 제주평화포럼의 성과를 들어 동북아와 한반도의 평화에 기여함을 홍보한다.
- 남북회담개최와 민족평화축전 개최 사례들을 들어 남북한관계 개선에 기여함을 홍보하고 제2차 남북정상회담시 회담장소로 제주도로 유치함은 평화의 섬 제주의 이미지를 큰 재정적인 부담없이 홍보할 수 있는 부수적인 효과를 얻을 수 있다.
- 감귤 당근을 비롯한 제주도 특산 농산물의 북한의 인도적 지속적 지원과 계속되는 대규모 단체 방북 교류를 들어 남북한 화해와 협력에 기여함을 홍보한다.

나. 세계평화의 섬에 관한 로고 제작과 국제관광자유도시로서의 이미지와 연계된 세계평화의 섬 홍보물을 제작하여 다양한 채널을 통해 보급

- 서울을 비롯한 대도시, 광장, 주요 지하철 등에 입간판이나 전광판 설치하여 국내인들에게 홍보한다.
- 인천을 비롯한 국제공항과 부산을 비롯한 국제항에 오가는 외국여행객들이 눈에 띄는 장소에 입간판이나 전광판을 설치한다.

다. 체계적인 국제홍보전략의 수립과 추진으로 해외언론매체를 이용

- CNN과 STAR TV 등 활용
- Arirang TV와 KBS 해외방송활용과 코리아타임스 등 영자일간지 활용
- Time, Newsweek 등 세계적 시사주간지와 세계적 관광잡지 등을 활용
- 서울주재 외신기자들을 활용

라. 세계평화의 섬 제주를 세계에 알릴 수 있는 독자적인 홍보체계를 수립·전개

- 영자잡지나 부로서를 제작 배포.

- 인터넷활용(독자적인 방송국이나 신문)
- 국제적인 조직을 가지고 있는 모임이나 사회단체를 통하여 세계평화의 섬 제주를 알리고 그 곳에 적극적으로 활동하고 있는 도·내외의 공직자, 지식인 집단 등을 이용한다. 로터리클럽이나 라이온즈클럽, 보이즈카웃, 적십자 등 국제적인 성격을 가진 사회단체는 물론 상공회의소나 관광협회, 학술연구단체 등과 같이 상대적으로 유리한 여건을 갖고 있는 사회단체들로 하여금 적극적으로 세계평화의 섬 제주를 알리는 데 앞장서도록 장려하고 지원해야 할 것이다.

마. 해외거주 제주인이나 제주를 좋아하는 내·외국인으로 홍보 네트워크 구축

- 해외에서 활발히 성공적으로 활동하고 있는 제주인, 재외제주도민, 나아가서 제주도에 호감을 가지고 있는 외국인들로 하여금 세계평화의 섬 제주를 알리는 데 앞장서도록 한다.

<표3> 제주도 지자체의 해외자매결연 현황

| 기관명 | 자매결연지역 | 결연일시 |
|------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 제주도 | 미국 하와이주 | '86. 11. 25 |
| | 인도네시아 발리주 | '89. 6. 16 |
| | 러시아 사할린주 | '92. 1. 17 |
| | 중국 해남성 | '95. 10. 6 |
| 제주시 | 일본 와카야마현 와카야마시 | '87. 11. 12 |
| | 중국 계림시 관서장족 자치구 | '97. 10. 29 |
| | 프랑스 로랑시 | '02. 11. 22승인 '03. 말 자매결연 체결예정 |
| 서귀포시 | 일본 사가현 가라쓰시 | '94. 9. 4 |
| | 일본 이바라키현 카시마시 | '03. 8. 27 신청 '03. 10월 말 허가예정 |
| | 중국 산둥성 내주시 | '95. 12. 11 |
| 북제주군 | 미국 캘리포니아주 샌타로사시 | '96. 10. 22 |
| | 일본 효고현 산다시 | '97. 7. 31 |
| | 일본 와카야마현 나가군 | '87. 11. 12 |
| 남제주군 | 중국 요녕성 홍성시 | '96. 11. 12 |
| | 뉴질랜드 파파쿠라시 | '97. 3. 7 |

바. 제주도 지자체들이 맺고 있는 해외자매결연도시를 활용하여 평화의 섬을 홍보

<표 3>에 제시된 바와 같은 제주도 지자체들이 맺고 있는 해외자매결연도시를 활용하여 평화의 섬을 적극 홍보해야 한다. 더 나아가 국제적으로 평화 이미지를 갖고 있는 스위스의 제네바, 네델란드의 헤이그, 일본의 히로시마 등과의 자매결연을 적극 추진해야 하여 이들 도시로부터 ‘노하우’를 배우는 것도 매우 필요할 것이다.

V. 결 론

지금까지 동북아평화공동체의 전제로서 ‘다자간안보협의체’의 결성 가능성을 검토해보고, 이와 관련하여 제주도가 추진하고 있는 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상의 유형과 그 실천전략들을 분석해보았다.

금년 방콕에서 개최되는 APEC 정상회담에서는 그간 경제문제에만 국한되었던 의제가 “반테러선언” 등 안보문제까지도 다루게 될 것이라고 한다. 이는 아태지역의 안보협력대화를 진일보시킨다는 점에서도 큰 의의가 있다. 동북아시아에서도 ARF정도의 안보협력대화 정도라도 시작하도록 한국 정부는 다양한 아이디어를 제의해야 한다. 현재 추진 중인 북한 핵문제를 해결하기 위한 ‘6자회담’이 지속되도록 노력하는 한편, 이를 동북아의 ‘다자간안보협의체’로 발전할 수 있도록 다방면의 외교적 노력을 기울이는 것도 한 방법이 될 것이다. 제주도로서는 ‘평화의 섬’ 추진과 관련, 이러한 ‘다자간안보협의체’가 가시화될 경우를 대비하여 ‘사무국’이 제주에 유치될 수 있도록 중앙정부에 대한 체계적인 로비를 미리 준비하는 것이 필요하다.

특히, 세계화와 지방화시대가 가속화됨에 따라 지방정부 차원에서도 동북아의 평화질서 구축 문제에 적극적인 역할을 할 수 있다는 점을 감안, 제주지방정부도 ‘평화포럼’ 등을 활용하여 한반도와 동북아의 안보와 평화를 진일보시킬 수 있는 다양하고 참신한 아이디어를 제안하는 ‘지적인 리더십’을 능동적으로 발휘해야 한다. 북한 핵문제 해결을 위한 ‘6자회담’의 장소로서 북경만이 아니라 제주에서 하자는 안을 주장하는 것도 제주의 평화 이미지를 진작시키는 데 좋은 방안이 될 것이다. 또한 제주평화포럼을 더욱 발전시켜 동북아의 다보스포럼이라는 이미지를 전 세계인들에게 심어주게 된다면 제주가 동북아의 평화 구축의 메카라는 상징성이 더욱 구체화될 수 있을 것이다.

제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 이제 구상 단계를 벗어나 구체적인 실천단계로 접어들고 있는 것이 사실이다. 제주국제자유도시 특별법 제12조 1항에 “국가는 세계평화에 기여하고 한반도의 안전과 평화를 정착하기 위하여 도(道)를 세계 ‘평화의 섬’으로 지정할 수 있다”고 규정함으로써 제주를 세계 ‘평화의 섬’으로 조성하는 데 필요한 법적 기초는 이미 갖추어져 있다고 볼 수 있다. 이제 이를 제도적으로 보장하기 위한 구체적인 사업계획을 마련하고, 이를 실천해감으로써 중앙정부가 제주도를 명실상부하게 세계 ‘평화의 섬’으로 지정·

선포해 주도록 온 제주인이 힘을 합해 요청해야 한다. 중앙정부는 조속한 시일 내에 제주도를 ‘평화의 섬’으로 지정함으로써 정부가 추진하는 각종 국제회의나 평화관련 사업들이 제주에서 이루어질 수 있도록 해야 할 것이다.

제주 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 새로운 천년이 시작되는 세기적 전환기에 있어 제주도가 문명 전환의 큰 흐름에 동참하고 기여하려는 의지를 담고 있는 운동이다. 21세기에는 아시아·태평양이 세계의 주체로서 교류의 중심적인 역할을 할 것이며, 이에 따라 동북아시아는 세계 문명과 교역의 중심지로서 부상할 것은 분명한 사실이다. 그리고 앞으로의 세계는 해양이 중요한 시대가 될 것이라는 점 또한 명백하다. 이러한 점에서 제주도의 지정학적 위치는 매우 중요하며, 이 시대를 사는 제주인들에게 무거운 사명감을 안겨준다. 제주도가 해양시대에 지정학적으로 동북아시아의 중심 축에 위치해 있다는 사실은 변방이었던 제주도가 이제 제주인들의 노력 여하에 따라 세계문명의 주역으로 당당하게 비상할 수 있는 기회를 포착하게 된 것이다.

제주도가 평화의 메카가 되고, 관광지로서만이 아니라 평화교류의 중심지로서, 평화협력의 학습장으로서의 역할을 수행하게 된다면, 평화질서를 바라는 기대와 염원들은 동북아시아는 물론 세계 모든 지역의 평화질서를 형성하는 데도 확산되게 될 것이다. 이러한 평화질서의 단초를 제주도가 적극 추진한다는 점에서 ‘평화의 섬’ 구상은 그 의의가 사뭇 크다.

그러나 이러한 평화질서를 제주인들이 주체적으로 주도해나가기 위해서는 이를 추진할 수 있는 능력을 갖춘 인재 양성이 시급하다. 아무리 좋은 조건이 주어진다고 해도 이를 운영할 수 있는 인재가 없으면, 다시 제주는 중앙의 객체로서의 역할에 만족해야만 할 것이기 때문이다.

Jeju's Survival Strategy in the Era of Globalization

Sung-Hee Jwa

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Introduction

Following the recent global trends, the Korean government has renewed its efforts towards creating a more dynamic economy through extensive economic reform and concrete steps to open up the economy are increasingly being made. The recently and timely pursuit to transform Jeju Islands into a free international city similar to Hong Kong and Singapore is an important and highly relevant step in the overall national development strategy, which includes the vision to make Korea a regional transport and business hub. Based on the competitive powers of its fresh environment and distinctive culture, it is expected that the island will be transformed into a free international city as well as a worldwide sightseeing destination. The Jeju Free International City is envisioned as a place that allows the unrestricted movement of people, capital and goods, thereby encouraging a significant increase in international and domestic businesses particularly in tourism, international trade and business, and finance.

It has been over a year since concrete steps have been taken towards building a free international city. The free movement of people, goods and services has brought a lot of opportunity for Jeju, but it has also been a cause of some worries. There is still insufficient private capital, and the response of the local people has been somewhat passive. Furthermore, similar free cities have been proposed in other parts of Korea, such as Incheon. Competition within Korea, as well as other world events, has provided further challenge for Jeju. The recent lifting of all import duties on tangerines by the WTO as well as market opening for other fruits, for example, has led to a glut damaging Jeju's tangerine sector — the island's number two source of income. Such events notwithstanding, there is a need more than ever to come up with a concrete strategy to meet the ever-changing global and national economic demands.

Aims of the Jeju Free International City

The former President of Korea, Kim Dae-Jung, on January 23, 2002 signed a special law that officially made Jeju an international free city. Jeju Island in the 21st century has been placed on the path to becoming an important and vibrant economy, fully integrated into the national and international economies, while functioning within a distinct local culture and pristine natural environment. Jeju Island has been proposed as a pioneer location as a creative social environment to encourage and induce foreign direct investment with a wide range of opportunities in the areas of leisure and tourism. A regulation-free environment that guarantees free movement of people, capital, goods and services is perhaps the most important principle of the Jeju Free International City. A balance of the three broad objectives: protection of the environment (environment sustainability), preservation of the local culture (building upon existing attributes and comparative advantage), and economic development (based on market principles) is another important guiding philosophy of the Jeju Free International City.

As a tourist and leisure area, the growth of Jeju's tourism sector will be encouraged while fostering an environmentally sustainable development strategy. Tax exemptions and other governmental support are being promptly put into place to encourage further investment in the tourism industry. New golf courses will be established with entrance and membership fees drastically reduced. Most importantly, sustaining the pristine natural environment will remain an utmost priority for the island developers.¹⁾ Furthermore, Jeju aims to attract international investment. Tax, public and private lease incentives, and other services will be aimed at facilitating foreign investors that decide to do business in Jeju. English service centers are being set up across the island to facilitate business communication among foreigners and Korean people. To meet the needs of increasing tourists, a number of world-class recreation facilities including leisure residence are being increased.

The advancement of Jeju as a knowledge-based economy promoting free trade and fostering financial services is also being rigorously pursued and the island further aims to foster its education sector. The basic infrastructure necessary to build a dynamic economy in Jeju will be expanded. This will include the improvement of airport, harbor, roads, as well as communication networks. Already, plans to build foreign investment zones have been designated as special districts including a free trade zone near Jeju airport.

The central and Jeju governments have allocated expenditure of 4.7 trillion won (\$3.6

billion) by 2010, with private sector contributions amounting to 1.3 trillion won. Furthermore, social overhead capital (SOC) funds are expected to reach 2.9 trillion won by 2010, and 1.7 trillion won are budgeted on seven initiative projects.

The advantages of Jeju

The development of the free international city builds upon the existing advantages of Jeju, which should become a model city not only in Korea but also in the North East Asian region. Jeju is strategically located at the center of North East Asia region and is close to major cities in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China. There are five cities with a population of over 10 million within two hours of flying time, and a further eighteen cities with a population of over 5 million.²⁾ Furthermore, there are over 50 cities with more than one million residences within three hours flying distance. Jeju should therefore exploit its advantage of proximity to growing trade flows and large population base.

An attractive topology and nature-blessed environment including the graceful Halla Mountain at the center of the island, orums, forests, and beaches have made Jeju earn the title of the “romantic island” . Jeju has a subtropical oceanic climate with four distinct seasons and maintains a unique culture and flavor distinct from other regions in Korea. Tourism infrastructure that includes tourism sites, international standard hotels as well as other forms of accommodation are available, and there are plans to continue expanding the tourist industry. All these factors have contributed towards Jeju becoming an ideal tourist destination and together with its attractive unpolluted and green environment make the island a “blueprint” model for sustainable development.

The already existing infrastructure with intention for further improvement should also facilitate the realization of a free international city while reducing the burden on private businesses of having to build basic infrastructure. The high standard airport has international and frequent domestic services though out the year. There is a deep-sea port facility through out the island with an expansion program in place in Jeju City. Power, telecommunications, clean water and sanitation infrastructures are also reliable.

There is a highly educated residence of over 500,000 that can provide initial labor and domestic market base. Moreover, there is hardly any social unrest, with unemployment and crime rates very low. Jeju’s high standard education establishments including private and national universities and research related

industries and the clean environment makes it ideal to set up science-based and hi-tech industries. In fact, there is already an established research and incubator activities focusing on agriculture and marine services. Ample room for improvement still exists in the secondary/tertiary education and skills training, especially in key competitive areas such as tourism management, agricultural sciences, languages and business studies. The island can also capitalize on the growing importance of wireless communications and e-commerce to overcome constraints on island isolation.

Institutional arrangement and sectors for development

Investors participating in the tourism and leisure industry such as the building of complex leisure sites, tourist hotels, recreation centers, ecological parks, and so on will benefit from various tax reductions and exemptions by being granted status as foreign investment promotion zone (see Table 1). Specifically, investors in the construction of leisure complexes, hotels and international conference halls investing over \$20 million, and those facilitating the tourist industry in general and investing over \$10 million will be allowed to benefit from the tax incentive system. A 100% exemption for 3 years and 50% exemption for another 2 years will be granted to those eligible on all corporate, income and regional taxes. Income used for renovation and expansion of businesses will be tax exempt. Other benefits are extended to Jeju residence and there are various subsidies available for those working in education and training, employment and research sectors.

<Table 1> Advantages of investing in the Jeju Free International City

The Jeju free trade zone will be an integral part toward building the free international city (see Table 2). In Korea, free trade zones are usually reserved for foreigners, but on Jeju Island, domestic investors will be allowed to set up businesses in the free trade zones as well and may benefit from the tax incentive system. Furthermore, a foreigner is expected to invest only \$10 million in the Jeju free trade zone compare to \$30 million in other regions in Korea.

<Table 2> Jeju free trade zone incentives

Fostering advanced scientific skills and high-tech on the island is critical. Taking advantage of the clean air and pollution-free environment and focusing on bioscience, marine research, genetics and hospitality management will be particularly viable, and should be augmented by creating links with international universities and research establishments. Those investing in such industries will only pay half of all registration fees, property tax, and capital tax. This Jeju tax system also applies to the island residence for 5 years, with an added 100% exemption on corporate and income tax for 3 years, and 50% for a further 2 years. In accordance with the nation's R&D related tax incentives that include deductible reserves for technology development, there exist further tax credit for technology and manpower development, and for investment in technology and manpower development facilities, and tax incentives for technology transfers.

Investment in education is considered fundamental in the development of the free international city and this seems viable given that Jeju is attractive towards new economy industries. Jeju aims to become a center for academic, industry and technology excellence. To help create an educational atmosphere aimed towards globalization, and thereby luring foreign schools, requirements for the establishment and operations of universities and other higher educational institutions will be eased. Furthermore foreign universities may establish branch schools in the form of a graduate school or a college, permitting full rights to create their own curriculum and recruit students. Foreigners may gain employed as regular teachers in the elementary and secondary schools and qualifications for Korean nationals to be admitted to foreign schools will also be eased to 3 years from the currently 5 years of outside residence. Currently, foreigners can be employed only as lecturers in tertiary education institutions.

The law has recently been extended to allow visitors to Jeju Island from about 190 nations including some 17 countries previously prohibited to enter Korea such as Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cambodia to enter without visas and stay for up to 30 days, and may enter the Korean peninsular as well. Foreigners in information technology, biosciences, foreign language education and others will be granted stay visas for 3 to 5 years. This should facilitate the movement of people to and from the Jeju Islands.

Logistics and financial services industries, although perhaps considered to be a part of the defining characteristics of a free international city, are not as yet considered to present substantial opportunities for Jeju at least in the short to medium term as the island possesses little sustainable competitive advantage in these areas. The resultant expansion of its economic base by pursuing to become a free international city should however lead to the growth of logistics and financial services to serve the island's growing economy over time. For the convenience of foreign investors, the government will make administrative institutions that provide and receive official documents in English. We may expect improved language skills to have an important impact on the availability of labor particularly in the tourism sector.

Infrastructure for tourism

Beside the freer flow of people encouraged by the no visa requirement for entry into Jeju, shopping, particularly duty-free shopping for foreigners as well as domestic visitors will be encouraged. Seogwipo has already been assigned as a center of marine and shopping tourism by re-developing Seogwipo Port. Furthermore, to attract tourists, restaurants, shopping malls and aquariums are planned in the Joongmoon Tourist Complex. In a duty free shop, residents can shop four times a year and buy goods up to \$300 per visit.

There are currently 8 golf courses on Jeju Island with a further 19 golf courses on the way, of which 5 are already under construction. It has been decided that the heavy taxation on golf be abolished and green fees be lowered to 60,000 won to attract domestic travelers as well as foreign visitors.

Sustaining and improving the tourism environment is critical to Jeju Island. A variety of tourist products will be developed, and a Jeju "brand guarantee" will be nurtured. However, in order to guarantee an environmentally friendly free international city, harmonious development between the natural environment and business activity that is economically and environmentally sustainable is important.

The seven catalytic projects

Seven catalytic projects towards establishing Jeju as a free international city have been identified, with the purpose of providing stimulus to a wide range of industry sectors through implementing a long term, sustainable development approach with the

conservation of the environment and quality of life being essential. The projects include the redevelopment of Seogwipo waterfront, establishment of a commercial precinct and water park at Joongmoon, the development of Freight Park and export zone at Jeju Airport, establishment of science and technology park associated with Jeju University, and a resort retirement development with golf course in the vicinity of Joongmoon (see Table 3 and Figure 1). It should be noted, however, that the success of these projects will depend on how effective Jeju will attract and maintain investors to the island.

<Table 3 : Proposed catalyst projects>

<Figure 1 : Location of catalyst projects on Jeju Island>

Source : Jones Land LaSalle, Seoul, Korea.

The Jeju Free International City Development Committee chaired by the Prime Minister administers the seven catalytic projects as well as the entire Jeju Free International City, and works hand in hand with the central government to take Jeju into the 21st century. Furthermore, a Jeju Free International City Development Center has been set up to act as a one-stop service window for FDI for the seven catalytic projects, where foreigners may deal with various matters regarding registration, taxes, legal and investment information and so on. It will also make efforts to attract and support foreign investors, and will provide publicity and marketing for international as well as foreign businesses that decide to settle in Jeju.

The way forward

The three broad objectives to protect the environment, preserve the local culture, and induce economic development and prosperity have been fully integrated in the new Jeju development program. The outcome envisioned is one of a broader based economy, combining primary economic activities with higher-value added processes. Jeju is destined to become an island at the center of excellence for learning, research

and development, particularly in the niche sectors of agriculture, biotechnology and above all tourism. Jeju hopes to host the 2005 APEC meeting, which should help establish the island's economic role in the Asia-Pacific region.

One of the greatest challenges is to get a more positive response by the local community. The tendency so far has been to wait for government and outside support. What is needed, perhaps, is to form a local development fund, which should send a strong signal showing Jeju's commitment and should help attract even further capital. Moreover, every local person should acknowledge that they are important ambassadors for the island. The continued undiminished support of the central government as well as from private investors remains indispensable.

The Jeju tourism industry has a comparative advantage over other areas thanks to its natural environment and unique island culture. The tourism potential of this startling scenic island is far from being exhausted, and there is ample room to expand tourism infrastructure to make Jeju even more competitive as an attractive holiday resort. As a preferred travel destination in all target tourism markets that delivers an internationally competitive, diverse yet uniquely Jeju experience, investors, both international and domestic cannot afford to resist the temptation to join in what promises to be a new and exciting Jeju Island.

It may be added that Jeju is not expected to exactly emulate either Hong Kong or Singapore, but its growth should be based on a foundation of its existing advantages in tourism and primary industry, coupled with investment in education to improve the island capacity to become an open society. This should provide a foundation for the development of derivative industries particularly focused on agricultural research and bioscience, which in turn should reinforce its primary, agricultural industry, as well as on the development of language and hospitality management skills that should further strengthen its tourism base. Furthermore, the resultant expansion of its economic base will lead to the growth of logistics and financial services to serve the island's growing economy over time in the domestic and East Asian region.

- 1) Jeju has recently been acknowledged as a GIS area and EU standards are applicable
- 2) Cities of over 10 million: Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai, Taejin. Cities of 5 to 10 million: Osaka, Taipei, Tarien, Shimyang, Hangju, Soju, Yundae, Chungdo, Namtong, Yungpa, Onju, Namkyung, Jaenam.

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1. 서 론 : 문제의 제기

EU, NAFTA, AFTA등 경제 bloc화의 세계적 추세에 부응하여 동북아에서도 한-중-일을 연결하는 자유무역지대와 지역 통화기금의 형성에 관한 논의가 활성화되고 있으며 또한 아시아 역내의 교역량 급증, 상호 보완적 경제관계의 강화 등으로 역내 경제공동체의 형성에 대한 관심이 과거 어느 때보다 높아지고 있다. 또한 이러한 추세에 발맞추어 노무현 정부는 동북아시아 중심국가로의 도약을 국가발전의 목표로 삼고 경제적으로 동북아시아 지역의 허브로서의 대한민국으로 발전하고자 정책적 노력과 함께 미국을 방문하여서도 부시 대통령으로부터 동북아 중심국가적 대한민국의 역할에 대한 미국의 지지를 얻어내고자 노력하였다.

이러한 국내외적 동아시아 역내 주요 도시들이 국제자유도시로 변모하려는 움직임을 보이고 있는데, 우선 국내에서는 인천 송도, 영종도, 김포 매퓌지 및 광양 목포 등 서해안 도시들, 그리고 중국의 경우에는 상해 푸둥 그리고 해남도 등이 국제자유도시로 변모하기 위한 시도들을 전개 중에 있으며, 이미 제주도는 김대중 정부 하에서 국제자유도시임을 선언하고 진정한 동북아의 허브로서의 국제자유도시가 되기 위한 각종 제도들을 법제화하여 동북아시아 경제공동체의 중심 거점으로 자리매김하려는 노력을 보여 왔다.

그러나 인천, 상해와 같이 교역, 물류, 그리고 금융 부문에 있어 비교 우위를 가진 주요 도시들의 국제자유도시화 경향은 동일 분야에 있어 지역 거점화를 추구하고자 하는 제주의 국제자유도시화 전략에 새로운 제약으로 등장하고 있음. 따라서 제주의 비교우위에 부합하는 새로운 전략 산업의 모색이 절실히 요청되고 있는 실정이라고 하겠다. 이와 관련, 동북아시아의 중심으로서, 경제공동체의 허브로서 성공적인 기능을 담당하기 위해서는 동북아시아 지역내의 다른 도시들과 비교할 때, 제주만이 가질 수 있는 차별적 비교우위를 확보하는 것이 절대적으로 필요하다.

제주도 비교우위를 가질 수 있는 산업분야로서 「관광」, 「문화」, 「교육」 등의 분야가 전략 부문으로 고려될 수 있는 바, 「문화」 및 「관광」의 측면은 이미 그 동안 많은

연구가 이루어져 왔으나, 「교육」의 경우는 상대적으로 간과되어 왔다. 이는 아마도 교육의 특성상 가시적인 경제적 수익과 직접적인 관련성이 없는 것처럼 인식되기 때문으로 여겨진다.

제조업을 중심으로 하는 산업사회는 20세기말을 즈음하여 이른바 지구화(globalization)와 함께 정보혁명을 거치면서 지식기반사회로 변환하고 있다. 이처럼 지식기반사회로의 진입이라는 측면에서 「교육」 분야가 경쟁력 있는 국제자유도시로서의 제주에 기여하는 바는 크게 두 가지로 나뉘어진다. 첫째는 높은 수익성에 기반한 고부가가치 산업으로서의 교육 산업이다. 지식의 중요성이 강조됨에 따라 지식서비스 업으로서의 교육에 대한 수요는 더욱 높아지고 있으며 특히 우리나라의 사교육시장에서 보는 바와 같이 지식서비스업으로서의 「교육」 분야는 국제적 경쟁력을 갖춘 국제자유도시로서의 제주의 위상확립에 보다 효과적인 새로운 대안으로서 대두될 수 있다.

둘째는 지식기반사회에의 사회적 기반(Social Infrastructure)으로서의 교육산업이다. 산업화 과정이 진행되어온 20세기에는 「제조」를 통하여 생산된 가시적인 각종 상품들이 생산자로부터 소비자에 원활하게 다다를 수 있도록 생산자와 소비자를 연결하는 「물류」 서비스를 위한 가시적인 사회적 기반의 확보가 국제사회의 중심지로 부상하기 위한 관건이었다면, 21세기의 미래는 「정보」와 「지식」을 상호 연결하고 공유할 수 있도록 연결해주는 사회적 기반을 확보하는 것이 핵심 과제라고 할 수 있다. 지식서비스업으로서의 교육은 산업화과정에서 대두된 제조업 및 기타 산업들에 필요한 지식 및 정보의 생산과 소비를 원활하게 연결해 줌으로써 21세기 지식기반사회의 사회적 기간산업(Social Infrastructure)으로서의 역할을 수행하게 된다. 따라서 국제적 경쟁력을 갖춘 교육분야는 우수한 양질의 고급두뇌를 공급하고 또한 우수한 교육환경을 제공함으로써 국제자유도시로서의 제주가 여타 고부가가치 산업을 유치하여 육성함에 있어서 지역기간산업으로서 중요한 역할을 수행하게 된다. 즉, 국제적 경쟁력을 갖춘 교육기관(들)을 육성함으로써 관련 산업 분야들에 긍정적인 유발효과(spill-over effect)도 함께 가져다 준다고 하겠다.

이처럼 국제자유도시인 제주가 「인간」, 「정보」, 「자원」, 「자본」의 자유로운 이동 속에서 고부가가치를 지닌 「지식 자본」(Knowledge Capital)의 동북아 지역 내 교환의 중심지로서의 경쟁력을 창출해낸다면, 즉 「교육」 분야에서의 대외적인 차별성을 확보한다면 제주는 동북아시아 지역의 진정한 중심으로 자리매김할 수 있을 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구는 국제적 경쟁력을 갖춘 동북아시아 지역의 「지식 자본」의 허브 역할을 하게 될 제주의 전략적 위상을 새롭게 모색해 보는 데 그 주요 목적이 있다 특히, 동북아시아 역내에서 국제자유도시인 제주가 절대적인 우위를 확보할 수 있는 새로운 분야로서 「지식 정보」의 육성 방안들을 점검하고, 그 실천적 방안으로서 국제교육복합단지의 설립 및 그 운영에 대한 전략적 방안들을 모색하는데 본 연구의 목적이 있다.

2. 국제자유도시로서의 제주의 경쟁적 우위 분석

본 절에서는 국제자유도시로서의 제주의 지역적 특성에 잘 부합되는, 기술적 특성을 개괄적으로 살펴보고, 특히 제주의 환경 및 제도적 특성을 포함한 지역적 특성과 지식서비스 산업간의 관계를 살펴보고자 한다.

제주의 경우 그 면적이 서울의 약 3배에 해당하며 현재 거주인구는 약 50여만 명으로 추산되고 있다. 우선 자연환경적 특성을 살펴볼 때, 쾌적한 거주환경을 위한 기후조건 및 기타 환경 여건은 양호한 편으로 기본적인 주거의 쾌적함을 제공하고 있다. 그러나 육지와 떨어져 있는 섬이라고 하는 지리적 여건을 고려할 때, 산업의 지리적인 집적화가 경쟁력이 절대적인 산업들의 경우에 제주는 그 지역적 특성이 매력적이지 못한 곳이라고 할 수 있다. 우선 기존의 전통적인 제조업의 경우에는 생산에 필요한 원부자재 및 생산인력의 공급에 있어서 여타 지역에 비하여 열세에 있으며 또한 시장 규모에 있어서도 인구 50여만 명의 시장으로는 열악한 조건이라고 할 수 있다. 더구나 단순한 지리적 근접성을 넘어서서 관련산업들과의 밀접한 연계관계를 필요로 하는 산업들의 경우에는 제주의 지정학적 위치가 이들 연계관계에 절대적으로 필요한 효과적인 업무 연락 및 조율 (communication and coordination)에 제한적인 요소로 작용할 수 있다. 물론 정보혁명을 이용한 정보통신기술의 발달은 지리적인 거리를 해소하는 데 많은 도움을 주고 있으나 아직도 기술의 암묵적 특성(tacitness)과 기업 거래상의 비밀유지 및 보안 등을 고려한 직접적인 대인간 접촉의 필요를 충족시키기에는 상대적으로 열악한 위치에 있다.

즉, 제주의 지리적 특성은 그 자연적 환경에 있어서는 기본적인 주거환경의 측면에서 쾌적한 환경을 제공한다는 유리한 측면과 함께 전문화된 생산요소 및 시장에서의 지리적 근접성 및 관련 산업간 밀접한 연계성에서는 다른 지역들에 비하여 다소 불리한 실정이다. 이러한 제주 지역의 특성을 고려할 때, 생산요소시장 및 수요시장 그리고 기타 관련 기업과의 밀접한 연계 관계를 필요로 하는 산업들은 제주의 지역적 특성과 잘 부합되지 않는다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 측면에서 볼 때, 제주지역에서 쾌적한 주거환경 및 자연환경을 중심으로 한 산업- 관광, 농업 및 어업- 들이 자생적으로 성장해온 것은 당연한 결과라고 할 수 있다.

따라서 농업 및 어업과 같이 전통적으로 발달해온 산업이외에 고부가가치 산업들 중에서 제주의 지역적 특성과 잘 부합되는 산업이 되기 위해서는 제주의 지리적 불리함이 문제가 되지 않는 산업이어야 할 것인 바. 특히, 연관산업과의 연계관계가 다소 느슨하고 생산요소 시장 및 최종소비자의 지리적 위치로부터 제약을 받지 않아도 됨에 따라, 제주의 지리적 근접성에서의 열위를 극복할 수 있는 산업이어야 할 것이다. 연관산업과의 연계관계가 느슨하고 생산요소시장 및 최종소비자의 지리적 위치로부터의 제약이 없는 산업

은 우선 특정한 지역의 지리적 특성 하에서만 가능한 산업으로 이 경우에는 타 산업과의 연계관계가 존재하지 않을 뿐 아니라 그 지역자체가 유일한 공급원이며 동시에 독점적 지위로 인하여 소비자들이 그 지역을 방문해야만이 소비할 수 있는 산업으로 이는 다른 아닌 관광산업이다.

이처럼 지역적 특성에만 의존하는 특수한 경우를 제외하고 일반적으로 산업간 연관관계에서 살펴볼 때, 타 산업의 생산요소를 제공하는 산업으로서 그 산출물이 전문적이고 특화되어 있을 때 산출물의 전문성과 시장에서의 독점적 지위로 인하여 시장으로부터의 거리에 제한되지 않게 된다. 이러한 기술적 특성을 지닌 산업으로 지식 및 정보의 원천적인 창출 및 유통과 관련된 산업을 들 수 있는데, 이에 해당하는 구체적인 산업으로서는 신기술의 연구 개발과 관련된 연구개발업, 독창적인 영화 등 다양한 멀티미디어 콘텐츠를 개발하는 콘텐츠 개발업, 그리고 교육산업 등을 들 수 있는 데, 특히 교육산업은 지식의 창출과 유통 모두에 관련되어 있다.

이들 산업의 특징은 기존의 제조업과는 달리 대규모의 기계 및 장비 등 생산을 위한 장치의 공급 및 투자에 의존하지 않고 대부분 전문 지식과 정보를 소유하고 있는 인적 자원에 의해 그 경쟁력이 결정된다는 점이다. 즉, 지식창출 및 유통에 관련된 전문 인력들이 모여서 활동하게 되면 자연스럽게 산업클러스터가 형성된다는 점이다.

그러나 제주지역에서 이러한 산업들이 자체적 경쟁력을 갖춘 산업으로 성공적으로 성장하기 위해서는 관련 산업들에 있어서 여타 지역과의 경쟁 관계를 고려하여야 한다. 특히, 지리적 위치의 열세를 극복하기 위해서는 해당 산업에서 제공하는 지식관련 서비스가 해당 수요자와의 지리적 근접성을 필요로 하지 않는 특성을 지니고 있어야 한다. 이는 기업의 생산 활동과 관련된 연구 개발에 있어서도 생산 현장과 밀접한 연구 개발활동 보다는 기초적이고 일반적인 기술 및 지식을 다루는 연구 개발활동이 더 적합함을 의미하며 교육산업 역시 미국의 실리콘 벨리, 보스턴, 샌디에고 등에서 나타나고 있는 긴밀한 산학협동이 필요한 분야나 내용을 교육하기보다는 많은 분야에 보다 광범위하게 영향을 미치는 정치, 경제, 사회, 및 자연과학의 기초분야와 관련된 부문이 더 적합함을 의미한다.

이상의 논의와 주거환경의 쾌적함의 중요성을 함께 고려할 때, 제주의 지역적 특성에 잘 부합되는 고부가가치 산업으로 보다 원천적이고 그 파급효과가 다양한 기술분야 및 사회 전반에 걸친 지식과 정보를 전문적으로 취급하는 고급두뇌들이 활동할 수 있는 산업을 의미한다고 하겠다. 결국 다음 절에서 논의할 제주국제교육복합단지(Jeju International Education Complex)의 기본적 성격 및 그 발전 방향도 이러한 원칙 하에서 출발하고 있다.

3. 국제교육복합단지의 전략적 위상 모색

3.1 국제교육복합단지의 기본 성격

앞에서의 논의를 살펴볼 때, 제주국제교육복합단지의 기본적 성격은 일반정규교육기관과 유사한 성격을 지니고 있다. 그러나 제주 국제교육 복합단지의 가장 기본적인 전제는 기존에 존재하는 국내 교육기관들과는 확연히 차별하여 한국, 중국, 일본, 동남아 국가의 민간 부문 및 공공 부문의 지도자를 양성할 수 있는 동북아 최상의 교육 기관으로 자리매김하는 것을 그 목표로 하고 있다. 국제교육이라는 표현이 의미하듯이 동북아시아에 존재하는 기존의 교육기관들은 그 기관들이 소재하는 지역의 지역적 특성 하에 발전하여 온 관계로 지역적 특성을 강하게 내포하고 있다는 약점을 가지고 있다. 이에 제주국제교육복합단지는 21세기의 세계화 및 정보화시대에 적합하도록 기존의 것과는 전혀 새로운 가치와 인식 속에서 새로운 자세로 접근해가야 한다는 것이며, 한국적 기준이 아닌 국제적 기준, 세계적 추세를 적극 수용하는 교육기관이 되어야 한다.

따라서, 국제적 경쟁력 확보와 또 세계적 수준의 특성화된 가치를 조속히 확보하기 위해서는 경우에 따라 한국 정부(교육부)의 기본적인 교육 방침과 무관하게 운영될 수 있는 특수 형태의 교육기관이 되어야 하며, 제주국제교육복합단지를 통하여 동북아지역의 「지식 자본」의 육성과 교류의 허브 역할을 효과적으로 수행함으로써 제주는 동북아를 선도하는 국제자유도시로서 지역내외의 지식을 수집 및 전파하고, 동시에 새롭게 창조해내는 선도적 역할을 수행할 수 있어야 할 것이다. 아울러 제주 국제교육 복합단지는 제주의 국제화 및 국제적 경쟁력 확보에 「교육」이 적절한 기능을 담당할 수 있어야 하며, 또한 제주에게 유무형의 긍정적 수익을 창출함으로써, 궁극적으로 진정한 국제자유도시로서의 제주의 이미지를 부각시킬 수 있는 새로운 이미지 창조에 기여해야 할 것이다.

3.2. 국내외 우수기관 비교분석 및 설문조사결과의 함의

해외 우수기관들의 벤치마킹 결과와 설문 결과를 함께 고려할 때, 다음과 같은 함의를 도출할 수 있었다. 첫째, 교육서비스에 필요한 교육환경 및 각종 환경여건(amenity)이 중요하다는 점을 알 수 있다. 앞서서도 언급한 바와 같이 특정한 산업이 특정한 지역에서 발달하기 위해서는 당해 산업과 연관된 산업들과의 관계가 매우 중요한데, 지적 서비스 산업은 여타 다른 산업과 달리 교육서비스를 제공하는 교육기관이 처한 환경과 관련된 거시적 미시적 환경 변수가 바로 연계 산업의 역할을 수행하고 있다는 점이다. 즉, 경쟁력을 갖춘 해외 명문 교육기관들은 공히 그 명성에 맞는 최고의 교육환경을 제공하고 있다는 점이다. 다시 말하면, 우수한 교육 환경 여건을 바탕으로 명성을 가지게 되면, 여타 산업활동 지역과 비록 지리적으로 격리되어 있다 해도 높은 명성을 누리고 있는 교육기관들의 경우에는 소비자 즉, 학생들이 스스로 교육을 받기 위해 찾아 온다는 사실이다.

둘째, 국제적 경쟁력을 갖춘 국제 교육기관의 존재는 여타 산업에도 보다 유리한 환경 여건(Amenity)을 제공하는 긍정적인 파생효과를 가져와 고급 외국인 인력의 유치에 매우 긍정적인 효과를 가져다 준다. 외국기업들이 투자 결정시 중요한 고려사항중의 하나는 해당 지역의 Amenity이다. 특히, 주거환경이 쾌적하고 세계적인 교육기관 및 환경들이 제공되는 곳에는 고급 두뇌들이 손쉽게 정착하는 경향이 있다. 그 좋은 예로 미국의 샌디에고를 들 수 있는데, 원래는 미해군을 중심으로 하는 군사도시 및 좋은 자연환경으로 인한 휴양도시로 출발하였으나, Biotech 그리고 telecommunication 등 분야에 고급두뇌들이 연구개발하기에 좋은 환경여건을 조성해 주고 또한 University of California San Diego와 Salk Institute 간의 관계 등의 예에서 볼 수 있듯이 세계적인 수준의 대학은 또한 세계적인 연구기관과의 상호 밀접한 협력을 통하여 Virtuous Circle을 가져옴으로써 생명공학 및 텔레커뮤니케이션 분야에 세계적인 두뇌들을 모이게 할 수 있었다. 그 결과, 샌디에고시 정부는 30여년 만에 샌디에고를 실리콘 벨리에 버금가는 세계적인 하이테크 중심지의 하나로 발전시킬 수 있었으며 이러한 발전과정에서 샌디에고의 대학 및 기타 교육기관들도 비약적인 발전을 하게 된다. 샌디에고의 이러한 예는 자연환경적으로는 비슷한 플로리다 주 그리고 하와이가 여전히 휴양도시 및 관광도시, 특히, 은퇴한 사람들이 모여 사는 실버타운적 성격만이 강한 점과 비교할 때, 고부가가치 지식산업을 육성하고자 하는 국제자유도시 제주의 발전 방향으로 벤치마킹할 만한 사례로 생각된다.

셋째, 산업활동지역과 지리적으로 격리된 지역에 위치한 교육기관들은 특정한 산업들과 관련된 기능적 지식보다는 모든 분야에 기초가 되는 전인적 지식과 리더쉽 및 기본 소양을 강조하고 있어 산업들과의 지리적 격리에서 오는 불리함을 극복하고 있다. 오히려, 이들 교육기관들은 우수한 교육여건 및 명성을 바탕으로 고객들로 하여금 스스로 찾아오게 만들고 있으며, 특히 비 학위과정 프로그램들은 특정한 지식을 전달하기 보다는 우수한 지도자들이 한자리에 모여 서로 의견을 교환하고 새로운 관점을 배우고 공유하는 최첨단의 고급 정보와 지식을 공유하고 전파하는 역할을 수행하고 있다. 아울러, 제주 지역에 유능한 전문직의 외국인 유치를 위해서는 그 가족들을 위한 amenity를 보장하여야 하는데 그 중에 중요한 요소 중의 하나는 자녀들을 위한 좋은 교육시설이라고 할 수 있다. 특히, 외국인들의 경우에는 자녀들과 떨어져 사는 것에 대하여 기피하는 바, 외국인을 제주 현지에 유치하기 위해서는 그 자녀들을 위한 최적의 교육환경을 제공하는 것도 중요한 유인 중의 하나로 작용하게 된다.

이러한 면에서는 후발 주자로서 세계적인 명성을 지니고 있는 프랑스의 INSEAD와 스위스의 IMD를 들 수 있는데, 이 두 모형들이 제주국제교육복합단지에 시사하는 바는 매우 크다고 하겠다. 이들 두 기관 모두 인근에 발달된 산업의 배경 없이, 미국의 Harvard, Wharton 등의 역사와 전통을 자랑하는 기존의 대학들에 비하여 후발주자라는 열세를 만회하여 세계적인 경쟁력을 갖춘 교육기관으로 발전하는데 성공하였다. 또한 일반적 대학

성격을 갖춘 교육프로그램을 제공하는 대학들의 경우 그 명성을 쌓기까지 많은 시간과 재정적 투자가 요구된다는 점과 제주도에는 이미 제주대학교를 비롯한 기존의 학사, 석사 및 박사학위를 수여하는 대학교 및 대학들이 존재하고 있다는 점 등을 고려할 때, 제주국제교육복합단지에 적합한 교육기관의 모형은 영어를 공용어로 하는 비학위 전문과정의 단기성 교육프로그램(예를 들면 1개월 혹은 2개월 단위의 최고 경영자 과정 및 최고 정책결정자 과정 혹은 지도자 과정 등)을 중심으로 특성화된 교육프로그램으로 시작하는 것이 시간적, 재정적 투입 대비 효과를 극대화하고 나아가 제주 지역의 기존의 교육기관 들 및 기타 환경 여건과의 보완적 효과를 극대화할 것이다.

이와 함께, 동북아 지역에서 조기 유학에 대한 수요가 폭발적으로 증대하고 있다는 점과 함께, 우수한 중·고등학교의 존재는 제주 지역에 우수한 내외국인 두뇌를 유치하는데 아주 중요한 긍정적인 요소로 작용할 수 있다는 점을 고려할 때, 영어를 공용어로 하는 세계적 수준의 기숙형 사립학교 역시 제주국제교육복합단지에서 전략적으로 다루어야 할 교육 프로그램 중의 하나라고 하겠다. 다음 절에서는 이들 비학위과정 그리고 기숙형 사립학교를 중심으로 제주국제교육복합단지의 운영모형 및 운영 전략에 대한 세부적인 논의를 진행하고자 한다.

4. 제주국제교육복합단지의 운영 모형 및 운영 전략

4.1. 기본 모형

제주국제교육복합단지란 우수한 인적자원과 세계와 연계된 유동적 자본을 바탕으로 첨단과 실용적 지식자본을 기초로 제주도라는 지역특수성을 살려 동북아 더 나아가 세계와의 인적자본, 자본자원 지식자본의 네트워크를 현실가능하며 실용 가능한 교육프로그램을 통해 세계최적의 교육복합단지를 지향하는 지식, 교육, 및 레저가 복합된 단지를 모델로 하며 아래의 그림에서 표시된 바와 같다.

첫째, 제주국제교육복합단지 모델은 제주도가 가진 동북아 접근 용이성, 환경적 쾌적성, 관광 및 휴양적 특성이라는 지역적 특수성을 기본 바탕으로 출발한다. 우선, 제주도는 동북아시아의 여러 국가와 지리적 인접성과 접근의 용이성을 그 특징으로 한다. 이러한 지역적 특성을 십분 활용해 동북아시아를 주요 타겟으로 추진하는 것이 바람직하다. 또한, 천연 자연적 환경과 맞물려 관광과 휴양지라는 이미지를 최적으로 활용할 수 있는 교육 환경의 장점을 활용한 교육프로그램의 개발과 이를 활용한 비정규 과정을 도입하는 것이 바람직하다. 특히, 이를 비즈니스 차원에서도 정규교육과정 프로그램보다는 정치, 경제, 사회 분야의 실무자들과 지도자들이 이러한 마음으로 쉽게 올 수 있도록 하는 단기과정이 바람직하다고 하겠다.

둘째, 제주국제교육복합단지 모델은 지리적으로는 동북아시아를 중심으로 하여 세계로 그 네트워크를 확장시키는 것을 강조하는 모델이다. 특히, 제주도는 동북아시아와의 인접성을 십분 활용해 우선적으로 동북아시아의 젊은 인재와 지식인 및 지도자들을 교육인력으로 확보해 동북아시아 지식네트워크를 구축하고, 장기적으로는 구축된 동북아시아 인적네트워크를 중심으로 하여 점차적으로 전세계적 네트워크로 확대하는 것을 그 목표로 한다. 이를 위하여 제주국제교육복합단지는 인적자원 면에서는 동북아시아와 세계의 우수인재를 피교육자로 유치하고, 교육자는 정치, 경제, 사회 분야의 지도자들을 중심으로 고급 인재 네트워크를 기반으로 운영한다. 특히, 제주 국제교육 복합단지는 초기에는 교육을 통해 관련 지식과 정보 연계를 구축함으로써 관련 교육 분야에 대한 무형 및 가상 지식네트워크를 구축하며, 장기적으로는 이러한 지식정보 네트워크를 기반으로 가치 네트워크로 성장해 가는 것이 필요하다.

셋째, 제주국제교육복합단지 모델의 실용적 특성은 정규과정보다는 특화된 비정규과정을 강조하는데 있다. 본 모델은 실무중심의 전문대학원으로서 정치, 경제, 사회 분야의 유명 학자 뿐만 아니라 실무자, 지도자들이 교육자로 나서게 함으로써 실용성과 독창성을 높여서 유인요인을 극대화하는 것이 바람직하다. 이러한 측면에서 또한 동북아시아 더 나아가 세계의 피교육자를 대상으로 실시한다는 점을 고려할 때, 영어를 공용어로 사용하는 프로그램으로 운영하는 것이 필요하다.

이상의 제주국제교육복합단지의 세가지 기본적 특성을 뒷받침하기 위해서는 우선 교육자 및 피교육자 모두가 우수한 인력으로 구성되어 시작될 필요가 있다. 또한 동북아시아 및 전세계의 자본을 이 분야에 투자에 유인하는 연계성과 유동성을 확보하는 전략이 필요하다. 마지막으로 우수 인력과 더불어 최신의 정보와 지식을 소개하고 보유하며 실무적으로 활용 가능한 내용으로 구성될 필요가 있다. 우수한 교육자 및 피교육자를 유치하기 위해서는 교육자들에게 세계 최고 수준 수준에 준하는 급료를 제공할 필요가 있으며, 피교육자들에게는 최적의 교육시설을 제공할 수 있는 투자가 필요하다. 교육 내용면에서 다른 교육기관과의 차별화를 위해 단지 이론중심의 학자가 아닌 세계 유명, 정치, 경제, 사회 지도자 등 실무 전문가 및 실무 경험이 풍부한 학자들을 교수로 활용함으로써 이론과 현실이 공존하는 실무중심의 고급 교육을 추진하는 것이 타당하다.

4.2 제주국제교육복합단지 기본 교육 모델

제주국제교육복합단지는 세계화, 전문화, 정보화, 통합화를 근간으로 하여 동북아시아를 중심으로 세계화된 지도자들을 양성하는데 목적이 있다.

첫째, 제주국제교육복합단지에서 실시되는 교육프로그램들은 그 경쟁력을 갖기 위해서 세계화를 그 근간으로 한다. 특히, 세계화된 지도자는 우선 영어로 의사소통이 가능하여 전세계 정치, 경제, 및 사회의 이론과 현실을 이해하고 실무능력을 가진 전문가 혹은 전문가의 자질을 지닌 사람들을 의미한다. 특히, 초기에는 동북아시아 특히 한국, 일본, 중국에 대한 정치, 경제, 사회적 이해에 교육과정을 전문화하며, 이들 지역학생과 교원을 통해

그 전문성을 배가하는 것이 필요하다. 특히, 영어 이외에도 동북아 현지 언어구사는 물론 현지 언어로 실무를 추진할 수 있는 인재 양성과 교육프로그램이 필요하다.

둘째, 제주국제교육복합단지의 교육 프로그램들은 정보화를 그 근간으로 하여야 한다. 정보화 없는 세계화는 불가능한 것으로 세계적인 e-education 추세에 따라 cyber강의, 멀티미디어를 이용한 각종 교육을 추진하고 다양한 contents 개발과 관련 기관과의 협력을 통한 원격교육프로그램을 추진하는 것이 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 최첨단 e-education 전산 및 네트워크 시설과 장비가 제주국제교육복합단지에 구비되어야 할 필요가 있다. 특히 우수한 교원과 고위지도자들을 유치하기 위해서는 이들이 회사나 기관을 떠나있어도 원격으로 회의를 주재하고 경영 및 행정에 관여할 수 있도록 복합단지 내 시설 모두에 실시간 원격회의와 정보 교환이 가능한 시설과 장비가 갖추어져야 한다.

셋째, 제주국제교육복합단지의 교육 프로그램들은 통합된 원칙 위에서 다양한 특성화를 지향할 필요가 있다. 기존의 교육 프로그램들과 효과적으로 경쟁하기 위해서는 전통적인 학제간 분화를 지양하고 실무능력에 적합한 학제간 통합을 지향함으로써 독창적 교육프로그램을 선도할 필요가 있다. 이를 위해서는 단순한 학과별 교과들을 백화점식으로 나열하기보다는 “선택과 집중”의 전략 아래 쟁점 및 실무중심의 통합교과과정 개발이 필요하다. 따라서 교육프로그램들은 기존의 기능 혹은 학문 분야 위주보다는 이슈 위주의 통합된 교과과정을 전문적으로 특화하여 통합적 관점에 의한 보다 실용적으로 살아있는 교육을 그 특장점으로 살려야 한다.

4.3. 지속가능한 모델의 모색

제주국제교육복합단지의 가능한 운영 모델로는 독자적으로 교육복합단지를 개발하고 이를 운영하는 독자 개발형, 다양한 형태의 자본을 도입해 우수교육기관과 공동교육프로그램을 운영하는 협력형, 각 국가나 기업들이 상호 출자하지만 교육과정에 대해서는 독립시켜 운영하는 상호 출자형, 각국이 일정 정도의 자본과 교육 프로그램 및 기관을 가지고 오는 각국 투자 입주형이 가능하다. 아래에서는 각 모형들의 장단점을 살펴보기로 한다.

가. 독자개발 운영형

독자개발 운영형은 전적으로 투자비용과 교육프로그램을 자체 조달, 개발, 운영하는 방식을 말하는 것으로 이 경우는 모든 필요한 예산 전체를 자체적으로 조달하고 프로그램 또한 독자적으로 운영하는 방법으로 이를 위해서는 우선 교육 프로그램 개발위원회를 구성해 다른 교육기관과 차별성이 있는 프로그램을 개발할 필요가 있다. 독자개발 운영형의 장점은 자금 운용 및 교육과정 운영도 타 기관의 간섭을 최소화할 수 있으며 따라서 설립자들이 원하는 방향으로 교육기관을 이끌어갈 수 있다는 점이 장점이다. 따라서 성공적

으로 계획대로 운영된다면 가장 조기에 원하는 목표에 가장 근접한 교육기관을 탄생시킬 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 독자개발 운영형은 세계적 표준에 부합하는 현재 및 미래의 지도자들을 양성하기 위해 필요한 국제적 명성을 축적하기까지 많은 시간과 비용이 소요된다. 따라서 명성이 축적되기까지 학생모집 및 국제적 연계망 확충에 많은 어려움이 있으며 재정책중 및 교육과정의 다양성을 기하기도 어렵다는 한계가 있다.

나. 해외유치형

해외 유치형은 자본과 교육 프로그램 모두를 하나 혹은 몇 개의 해외 유명 교육기관으로부터 직접 들여와 복합단지를 조성하는 방안을 말한다. 일 예로 싱가포르에 설립된 INSEAD 아시아 캠퍼스가 여기에 해당한다. 이 경우 운영은 프랑스의 Fontainebleau에 있는 INSEAD의 주 캠퍼스로부터 직접 통제를 받는다.

해외유치형의 장점은 해외유명 교육기관을 직접 제주도에 유치함으로써 그 명성에서 오는 초기 투자비용 및 시간, 그리고 노력이 상대적으로 적게 들고 또한 선진 교육기법 및 운영기법을 도입함으로써 교육의 선진화를 기할 수 있다는 장점이 있으며 무엇보다도 세계적인 교육기관의 존재로 인한 고용창출, 고급두뇌 유치 그리고 세계적인 교육 프로그램 운영 등에 따른 제주지역에의 파급효과를 기대할 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 해외유치형의 경우, 해외교육기관의 이해관계에 의해서만 좌우될 것이므로 교육 프로그램의 운영 등에 관여할 수 없어서 소기의 기대 효과를 달성하지 못할 수도 있다는 단점을 들 수 있다.

다. 상호출자형

이상의 독립형과 유치형을 비교하여 볼 때, 결국 독립형이나 유치형보다는 이를 절충한 협력형이 현실적으로 가능한 모델이 될 수 있다. 협력형은 자본과 교육 프로그램 모두를 타국 및 여러 기관과 협력해 복합단지를 조성하는 방안을 말한다. 여기에는 상호출자형, 분권협력형, 각국 투자 입주형이 있을 수 있는데 우선 상호출자형은 자본면에서 외국 및 여러 기관의 출자를 받고 교육프로그램은 상당부분 독립적인 재단 등에서 관장하는 경우를 의미하는 것으로 중국 상해에 설치된 中歐國際工商學院 (China Europe International Business School)이 그 좋은 예가 될 수 있다. 中歐國際工商學院은 재정적 지원은 중국의 상해 시정부와 유럽연합(European Union)으로부터 받으며 중국 상해의 交通大學과 European Foundation for Management Development가 합작으로 교과과정 및 학사과정 운영을 공동으로 책임지고 있는 모델이다. 현재 이 모델은 성공적으로 정착하여 영국의 Financial Times에 의하면 중국 내에서는 최고의 비즈니스 스쿨로 또한 아시아 최고의 비학위과정 프로그램으로 평가받고 있다.

이 모델의 장점은 재정적 출자에 의한 지분 확보를 통하여 교육프로그램 운영에 깊이 관

여할 수 있으며 또한 해외 자본의 유치를 통한 해외 우수기관의 참여 그리고 해외우수두뇌의 참여를 유도할 수 있다는 장점도 있으나, 제주도에서 이에 필요한 상당한 투자 재원을 확보하여야 한다는 점과 그러나 현실적으로 투자유치에서 오는 어려움과 권한의 최소화에 따른 투자 기피가능성 또한 배제할 수 없다.

라. 분권 협력형

분권 협력형은 자본, 운영, 교육과정 전반에 걸쳐 국내외 여러 기관과 상호 일정부분 협력해 조성하는 방안을 말한다. 기본적으로 자본, 교육, 운영을 각 전문기관에 의뢰하돼 여러 국가에 개방하는 형태이다. 일본의 규우슈우 벳푸에 설립된 立命館 APU (Asian Pacific University)가 그 예이다. 이 학교의 경우 부지는 오이타현 정부에서 제공하고 건설공사 및 학교 운영에 필요한 기금은 기업들이 기부하여 모금하고 대학의 운영은 교도에 있는 명문 사립대학인 立命館 (Ritsumeikan) 대학재단에 위임하여 설립되었다. 또한 실질적 운영은 이 대학의 이사회, 자문위원회, 그리고 대학집행부를 중심으로 자율적으로 운영되며 立命館 재단은 학교운영과 관련된 일반적인 경험과 지식을 이용하여 학교 발전을 위한 지침을 제공하고 도움을 준다.

분권 협력형에서는 자본조달 방식을 기업에 중점을 두고 국내외 기업을 통해 투자를 받아내는 방식이다. 이를 위해서는 조성준비위원회에 기업을 중심으로 인사를 구성하거나 특정 교육프로그램을 기업과 연계시켜 기업의 투자를 유치해 내는 방식을 사용할 수 있다. 장기적 발전을 위해서는 학생유치 시에도 이러한 점을 감안해 현 교육법과 독립된 기부제를 공식화하는 것이 필요하다.

전반적인 운영은 대학원 운영위원회를 통해 독자적으로 운영하되 기부자 및 사회적 저명 인사들로 이루어진 이른바 advisory committee 등과 같은 외부로부터는 조언을 적극적으로 수용하되 이들에게는 결정권은 부여하지 않는 형태가 여기에 속한다. 대학원 운영위원회를 중심으로 교육 프로그램은 국내외의 명문교육기관과 협력을 통해 공동 운영하는 형태이다. 이를 위해서는 교환 프로그램과 학점교환제 등을 우수기관과 체결하고, 이들 기관에서 단기교육과정에 참여할 수 있도록 하는 운영방법이 필요하다. 이외에도 기업의 명칭을 빌려 교육 프로그램 이름을 개설하고 재정지원을 받고 재교육을 담당하는 프로그램을 운영하는 방안도 여기에 속한다. 이러한 분권 협력형의 경우는 자본, 교육, 운영이 분권화, 전문화됨에 따라 효율성을 기할 수 있다는 장점이 있다. 더욱이 교육프로그램의 국내외 협력제도를 통해 교원 및 학생 충원의 어려움을 어느 정도는 해소할 수 있다는 점과 자본의 초기 투자를 줄이고 지속적인 자금지원을 받을 수 있는 제도라는 점에서도 의미가 있다. 그러나 현실적으로 자본, 교육, 운영이 완전 분리된 형태로 운영되는 것을 제도화하는데 따른 어려움과 문화적 수용성 여부가 관건인 바, 이것이 불가능할 경우 그에 따른 각 관련기관의 적극성 결여로 인한 실질적인 운영이 유명무실해질 수도 있다는 단

점이 있다.

마. 프로그램 입주형

프로그램 입주형은 복합단지 운영위원회 측은 기본적인 교육시설 등을 제공하고 여러 가지 프로그램들이 개별적으로 운영하는 형태를 말한다. 프로그램 입주형의 경우는 마치 백화점과 같이, 국내외 우수 교육기관 및 기업이 각자 자신의 교육 프로그램을 제주국제교육복합단지에 가지고 오고 이에 필요한 경비를 자체 조달하여 독립채산제로 운영한 형태이다. 따라서 전체 복합단지 시설자금 및 기본 운영자금에 대한 조달을 지방정부가 담당하여 우수 교육기관과 공동 교육 프로그램 및 자체 교육프로그램 및 교육환경을 제공하게 된다. 복합단지 운영위원회는 교육단지에 입주할 교육프로그램을 선별하여 유치하는 책임을 맡으며 또한 자체 교육프로그램을 운영할 수도 있으나, 원칙적으로 교육 프로그램은 각 교육기관 및 기업으로부터 위탁을 받는 형태로 제주국제교육복합단지 내에 각 교육기관 및 기업의 교육 프로그램이 독립적으로 운영되는 형태이다. 프로그램 입주형 모델은 초기 프로그램 개발 및 운영에 대한 부담과 없이, 다양한 형태의 교육 프로그램 운영이 가능하며, 그에 따라 학생 수요나 교원 충원이 용이해 질 수 있다는 장점 그리고 명실상부한 교육허브의 모델로서 역할을 할 수 있다는 점이 장점이 있으나 소기의 목적을 달성하기 위해서는 입주 프로그램에 대한 철저한 선별 심사 및 관리가 절대적으로 필요해진다. 아울러 취지에 맞는 우수한 프로그램들이 입주하도록 유치하는 데 어려움이 있을 수 있으며 또한 운영 및 교육의 다양성으로 조정의 어려움과 함께 국제교육복합단지의 정체성 위기를 초래할 수도 있다는 단점이 있다.

4.4 단계별 모델 선택 전략

이상에서 독자형, 해외유치형, 상호출자형, 분권협력형, 프로그램입주형 등 다섯 가지에 대해서 살펴보았다. 그러나 현실적으로 가능한 모델은 이들간의 조합형태로 단계적으로 추진될 필요가 있다. 초기에는 협력형을 중심으로 운영하되 점차 독자성을 강화시키는 방향으로 나가는 것이 바람직할 것이다. 이러한 측면에서는 정규학위과정을 중심으로 시작한 INSEAD보다는 실무과정을 중심으로 시작한 IMD 모델이 제주국제교육복합단지에는 더욱 적합한 사례로 여겨진다.

가. 초기 모델

즉, 초기에는 막대한 자본 투자와 인적자원 확보의 어려움이 있으므로 학위과정이나 독자적 운영 방안보다는 비학위과정을 통한 협력형 모델을 응용하는 것이 바람직할 것이다. 초기 모델은 최소 5년을 기준을 계획하는 것이 필요할 것이다.

초기에는 자본이 투입이 많이 들지만, 이를 최소화하고 효율성을 극대화하기 위해서는 다양한 기관으로부터 자본을 확보하는 방안과 선진 교육과정 도입과 발전가능한 투자를 유인하는 것이 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 해외 우수기관과의 투자 혹은 해외 우수기관의 인력이나 교육프로그램을 입주형으로 유치해 자본 유입을 용이하고 교육의 질적 향상 그리고 명성, 수준 높은 교원 및 학생확보를 동시에 기하는 것이 바람직하다. 또한 기업들의 재교육이나 임원교육을 연계시킬 수 있도록 함으로써 자본 유치를 용이하게 하는 것이 필요하다.

이러한 자본 유인책들은 교육 프로그램에서도 해외 유명 교육기관의 프로그램 혹은 명칭을 빌리는 방안, 기업의 명칭 혹은 재교육 임원 교육 프로그램을 유치하는 방안이 바람직하다. 이러한 연계프로그램은 우수 교원 및 학생 유치에 유리하게 작용할 수 있는 요인이 될 수 있다. 운영면에서 적극적 관심을 보이는 교육기관이나 기업의 경우에 한해서 참여, 결정권을 부여하는 방안을 고려하는 것이 타당할 것이다. 그러나 가급적 제주국제교육복합단지 조성 준비위원회의 영향력을 일정정도 유지하는 것이 필요할 것이다.

나. 후기 모델

초기 모델이 점차 안정화되고 5년 뒤 어느 정도 명성, 프로그램의 안정성이 유지된다면 학위과정을 추가하고 국내외 교육기관 및 기업, 정부기관과의 협력관계를 강화하며, 다른 한편으로는 독자적 브랜드를 점차 강화하는 방향으로 선회하는 것이 필요하다. 이는 설립 후 10년 이후를 목표로 추진하는 것이 타당할 것이다.

자본면에서 5년간 초기 프로그램이 안정적으로 확보되면 수익구조를 창출할 수 있는 프로그램으로 전환하는 것이 필요할 것이다. 그리고 등록금 보다는 기부나 기업들의 투자를 늘리는 제도화하는 방향으로 전환하는 것이 자금의 안정성을 위해 바람직할 것이다. 기타 각종 수익사업을 창출하는 것 또한 필요할 것이다.

교육 프로그램은 가급적 개방형, 전세계 연계 교육프로그램을 유지하되, 자체 교육위원회의 구성원이 충분히 구성되면 이들을 통해 독자 교육 프로그램 개발을 점진적으로 추진하는 것이 바람직할 것이다.

어느 정도의 명성과 우수한 교원이 구성되면 학교운영은 학교운영위원회를 구성해 독자적으로 운영하되 국내외 기관 및 기업들의 자금 지원을 지속 혹은 늘리기 위해서는 외부 인사의 운영 참여 및 결정권을 제도화 하는 기구를 마련해 발전과 자금 확보 두 가지 목표를 모두 충족시키는 방향으로 운영하는 것이 바람직할 것이다.

다. 제도적 선행사항

첫째, 제주국제교육복합단지의 성공은 국내 교육법의 제약에서 얼마나 자유로울 수 있는냐에 달렸다. 특히 기부입학제, 교육부 감시 등으로부터 자유로울 수 있는 제도적 장치가 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 제주국제자유도시 추진과 더불어 예외 조항을 얻어내는 것이 자유로운 교육제도 채택에 도움이 될 수 있다.

둘째, 제주국제교육복합단지는 기존의 교육기관을 활용하여 새로운 프로그램이나 전문대학원을 신설하는 것이 아니라, 새로운 교육기관을 독립적으로 만드는 것이다. 따라서 이를 위해서는 정치, 경제, 사회, 교육 부문에 영향을 행사할 수 있는 지도자들로 준비위원회가 구성될 필요가 있다. 이러한 준비위원회 구성원의 수준은 자본, 교육, 운영면을 결정하는 중요한 변수가 되고 초기 설립 및 정착에 큰 영향을 할 것이다. 또한 준비위원회가 충분히 활동할 수 있는 시간적 재정적 지원 또한 제주국제교육복합단지의 성패를 결정하는데 결정적인 요인이 될 것이다.

셋째, 제주국제교육복합단지의 원활한 운영을 위해서는 교원 및 학생들의 자유로운 이동이 보장되어야 한다. 비자 및 여권에 대한 규정을 제주국제자유도시 추진과 더불어 이들에 대한 완화조항을 얻어내는 것이 필요하다. 이와 더불어 자본의 이동에 대한 자유를 보장하는 제도적 장치를 보장할 필요가 있다. 이러한 제도적 보완은 인적 자원과 자본의 이동을 원활하게 할 수 있는 제도적 걸림돌을 제거하는데 초점을 맞출 필요가 있다.

5. 교육프로그램 특화방안

앞에서의 기본적인 운영 모델 및 방안들을 바탕으로 고려할 때, 제주국제교육복합단지가 현실적인 경쟁력을 갖기 위해서 기존 한국의 중·고등학교 교과과정을 탈피한 영어로 가르치고 생활하는 기숙형 사립학교 그리고 기존의 대학교 체제와는 전혀 다른 영어를 공용어로 하는 비학위과정 중심의 전문대학원으로 특화하여 출발하는 것이 필요하다고 하겠다. 이러한 국제교육복합단지의 특화방안을 보다 구체적으로 표시하면 다음의 그림과 같다.

5.1. 기숙형 사립학교

기숙형 사립학교는 영어로 모든 교육이 이루어지는 4년제 정규 고등학교 과정과 영어교육 및 기타 제2외국어 교육을 전담하고 전세계대학 진학 시 언어진로지도를 담당하는 어학원으로 통합 운영될 필요가 있다. 정규 4년제 고등학교는 영어, 제2외국어, 수학을 필수 과목으로 하며, 기타 과목은 국가협력, 기업경영, 세계경제, 문화이해 등 자유로운 창의성을 발휘할 수 있도록 다양한 교과목을 개설하며 그 교과목은 교내교육위원회의 심의와

협의를 거치도록 한다.

그러나 언어교육은 기초적 언어능력이 가능한 학생들이 입학하지만, 현실적으로 수업이 가능한 학생들은 정규과정을 택할 수 있도록 하고 정규과정 중 영어과목을 택하도록 하지만 수업이 불가능한 학생들을 위한 1년 단계별 적응과정을 두어 언어교육을 전담하도록 하는 프로그램이 필요하다. 더 나아가 필수과목인 제2외국어 교육과 부분적인 제2외국어로 이루어지는 과목을 지원하게 되는데, 여기에는 외국인들을 위한 중국어, 일본어, 한국어 교육도 포함될 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 어학원은 고등학교 상호협력 프로그램으로 운영하는 것이 바람직하며, 이 어학원은 제주도민을 포함한 일반 내외국인에게도 개방해 운영함으로써 새로운 교육 및 수입원으로 발전시킬 필요가 있다.

이를 위하여 처음부터 외국의 유명 사립기숙학교를 복합단지 내에 독자 혹은 합작을 통한 유치할 수도 있고, 다른 대안으로는 독자적으로 기숙형 사립학교를 설립하여 해외 명문 학교와의 연계프로그램을 강화하여 장기적으로 세계적인 명성을 확보하는데 노력할 수도 있다. 특히, 독자설립의 경우에는, 해외 명문 사립학교에 1년간 수학할 수 있는 제도를 조기에 실시하여 해외우수 교육을 직접 체험하고 더 나아가 기숙형 사립학교의 질과 명성을 향상시키는 데 도움을 주도록 하여야 할 것이다.

5.2 전문대학원

전문대학원의 교과과정은 단기, 비학위 과정들을 중심으로 운영되며, 전략프로그램, 기업위탁프로그램, 국내외연계프로그램으로 구성되어 운영될 수 있다. 전략프로그램은 전문대학원의 특화, 전문화 전략의 일환으로 운영되는 것으로서 예를 들면, 세계협력 지도자과정, 동북아협력 지도자과정, 기업혁신 지도자과정, 기술경영 지도자과정으로 구성될 수 있다. 한편 기업위탁프로그램은 국내외 우수기업으로부터 글로벌경영교육에 대한 위탁을 받아 운영되는 프로그램으로 국내기업 위탁경영 프로그램과 해외기업 위탁경영 프로그램으로 구분된다. 이 프로그램은 기업의 요구에 따라 유동적으로 운영되므로 사전에 기초 연구와 수요분석이 필요한데, 특히 해외기업 위탁경영 프로그램을 성공적으로 운영하기 위해서 해외기업이 호감을 가질 만한 교수진과 교육 프로그램이 뒷받침되어야 할 것이다. 이러한 위탁경영 프로그램에는 제주도의 특성을 살린 관광경영, 스포츠경영, 레저휴양경영 프로그램 등도 병행해서 운영할 수 있을 것이다.

국내외연계프로그램은 국내외에 있는 우수교육기관의 전문대학원 프로그램 중 일부를 제주국제교육복합단지에 유치해 운영하는 것으로 독립채산제로 운영하도록 하는 방안을 고려할 수 있다. 이러한 연계프로그램이 보다 원활히 운영되기 위해서는 제주국제교육복합단지와 연계되어 연구할 수 있는 연구소 및 각종 국제회의에 참석하는 국제컨벤션센터와의 유기적 연계가 필요하다. 즉, 해외 석학들에게 연구와 회의 참석이라는 또다른 인센티브를 제공함으로써 프로그램의 운영 및 교원확보를 동시에 해결할 수 있기 때문이다.

국내연계프로그램으로는 제주소재대학과의 연계프로그램을 포함하여 국내 서울대, 연대, 고대, 포항공대, KAIST 등과의 연계프로그램을 개발해 운영하는 것으로 제주복합단지 housing개념으로 운영되는 프로그램을 말한다. 이와 아울러, 국외연계프로그램은 해외우수교육기관의 전문대학원 프로그램을 직접 유치해 교육의 질적 향상과 해외교원확보라는 두 목적을 동시에 달성할 수 있는 프로그램이다. 이 프로그램은 기본적으로 해외우수교육기관의 재량권을 전적으로 인정하며 제주국제교육복합단지가 첨단전문대학원 교과과정 및 운영 기법을 자연스럽게 학습하고 자체적 명성을 높일 수 있는 방안이다. 이 프로그램의 명칭은 해외 대학명칭이나 외국과 같은 기부자 명칭을 그대로 적용할 수 있도록 하는 것이 필요하다. 한편, 국제기구들이 필요로 하는 전문인력들을 대신 교육시켜주는 프로그램도 생각할 수 있는데, 그 한 예로서 국제기구협력프로그램은 전세계적인 국제기구의 관계자를 중심으로 이들 기구 지도자 및 실무자들이 교육을 담당함으로써 국제기구의 충원과 교육을 동시에 담당하는 프로그램을 말한다.

5.3. 제주국제교육복합단지 주변 개발 계획과의 연계성

제주국제교육복합단지가 경쟁력을 갖고 성공할 수 있기 위해서는 제주도의 주변개발계획과의 체계적인 연계 속에 지식, 숙식, 스포츠, 문화, 레저, 휴양 등 최적 교육환경 및 연계 프로그램을 제공하는 것이 필요하다. 즉, 외부지식프로그램과의 연계, 숙식의 최적화, 스포츠 및 휴양의 유인이 필요하다.

가. 제주평화센터 등 제주도 및 국내 각종 연구소와의 연계

저명한 학자 및 정치, 경제, 사회분야의 지도자들에게 전문대학원의 교원자격과 더불어 연구소의 특임연구원 자리를 겸임하게 함으로써 단기 한국 방문에 따른 부담을 줄이고 이들의 연구활동과 지식공유를 가능하게 하는 것이 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 현재 제주도에 추진되고 있는 제주평화센터를 중심으로 제주도내의 각종 연구소와의 협력관계를 체결함으로써 유인책을 강화할 필요가 있다. 그러나 이러한 협력관계를 제주도에만 국한시키기보다는 국내의 우수 대학 및 기타 연구소와 연계 또한 개방적으로 운영할 필요가 있으며, 이러한 운영은 우수 교원에 대한 재정적 부담을 줄일 수 있는 방안이 될 수 있다.

나. 제주국제컨벤션센터 등 국제회의와의 연계

저명한 학자 및 정치, 경제, 사회분야의 지도자들에게 전문대학원의 교원자격과 더불어 이들이 세계 저명 인사들이 참여하는 각종 국제회의에 참석하게 함으로써 단기 한국 방문에 따른 부담을 줄이고 이들의 연구활동과 지식공유를 가능하게 하는 것이 필요하다. 이러한 점에서 현재 제주도에 설립된 국제 컨벤션센터의 효율적 운영이 절실히 필요하다. 제주국제컨벤션센터에 각종 기업관련 행사나 대형 국제회의가 자주 개최되면 단기 과정

으로 운영되는 전문대학원에 교원들의 한국행을 보다 용이하게 만들 수 있기 때문이다. 뿐만 아니라, 제주도 이외에도 국내에서 개최되는 국제회의 및 기업 행사에 참석하는 사람들과의 지식네트워크를 통해 이들의 한국에서 활동범위를 확대시키고 이에 대한 부수적 재정지원을 할 필요가 있다.

다. 국내외 대학 및 기업 특강과의 연계

저명한 학자 및 정치, 경제, 사회분야의 전문지도자들에게 전문대학원의 교원자격과 더불어 다양한 대학 및 기업 특강 기회를 제공함으로써 단기 한국 방문에 따른 부담을 줄이고 이들의 연구활동과 지식공유를 가능하게 하는 것이 필요하다. 이를 위해서는 현재 제주도를 비롯하여 국내외 대학과 기업들과의 연계 협력체결이 필요하며 이를 통해 우수 교원을 보다 효과적으로 유인할 수 있도록 하고 동시에 특강 등을 주선할 수 있도록 하는 프로그램들이 개발될 필요가 있다.

5.4. 교육 및 주거시설의 중요성

제주국제교육복합단지에 우수한 인재들을 유치하기 위해서는 최고의 기숙 및 교육환경과 장학제도, 해외유수 대학 진학 프로그램이 있어야 한다. 특히, 국내 타 지역 뿐만 아니라 전세계에서 온 학생과 교원들의 원만한 교육활동을 위해서는 누구나 안심하고 생활할 수 있는 최적의 거주 및 활동 공간이 마련되어야 한다.

우선 기숙형 사립학교의 경우에는 교육시설과 주거시설은 분리되어 있으며, 기숙학교의 특성상 가까이 위치하여야 한다. 교육시설의 경우에는 최첨단 멀티미디어 설비를 갖춘 교실과 함께 최첨단의 도서관 시설이 함께 하여야 하며 특히 모든 시설들은 언제 어느때나 인터넷 및 기타 통신망에 접속이 가능하도록 설비되어야 한다.

주거시설은 학생용과 교원으로 구분해 다양한 형태로 건축될 필요가 있다. 우선 학생용은 기숙형 학교의 경우 소형 아파트 수준의 시설과 환경을 구비하되 식당과 주방 미팅룸을 겸비한 형태의 건물로서 기숙형 사립학교를 위하여 년인원 400명의 학생을 기준으로 200가구(100명 4학년, 2인 1가구)가 필요하며 또한 기숙형 학교의 교원용 아파트는 개인 혹은 부부, 가족이 거주할 수 있는 형태로 400명 학생기준으로 100가구가 필요하며 주거 및 시설 수준은 고급으로 할 필요가 있는데, 기숙형 학교의 특성상 학생용 주거 시설과 인접하여 설립되어야 할 것이다.

전문대학원의 경우에는 교육 연구 및 주거 일체형의 개념으로 시설을 설립하는 것이 필요하다. 이러한 시설은 강의 및 연구에 필요한 공간 및 주거 그리고 휴식 공간까지 함께 포함된 일체형 공간을 의미하는 것으로 일체형 공간은 불필요한 공간이동의 최소화에 따른 편의성의 증대 뿐만 아니라, 교수요원 및 피교육자들간의 보다 친밀하고 밀접한 관계

를 형성시킴으로써 교육효과를 극대화하는 장점을 지니고 있다. 한편 저명인사들을 위한 게스트용의 호텔식 아파트가 필요한데, 현실적으로 이를 별도로 건립하기보다는 기존의 제주도내 아파트나 호텔을 활용하는 방안도 고려할 수 있다.

주거시설에 필수적으로 함께 설치되어야 하는 것은 스포츠 시설이다. 모든 스포츠 시설을 다 갖출 수는 없지만 최소한의 운동장과 체육관 시설이 요망되며 아래에서 논의되는 바와 같이 제주도내의 체육시설과의 연계관계를 잘 활용하여 설계하면 최소의 시설로 모든 필요한 스포츠 시설을 구비할 수도 있을 것이다.

5.5 스포츠·레저·휴양 복합단지와의 연계

제주국제교육복합단지의 다양한 교육프로그램 제공은 물론 학생과 교원에 대한 유인책을 위해서는 자체적인 스포츠 시설 이외에도 현재 제주국제자유도시 추진계획에 포함되어 있는 스포츠, 레저, 휴양 단지 활성화계획을 이와 연계하는 방안이 필요하다. 특히, 제주도에 있는 공공 체육시설과 향후 추진할 스포츠 시설을 연계시켜 제주국제교육복합단지의 프로그램으로 만들 필요가 있다.

현재 제주도는 레저, 스포츠 관광과 연계 가능하며 대규모 체험이 가능한 레저, 스포츠 시설과 오름 트레킹, 바다 래프팅, 산악자전거, 승마, 골프 등 레저 스포츠 공간이 풍부하며 향후 제주국제자유도시 발전계획에도 레저산업 발전계획이 포함되어 있다. 이러한 제주도의 레저산업발전계획을 제주국제교육복합단지와의 연계시켜 교육프로그램으로 활용할 경우 교육의 질적향상과 우수 교원 유치가 가능할 것이다.

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동북아 공동체 구상과 제주도의 위상

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앞서 발표해주신 여러분들의 고견에 상당부분 공감을 하고 있다는 점을 전제하면서 몇 가지 제언을 드리고자 합니다.

I. 서론

세계적인 지역주의 추세에 우리는 어떻게 대처할 것인가? 라는 물음이 주어진다면, 답은 분명합니다. 참여정부가 지향하고 있는 동북아 경제허브국가를 실현하는 것이고 이의 일 정부문을 제주가 국제자유도시 건설을 통해 일익을 담당하겠다는 것입니다. 물론 이런 과제는 그리 간단하지만은 않습니다. 그러나 역시 불가능한 것도 결코 아니라고 생각합니다. 그것은 바로 제주가 동북아에서 차지하는 지정학적 잇점과 청정한 자연환경을 보유하고 있기 때문입니다.

제주도가 중심이 되는 동북아공동체 추진을 위해서는 제주도민 모두가 세계화에 대한 오픈 마인드를 갖고 진향적인 관점에서 동참하는 분위기가 조성되어야 하며, 개발정책은 선택과 집중의 원칙을 가지고 균형적으로 추진되어야 할 것입니다.

그러나 오늘에 현실을 냉철히 되돌아볼 때 세계화에 대한 도민적 합의나 그것을 유도해 내기 위한 정책은 결코 쉬운 일이 아닙니다. 그것은 바로 사회의 다원성으로 인한 이해관계의 첨예한 대립이 존재하기 때문입니다. 이런 상황 속에서도 국제자유도시 추진을 통해 430만명의 최대 관광객 유치, 내국인면세점 오픈, 투자의향 증가 등 가시적인 성과를 얻고 있습니다. 하지만 도내적으로는 쇼핑아울렛 설치 논란, 내국인면세점 운영에 따른 기존 상권 침해 문제, 개발이익의 배분문제 그리고 국내적으로는 경제자유구역과의 경쟁, 국제적으로는 홍콩, 싱가포르에 뒤지는 제도적·법률적 조건 등으로 인해 국제자유도시의 경쟁력을 확보하는 것이 그리 쉬운 것이 아님을 알 수 있습니다.

따라서 우리는 시행착오를 최소화한다는 자세로서 국제자유도시 개발방향과 동북아 공동체추진전략을 새롭게 점검할 때라고 보면서, 몇 가지 제언을 드리고자 합니다.

1. 선점효과의 극대화와 경제자유구역과의 공생적 연계 모색

먼저, 동북아 경제공동체를 추진하는 과정에 제주도가 중심적 역할을 하기 위해 국내적으로 어떤 위상을 확보해야 하는가를 심각하게 고민하고 위치설정을 빨리 해야 합니다.

동북아 공동체 추진의 핵심지역으로서 자리를 빼앗기지 않으려면, 경쟁 대상지역인 인천, 부산 등의 입지조건을 비교 검토하여 장단점을 분석하여야 할 것입니다. 그 가운데 우리의 장점을 살릴 수 있는 분야와 단점을 보완할 수 있는 방안을 총체적으로 준비하여야 한다는 것입니다.

작년 제주평화포럼에서 제기했듯이 제주도가 국내 유일이 국제자유도시로서 갖는 비교우위는 영구적인 것이 아니라는 사실을 다시 한번 강조하고 싶습니다. 국제자유도시 특별법은 고작해야 10~20년 정도의 한시적 이점이 있을 뿐이며, 어쩌면 이보다 더 빨리 소멸될 가능성이 높다는 사실을 염두해 두어야 한다는 것입니다.

아시다시피 올 7월부터 경제자유구역법이 시행되어 올 8월 인천이 첫 경제자유구역으로 지정되었고, 또다시 지난 달 24일 부산·진해구역 및 전남 광양만권을 경제자유구역으로 지정하여 외국인 투자를 유인하기 위한 특구 정책이 추진되고 있습니다.

또한 각 지자체들은 국제자유도시특별법이나 경제자유구역법과 같이 일부지역에 국한한 특구 전략보다는 전국에 걸친 자유화가 이루어지도록 하는 획기적인 방안이 필요하다는 주장을 강력하게 제기하고 있는 실정입니다.

따라서 지나치게 제주라는 지역적 관점에서 국제자유도시를 추진해서는 적극적인 중앙정부의 지원을 얻어낼 정당성을 확보할 수 없습니다.

경제자유구역과의 명확한 역할 분담을 통해 상호 상생적 발전을 도모할 수 있는 전략을 마련하되 기본은 국가적 발전을 선도하면서 지역적 이익을 도모해야 한다는 것입니다.

제주만의 국제자유도시를 추진해서는 결코 중앙정부의 지원을 확보할 수 없음을 우리는 명심해야 합니다. 다만 제주는 섬이라는 지역적 특성상 여러 가지 차별적 제도를 도입하더라도 이의 부정적 효과가 최소화될 수 있음을 주장해야 할 것입니다. 예를 들면 조세제도의 특례지역, 행정체제의 특례지역, 교육체제의 특례지역, 투자유치의 특례지역으로 인정되어야 할 것입니다. 도민 여러분들이 합의적 의견만 주신다면 이를 위한 법체제 구축

에는 제가 앞장서겠습니다.

이를 위해서는 내부적 토론은 활발하게 하되 외부적으로 단일된 목소리를 내어야 할 것입니다. 지방자치시대에 중앙정부는 지역간 형평성을 중요시하고 있습니다.

의정 활동을 하면서 아쉬운 점은 우리의 도세가 다른 지역에 비해 그리 크지 않다는 사실입니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 국제자유도시특별법을 성안하면서 합의과정을 거쳐 확정되었던 7대 선도 프로젝트를 추진하는데 있어, 합의 당사자였던 분들이 법에 따른 계획안이 만들어지기도 전에 반대나 유보입장을 공표함으로써 도민여론을 분열시키고 중앙정부의 적극적 지원을 주저하게 만든다는 사실입니다.

제주도에 그 어떤 제도적 특혜가 주어진다 해도 성숙한 토론을 통한 도민적 합의를 이끌어낼 역량이 갖추어지지 않는다면 그것은 속 빈 강정에 불과할 것입니다. 저를 비롯한 정치권과 행정당국이 혁신이 필요한 부분이라고 생각합니다.

거듭 강조하지만, 가장 먼저 국제자유도시를 실시하고도 동북아 공동체 추진에서 주도권을 상실하는 우를 범하지 말아야 합니다. 실기하지 않는 것이 급선무라는 점을 명심해야 합니다.

2. 개발이익의 환원과 제주지역간 균형발전 실현

21세기 지역의 비전으로 국제자유도시를 추진하고 있습니다. 국제자유도시는 개방화의 시대에 제주가 우리나라의 개방거점지역으로서의 선도적 역할을 다하겠다는 것이며 도민의 풍요로운 삶을 향유할 수 있는 제반여건을 조성하겠다는 것입니다.

이를 위해서는 내부적인 역량강화가 선행되어야 합니다. 하지만 내부적 역량을 강화하기 위해서 선행되어야 할 과제는 여러 가지가 있습니다. 첫째 도민들의 선진도민 의식을 형성하여야 하고 세계를 향한 개방적 마인드를 가져야 하며 세상을 포용할 수 있는 마음의 여유를 가져야 합니다. 그러나 무엇보다 지역간 불균형이 해소되지 않는다면 제주의 사회적 통합은 불가능합니다. 지역간 균형발전은 도민의 역량을 결집하는 데 필요한 사회적 통합의 원동력인 것입니다.

주지하다시피, 산남지역은 정체와 저 발전의 위기에 직면해 있습니다. 궁극적으로 이러한 현상은 산남과 산북간의 갈등을 심화시키고, 지역의 효율성 저하로 인해 국제경쟁력이 약화를 초래하게 될 것입니다.

이러한 상황에서 지역의 균형발전은 당위의 문제가 아니라 지역 생존을 위한 절박한 시대적 과제라고 판단되며 이러한 과제를 올바르게 해결하기 위해서는 균형발전 정책을 강력

하게 추진하여 산남지역이 스스로의 힘으로 일어설 수 있는 조건을 만들어 내야 합니다.

참여정부에서도 ‘지방분권과 국가균형발전’을 핵심 국정과제로 선정하여 지역간 불균형 시정과 지역의 혁신·특성화발전을 강력하게 추진할 계획을 가지고 있습니다.

제주시와 여타지역간의 불균형 문제는 수도권과 비수도권의 불균형문제에 버금가며 똑같은 문제점들을 노출시키고 있습니다. 특히 제주시로의 인구집중은 주택, 교통, 범죄 등의 각종 사회문제와 대기오염, 수질오염 등의 환경문제를 야기시키고 있습니다.

반면 제주시이외 지역은 지속적인 인구감소로 인구의 성과 연령구조의 균형이 파괴되고 있으며, 독자적인 소비시장 창출이 불가능하여 경제침체의 장기화를 초래하는 악순환이 계속되고 있습니다. 이러한 상황을 방지할 경우 제주는 경쟁력을 상실할 가능성이 높아, 이에 대한 획기적인 정책대안 개발이 시급한 실정입니다.

따라서 제주시 이외의 지역에 대한 지역경제의 활성화를 도모할 정책개발이 이루어져야 할 것입니다. 내국인면세점 운영 수익금의 일부를 (가칭)지역균형발전기금으로 조성하여 산남지역에 대한 집중적 투자를 해야 할 것입니다. 뿐만 아니라 추가적으로 제시될 선도 프로젝트사업도 우선적으로 산남지역에 배정되어야 할 것입니다. 물론 입지 타당성 검토가 필요하지만 모든 조건이 유사하다면 산남지역에 대한 정책적 배려가 필요합니다.

중앙정부차원에서 수도권과 비수도권의 불균형을 해결하기 위한 방안의 하나로 행정기관의 지방이전을 추진하고 있듯이, 제주시로 집중되어 있는 주요 행정기관을 낙후된 지역으로 이전하는 방안도 모색해야 할 것입니다.

그리고, 국제자유도시를 추진하면서 특화된 산업으로 육성중인 교육산업, 건강산업, 실버산업 등을 제주시 이외의 지역경제를 활성화시킬 수 있는 산업으로 특화된 개발을 추진할 필요성이 있습니다. 그러한 의미에서 제주도가 구상중인 ‘제주국제교육단지’ 건설도 제주시이외의 지역에 유치하여 지역불균형을 해소하기 위한 방안의 하나로 활용해야 합니다.

3. 21세기 패러다임에 부합된 관광산업의 리모델링

최근 관광관련 분야의 시장개방이 급속히 이루어지고 외자유치를 위한 국내 투자 환경의 조성도 적극적으로 이루어지고 있는 실정입니다.

이러한 시장개방은 긍정적인 영향과 부정적인 영향을 동시에 초래하겠지만 우리의 관광산업에 유리한 방향으로 활용하여 21세기 고부가가치를 창출하는 핵심 서비스산업으로

발전시킬 수 있는 전기를 마련해야 할 것입니다.

우리 관광산업에 대한 구조조정을 조기에 마무리하여 관광산업의 기반을 확충하고 서비스 및 경영을 국제수준으로 강화시킴으로써, 시장개방 국면을 새로운 도약과 발전의 계기로 삼아야 할 것입니다.

관광사업체의 규모를 대형화·기업화하여 외국의 초대형 관광기업들의 국내시장 진출에 대비하도록 해야 합니다. 특히 여행업체는 여행사의 대형화를 통해 효율성과 생산성을 제고하도록 해야 합니다.

IMF 이후 공·사기업을 비롯한 사회전반에 뼈를 깎는 구조조정이 진행되고 있는 실정임에도 우리 관광업계가 너무 안일하게 대처하고 있지는 않은지 반성할 필요가 있다고 봅니다.

4. 배타적 지역정서가 세계화를 막는다.

우리의 관습에 내재되어 있는 배타적인 지역정서가 외국기업의 유치나 지역경제협력에 걸림돌이 되고 있다는 지적이 있습니다.

“제주도민들이 세계적인 마인드를 갖추지 못하더라도 반세계화적이지는 말아야지 않느냐”, “제주도민들이 시장경제에 대한 이해부족과 반 기업 정서가 강하다”는 말을 많이 듣습니다.

물론, 이러한 예기가 절대적인 것은 아닙니다만, 우리가 지금껏 외자유치를 원하면서도 투자자의 시각을 외면하는 사례가 비일비재했다는 점은 부정할 수 없는 사실일 것입니다.

공동의 이익보다 개인의 이익을 중시하고, 이익배분에는 적극적이나 노력과 부담은 지기 싫어하는 사회적 분위기를 개선하려는 정책 추진이 필요하다고 봅니다.

이윤을 쫓아 투자하는 자본의 생리를 인정하고 투자시 필요한 행정절차 시일을 최단축시키는 윈스톱 서비스, 고객의 가려운 곳을 긁어주는 맞춤형서비스 등을 제공해야만 투자가 이루어진다는 사실, 투자가 이루어져야만 새로운 도민이익이 창출된다는 기본적인 사실에 충실할 필요성이 있다고 봅니다.

또한, 외지인 또는 외국인에 대한 배타적인 요소들을 제거하여 함께 어울려 살아갈 수 있는 환경이 조성되어야 합니다. 그것을 거부하면서 동북아공동체의 중심 축을 예기하는 것은 지나친 이기입니다.

동북아교류를 위해서는 영어 이외에 중국어, 일본어 등의 구사능력도 뛰어나야 하나 그러한 인력이 충분히 확보되어 있지 못한 상태입니다. 우수인력 확보를 위해 제주도를 인적 교류의 중심지로 만들기 위한 교육제도 개혁이 필요합니다.

교육시장의 개방을 통해 학생, 학부모, 기업 등의 수요를 충족시킬 수 있는 다양한 형태의 학교가 생겨나 서로 경쟁할 수 있는 체제가 갖추어져야 할 것입니다. 교육공급자에 대한 개방뿐만 아니라 수요자에 대한 개방도 이루어져 외국인들도 자유롭게 제주에 와서 교육을 받고 능력이 인정되면 지역경제에 기여할 수 있는 기회가 주어질 수 있는 풍토를 만들어야 한다고 봅니다.

II. 맺 음 말

앞서 언급했듯이, 동북아 경제공동체 전략은 단순한 지역의 경제적 발전전략이 아닌, 생존을 위한 절박한 선택임을 인식하고 이의 성취를 위해 도민적 합의 및 지지를 이끌어 낼 수 있는 리더십의 정립이 필요합니다.

동북아의 공동 평화와 번영의 공동체를 건설하는데 내부적인 해결과제도 산적해 있다는 것을 인식해야 합니다.

지역주의적인 접근 방법을 뛰어넘는 개방화 전략수립과 함께 지역의 균형발전을 도모하기 위해 산남·산북간의 역할 분담에 대한 도민적 합의를 이루어야 하며,

우리 사회의 계층간·지역간 갈등을 해소함과 동시에 우리 모두가 제주도민이면서 당당한 세계시민이라는 자긍심을 확산시키는 정책이 필요한 때라고 봅니다.

다른 지역의 변화를 고려하지 않고 오직 우리의 상황만을 강조할 경우 자칫 동북아 공동체 추진에 조화를 이루지 못할 수도 있습니다. 다핵화되는 시대적 흐름을 간파하고 다른 지역과의 조화를 이루는 가운데 최적화를 이룰 수 있는 해법을 찾아야 한다는 것입니다.

동북아 공동체 추진은 지역을 뛰어넘어 국가간 경쟁을 전제로 한 시간을 다투는 문제인 만큼 전략적 개방화 대책에 기초한 실천이 중요하다는 점을 강조하고 싶습니다. 감사합니다.

동북아 공동체 구상과 제주도의 위상

현 경 대
국 회 의 원

세계적 냉전 구조가 와해된 21세기 새로운 국제질서의 특징은 이념, 체제, 제도간의 갈등과 대립은 현저하게 감소한 대신에 평화와 경제발전의 중요성이 크게 부각되고 있다.

어느 국가도 세계질서를 독단적으로 이끌어 나갈 수 없는 정치질서 속에서 국가간 상호의존성은 더욱 증대되고 있으며, 이러한 현상은 지역경제 블록화를 일반화시키고 있다. 현재 지구상에는 완성되었거나 추진되고 있는 경제협력체가 많다. 즉, EU를 비롯하여 ASEAM, 북미자유무역지대, 남미공동시장, 멕시코·페루·에쿠아도르·베네주엘라·콜롬비아가 참여하는 안데안조약, 페르시아만협력회, 아랍협력회의, 마그레브동맹체, 호주와 뉴질랜드의 자유무역지대, 동아프리카공동시장, 서아프리카경제공동체 등이 있다.

그러나 동북아에서는 아직까지 자유무역지대나 협력체적 구조도 형성되지 못한 상황이며 이제 논의를 시작하는 초보적인 단계이다. 동북아공동체를 형성시키기 위해서는 앞으로 각국의 입장과 관심을 확인할 수 있는 공동 세미나, 공동 이익 및 협력 가능성 등을 파악하기 위한 공동 조사, 특정사업을 중심으로 한 제한적 협의체 구성, 비정기적 또는 정기적 정부간 협의체 구성, 정부간 상설기구 설치 등의 과정을 단계적이든 동시적이든 거치는 것이 필요하다.

이러한 과정을 거쳐서 구성하게 될 동북아공동체는 그 형태가 평화공동체이든 경제공동체이든 간에 제주가 중심이 되는 것이 바람직하며, 그 본부도 제주도에 위치토록 할 것을 제안한다. 이러한 제안을 하는 이유는 여러 가지가 있다.

첫째, 제주도는 지리적으로 동북아의 출입구에 위치하고 있기 때문이다.

동북아의 지리적 범주는 러시아 극동지역, 산둥반도를 포함한 중국의 동북3성, 남북한, 몽고, 일본 등 약 16,000만km²의 면적에 달하는 지역을 말하는데, 바로 이 동북아시아의 해양관문에 제주도가 위치하고 있는 것이다.

둘째, 제주도는 역사적 의미에서 화해와 평화를 상징하는 지역이다.

제주도는 좌·우의 대립과 각종 인권유린에 의해서 1948년부터 7년 동안 주민의 10% 정도가 희생된 소위 ‘4·3사건’이 발발했던 곳이다. 최근에는 이 사건의 진상조사와 주민의 명예를 회복시키기 위한 특별법이 제정되고 정부의 진상보고서가 나왔으며, 이를 계기로 제주도를 ‘평화의 섬’으로 만들자는 노력이 지역적, 국가적, 국제적으로 활발한 실정이다. 남북한 관계 측면에서도 한반도의 가장 남쪽에 위치하고 있는 제주도가 화해와 평화의 중심이 되는 것과 관련하여 북한이 거부할 가능성은 거의 없어 보인다. 그동안 제

주도와 북한 간에는 감귤 및 당근보내기운동, 제주도민 방북관광, 그리고 일주일전에 개최된 남북한 평화축전 등으로 상당히 우호적인 상황으로 발전하고 있어서 제주도가 남북 화해 상징의 섬으로 자리매김하는데 전혀 손색이 없을 것이다. 동북아지역에서 그 어느 곳도 제주도만큼 평화와 화해를 상징할 수 있는 곳은 없다.

셋째, 제주는 대륙과 해양을 잇는 곳에 위치하여 긴 세월동안 대륙문화와 해양문화가 함께 어우러져 독특한 탐라문화를 형성해 온 곳이다. 지역공동체라는 국가간 협력체제 구성에 있어서 문화적 상통성은 매우 중요하다. 따라서 해양국가와 대륙국가가 함께 이루어가는 동북아지역의 공동체 구성은 동북아의 거의 모든 지역과 문화적으로 통할 수 있는 환경을 가지고 있는 동시에 독특한 문화를 형성하고 있는 제주가 그 중심이 되는 게 바람직하다.

넷째, 국제적 기능과 역할을 할 수 있는 제도적 장치를 국가가 보장하고 있는 곳이 바로 이곳이다.

사면이 바다로 둘러싸인 제주도는 국가가 특별법에 의하여 국제자유도시로 지정하고 있다. 원활한 접근성을 보장할 수 있는 공항시설과 항만시설을 갖추고 있는 곳이며 각종 선박이 자유롭게 등록할 수 있는 선박등록특구지역이기도 하다. 또한 무비자 입국이 허용되는 곳일 뿐만 아니라 국제자유도시로서의 조세 및 행정적 지원을 국가가 보장하고 있는 곳이기도 하다.

Participants

Foreign Participants

AKASHI, Yasushi currently serves as the Representative of the Government of Japan on Peace-Building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka, Chairman of the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention, President of the Council on Population and the Japan Association for the Study of the United Nations. In addition, he is Visiting Professor at Ritsumeikan University and some other universities. After graduating from the University of Tokyo in 1954, Mr. Akashi studied as a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Virginia, and later at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He also served as the former Under Secretary General of the U.N.

BARON, Barnett is the Executive Vice President of the Asia Foundation, which he joined in 1993. He was vice president and regional director for South and Southeast Asia from 1993 to 1994, when he became executive vice president. Prior to joining the Foundation he was vice president for international programs at Save the Children (U.S.) from 1990 to 1993. Dr. Baron was assistant professor of political science at Columbia University and Barnard College from 1970 to 1972. He is the founding chairman of the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (1994) and currently serves on its Executive Committee. He received his B.A. in government and history from New York University; M.A. in international relations and Ph.D. in political science from Yale University.

DRENNAN, William, Deputy Director, Research and Studies Program, United States Institute of Peace

ECKERT, Paul, Chief Correspondent, Reuters Korea

FAIRCLOUGH, Gordon, Seoul Bureau Chief of Wall Street Journal

GREGG, Donald currently serves as a Chairman of the Korea Society. He was the

former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea (1989~1993) and the former National Security Advisor to Vice President Bush (1982~1988). He was a staff member for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (1972~1982) and a CIA officer (1952~1975). His fields of expertise include defense and security relations, military issues, foreign relations and policy, international economics, nationalism, terrorism, and U.S. policy towards the two Koreas, Japan, Myanmar, and Vietnam.

HALEY, John J. is a President and Chief Executive Officer of Watson Wyatt & Company. Mr. Haley joined Watson Wyatt Worldwide in 1977. He is a consulting actuary primarily in the retirement field, where he specializes in consulting for large companies. He has also been one of the leaders in the development of Watson Wyatt Worldwide post-retirement benefit consulting practice and has carried out a number of financial studies on this subject. In addition, he has directed the development of Watson Wyatt Worldwide's Asset/Liability Model. Mr. Haley was elected a Director of the firm in 1992. He is a member of the Executive Committee, Chairman of the Management Committee, and formerly managed Watson Wyatt's largest consulting office, Washington, D.C.

HAN, Feng is a Deputy Director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). His research interests include current international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular the regional economic, political, security, social and cultural cooperation. He has joined the CASS in 1986 and worked as a research fellow in Institute of World Economics and Politics and Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies. Additionally he was a visiting scholar at the Department of Politics at the University of Tasmania, Australia.

HESELTINE, Colin is the Australian Ambassador to the ROK. He is a senior career officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He has had an extensive experience in North Asia, having served on two occasions as Minister and Deputy Head of Mission in the Australian Embassy in Beijing (1982~85 and 1988~92). He was also Australia's unofficial representative in Taiwan from 1992 to 1997 when he headed the Australian Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei, and in Canberra he was First Assistant Secretary, North Asia Division (1998~2001).

HUBBARD, Thomas C. is the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. He was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 7, 2000, to July 10, 2001. Before that, he served concurrently as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Republic of Palau from July

1996. Ambassador Hubbard graduated in 1965 from the University of Alabama. He joined the Foreign Service in 1965 and was posted in 1966 to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, where he served as a Political/Economic officer.

IKENBERRY, John is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Prior to joining the School of Foreign Service in 2000, Dr. Ikenberry taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Princeton University. From 1994 to 1998, he was co-director of the Lauder Institute of Pennsylvania. Dr. Ikenberry was also a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, D.C.

KIM, Spencer is currently a President of CBOL Corporation California, USA, and Distinguished Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He was also Distinguished Professor at Central University for Nationalities in Beijing, China. He is currently engaged in various civic activities as Board Member of the Korean Society and the Founding Member of the Pacific Council on International Policy.

KIRK, Donald served for six years as a Korea correspondent for the International Herald Tribune, and now works on a book project. He has written two books on Korea, "Korean Crisis: Unraveling of the Miracle in the IMF Era" and "Korean Dynasty: Hyundai and Chung Ju Yung" as well as numerous articles for journals and magazines. He served previously as a correspondent in Asia for newspapers and magazines and was based in Washington for eight years as an editor and correspondent for USA Today. Furthermore, he has also written books on the Vietnam War and the Philippines.

KOHSAKA, Setsuzo is the General Partner and Japan Representative for a newly established business-consulting corporation: COMPASS PROVIDERS L.L.C.: in New York. He has an extensive experience in international business and corporate management, providing a vast range of consultation services for international business projects. Presently, he is the chairman of the Discussion Group on Constitution Issues, and prior to that he served as the chairman of Committee on Global Environment and Energy Issues. Furthermore, he works as a member of the Committee on Personnel Advisory for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as a Visiting Professor of international energy resources study and environmental issues at

Takushoku University.

LEE, B. J., Newsweek Seoul Correspondent

LEE, Chuly has served as Vice President and Regional Manager (Asia-Pacific) of Watson Wyatt since July, 2002. Ms. Lee joined Watson Wyatt in 1993 and worked in the Hong Kong office, developing new business for Korean and other multinational clients in the region. From 1994 to 1999, she was the Managing Director of Watson Wyatt's Seoul, South Korea office. From September 1999 until her recent appointment, Ms. Lee worked in Watson Wyatt's New York office as the Regional Practice Director for the International Practice. Prior to joining Watson Wyatt, Ms. Lee worked in London as a consultant and as a university researcher and lecturer from 1984 to 1992. Ms. Lee received her B.A. in psychology from Connecticut College and holds a doctorate in Psychology from the University of London (Institute of Psychiatry, Post Graduate Medical School).

MACINTYRE, Donald has been the bureau chief for Time magazine in Seoul since January 2001, when he set up Time's first full-time bureau here. The bureau has covered a wide range of stories on politics, the economy and culture but of course one of the main concerns has been North Korea coverage. He has visited North Korea four times in the last two years and made several visits to the North Korea-China border. Prior to moving to Seoul he was in Tokyo with Time for three years. Before joining Time, he worked for Bloomberg Business News in Tokyo for five years. Previously he also worked in radio and newspapers in Rome. He did a maitrise at the Universite of Nanterre in Paris and received BA at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada.

MEI, Zhaorong, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs

OKONOGI, Masao has been a Professor in the Political Science Department of Keio University since 1985. During his tenure at Keio, he has had the opportunity to teach and study at various universities around the world, including Sino-Soviet Institute at the Gorge Washington University (1982), Department of Political Science and Diplomacy of Yonsei University in Seoul (1989), the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow (1989), and the Center for Korean Studies at the University of Hawaii (1990). From 1995 to 1999, he served as Director for Keio's Center for Area Studies.

PANES, Enrique, Spanish Ambassador

PERRY, William J., a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where he is co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities. Dr. Perry was the nineteenth United States secretary of defense, serving from February 1994 to January 1997

PRINCE, Dorian took up his present post as Ambassador, Head of the E.U. Commission Delegation to the Republic of Korea in October 2002. Born in Pontypool, Wales, UK, in 1954, he was educated in Oxford University and the Sorbonne, Paris. He began his professional career in the private sector in the UK, first in the textiles, chemicals and paints industry (Courtaulds Ltd.) and in the non-ferrous metals sector, as Secretary-General of a trade association representing over 30 countries.

PRIMAKOV, Evgeny Maksimovich born 1929, (Dr., Prof., Academician), State Duma deputy, President of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 1953~70, journalist, deputy Editor-in-chief, correspondent in Arab countries, "Pravda" newspaper; 1970~77, deputy Dir., Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Academy of Sciences of the USSR (as from 1991, Russian Academy of Sciences); 1988~89, academician-secr., World Economy and International Relations Department, Academy of Sciences; Presidium mem., Academy of Sciences; 1989-91, mem. CPSU Central Committee, mem. Politburo; 1989~91, Chairman, Council of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet; 1991, mem., USSR Security Council; Sept.-Nov. 1991~96, first Vice-Chairman, head, First Directorate, KGB (State Security Committee); Dir., Central Intelligence Service of the USSR; Dir. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service; 1996~98, Minister of foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; 1998~99, Prime-minister of the Russian Federation; 1999~2003, State Duma Deputy with OVR, Chairman, mem, OVR fraction. Dec. 2001~, President of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

REN, Xiao is a Director and Senior Fellow at the Department of American Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). He received his Ph.D. in political science from Fudan University in 1992. His research and teaching concentrate on international relations of the Asia-Pacific, Northeast Asian security, and U.S. Asia policy. Previously he held research and teaching positions at the University of Turku, Finland, Nagoya University, Japan, the George Washington University in Washington,

DC, U.S.A, and Fudan University, Shanghai, China. His op-eds appear on newspapers such as Wenhui Daily, Jiefang Daily, and Shanghai Evening Post etc. His recent publications include *New Perspectives on International Relations Theory*, The Changzheng Press, 2001 and *U.S.-China-Japan Triangular Relationship*, The Zhejiang People's Press, 2002.

SCANLON, Charles, BBC Correspondent for Korea

SOHN, Jie-Ae is CNN's Seoul bureau chief and correspondent, named to this position in 1995. Sohn joined the network in 1994, serving as CNN's part-time Seoul correspondent until May 1995. She has covered numerous events for CNN from Korea, including the recent South Korean elections; the fatal collapse of a Sampoong department store, Korea's worst peacetime disaster; and the arrest of former Korean Presidents Roh Tae-Woo and Chun Doo-Hwan for securing secret political funds and for their involvement in halting the 1980 pro-democracy movement in Kwangju. She also has provided continuous reports on the Korean peninsula's North-South border tensions, including intrusions into the de-militarized zone.

Before joining CNN, she was a New York Times correspondent for three years. She reported on Korea's developing economy for the English-language magazine *Business Korea* and also has been published in leading international publications, including *U.S. News and World Report*, *Fortune* and *The Times*. Sohn is fluent in Korean.

TAKANO, Toshiyuki has been serving as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Embassy of Japan to the Republic of Korea since December 2002. He entered Diplomatic Service in 1967, and his distinguished diplomatic career includes postings as Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore (2001~2002), Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Embassy of Japan to the ROK (1996~1997), and Counsellor at the Embassy of Japan in the United States (1986~1987). In Japan, he held a number of key positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (2001), Director-General of Intelligence and Analysis Bureau (1999~2001), Director-General of the Foreign Service Training Institute (1998~1999), Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau (1997~1998), Deputy Director-General of Asian Affairs Bureau (1992~1994). He holds a degree from Tokyo University.

TAYLOR, David, New Zealand Ambassador

TIMONIN, Alexander is the Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Korea. He was born in 1952 in Tula city, Russia. He received his Ph.D. in Korean Studies at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Moscow State University, where he subsequently worked as a senior lecturer from 1975 to 1980. In 1980 he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and served at Russian embassies in the two Koreas. In particular, he served at the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK for two terms from 1980~1985, and 1987~1992. In 1994 he was posted as a Counsellor to the Embassy of Russia to the ROK. In 1999 he was named as a Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy of Russia to the DPRK, and from November 2000 he served as Minister-Counsellor at the Russian embassy in the ROK. He is fluent in Korean and English. Furthermore, he is author of several books and articles devoted to the political and economic issues of South and North Korea. Recent publications include articles on Transportation Policy (Russia and multilateral economic cooperation in North-East Asia) in the Korean Monthly magazine.

WARD, Andrew has been the Korea correspondent for the Financial Times since September 2001. Before coming to Seoul, he was a reporter for the FT in London, having joined the newspaper in 1999. He graduated in Politics and Modern History from the University of Manchester in 1999.

WARNE, Robert, Visiting Professor, Korea University

WEINROD, Bruce is the Managing Director & General Counsel of the International Technology & Trade Associates Inc. He has extensive domestic and international experience in both the private and public sectors, including senior positions in the Defense Department and on Capitol Hill. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, Mr. Weinrod coordinated key policy initiatives with America's Western European allies, including England, France and Germany and also at NATO headquarters. He played an important role in the development of closer US relations with the newly emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and with respect to relations with Russia as well. Mr. Weinrod represented the Pentagon in senior US government inter-agency discussions and on Capitol Hill.

WELDON, Curt serves as a Congressman in the US House of Representatives for the Seventh Congressional District of Pennsylvania. Currently serving his ninth term, Congressman Weldon is the most senior Republican in the Pennsylvania Delegation. A Member of the House of Representatives since 1987, Weldon has taken leadership

roles on a wide variety of issues, ranging from national security to the environment. A senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, Weldon served six years as the Chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee, overseeing the development and testing of key military systems, weapons programs, and technologies that fulfill military needs. Weldon has used that position to become the leading House supporter of a national missile defense. Weldon now serves as the Vice Chairman of the full Committee as well as Chairman of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee.

Korean Participants

BAE, Soon Hoon, Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Business Hub, Former Minister of Information and Communication

BOO, Man-Keun is the President of Cheju National University. Since joining Cheju National University, he took various responsibilities as Director of Planning & Research 1990~1992, Dean of the College of Law & Politics and Graduate School of Public Administration 1994~1996. He is the author of Studies on Korean Local Autonomy and Residents Movements of the Jeju Area. He graduated from Cheju National University majoring in law and received his Ph.D. from Konkuk University.

CHAE, Nam-Hee, Standing Commissioner, Central Land Tribunal.

CHO, Sung Youn is professor of College of Humanities at Cheju National University. He was President of the Korean Social History Association and Visiting Professor at Yonsei University. He graduated from Yonsei University majoring Sociology and completed his Ph.D. at Yonsei University.

CHUNG, Hak Jin, CEO & President, ROTEM

CHUNG, Mong-Koo is chairman and chief executive officer of Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Motors Corporation. Prior to Jan. 1999, he was chairman to several other Hyundai affiliates. They are Hyundai Space & Aircraft Co., Ltd., Hyundai Motor

Service Co., Ltd., Hyundai Pipe Co., Ltd., and Hyundai Industrial Development Co., Ltd.

In 1996, Chung was appointed chairman of Hyundai Group and held this position till 1998. In 1986, Chung was appointed president and CEO of Incheon Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and was promoted to chairman in 1987. In 1982 Chung was appointed president and CEO of Hyundai Pipe Co., Ltd. and was promoted to chairman in 1987. In 1974, Chung was appointed president and CEO of Hyundai Motor Service Co., Ltd. and was promoted to chairman in 1987 until its consolidation with Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd. in 1998.

In addition to his Hyundai responsibilities, Chung was chairman for various associations such as the Korean Container Industry Association, Asia Archery Association and Korea/Russia/CIS Economic Association. He also worked as chairman of the Bidding Committee for the 2010 World Expo and is currently vice chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries.

Born March 19, 1938, Chung holds a bachelor's degree in Industry Business Administration from Hanyang University. He also received an honorary Ph.D. in Business Management at the National University of Mongolia in 2001. Chung was awarded the Distinguished Service Citation from the Automotive Hall of Fame in 2001, making him the first Korean and second Asian to receive this award.

GONG, Ro-Myung was born in Myung-chun, North Korea on February 25, 1932. Having received elementary and secondary education in Seoul, he was admitted to Law College, Seoul National University in 1951, and received baccalaureate degree in law in 1961. He was commissioned in the ROK Army in 1953 and discharged from the military service with the rank of captain in 1958 and immediately entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). He studied at London School of Economics for one year (1960~1961). Then, he served a number of foreign posts such as in Washington (1962~1964), Tokyo (1966~1969), and Canberra (1972~1974). While in Seoul, he was involved with negotiations on Korea-Japan Normalization Talks in 1965, and served as director for Northeast Asian Affairs (1970~1972) and later as director general for Asian Affairs (1977~1979) and Assistant Minister for Political Affairs (1981~1983). He served in Cairo as Consul-General in 1979~1980.

HA, Young Sun is a Professor at the Department of International Relations, College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University. His professional and research experience at Seoul National University stems for more than twenty years during which he served as a Chairman of the Department of the International Relations (1985~1986; 1987~1993), Director, Center for International Studies (1993~1996), Director, American

Studies Institute (1996~1999). His foreign research experience includes a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Culture, The University of Tokyo (1994~1995), Visiting Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden (1986~1987), and Compton Fellow at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1978~1979).

HAN, Duck-Soo is the President of Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (KIET). Until recently, he has worked as Advisor for Kim & Chang, one of the leading law firms in Korea. He earned his Ph. D. in Economics at Harvard University. He has served as Commissioner of the Korean Industrial Property Office, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Trade, Industry & Energy, Minister for Trade in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ambassador to OECD, Senior Secretary to the President for Policy & Planning, and Senior Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs.

HAN, Hwa Kap, Member of ROK National Assembly, Millennium Democratic Party

HAN, Seok-Ji, Professor, Cheju National University

HYUN, Kyung Dae is a lawyer and Member of the National Assembly since 1980. He held various duties as Secretary-General of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification of the Republic of Korea, Chairman of Legislative and Justice Committee of the National Assembly, and Floor Leader of the Democratic Liberal Party. He graduated from the College of Law at Seoul National University.

JWA, Sung-Hee is currently the President of the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI). He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Los Angeles. After spending two years as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, he joined the Korea Development Institute in 1985, where he served as senior (research) fellow until 1997. He also served as a member of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning from 1994 to 1997, the Policy Advisory Committee at the Ministry of National Unification from 1997 to June 2003, the Presidential Commission on Government Reform from 2000 to February 2003, and the National Economic Advisory Council from March 2002 to February 2003. Currently, he is a member the Korea Tele-Communication Commission at the Ministry of Information and Communication and group representative of the Jeju International Free City Forum.

KANG, Gun-Hyung, Professor, Cheju National University

KANG, Weon Chul, Member of Jeju Provincial Council

KIM, Bang Hee, Economic commentator

KIM, Boo-Chan, Professor, Cheju National University

KIM, Cae-One is a Professor of International Economics at the College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University, and Joint Representative of the Jeju Free International City Forum. He is also President of EU Studies Association and member of the Scientific Council of ECSA World, Brussels, Belgium. He is the author of EURO and Korean Economy, Theory of Industrial Policy (co-author). He graduated from the Law College, Seoul National University, and received a Ph.D. from Brussels University in 1969.

KIM, Dalchoong is a Professor Emeritus at Yonsei University in Seoul. He served as President of the Sejong Institute (1999~00), Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration (96~98), Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies (92~96), and Director of East and West Studies (82~92), Yonsei University. He served as Secretary-General of the Korean Political Science Association (85), President of the Korean Council of Area Studies (86~88), and President of the Korean Association of International Studies (93). He also served as President of International Political Science Association (IPSA, 00~03). Professor Kim is a specialist on Korean foreign policy and written widely on East Asian regional security issues. Dr. Kim is also Chairman of the National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), a region-wide NGO for security cooperation. Since 1986, Dr. Kim has served as Program Chair of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA), a private council concerned with Korean foreign relations whose membership includes leading academics, journalists, and business leaders in Korea.

KIM, Dong-Jae is an Associate Professor of Strategy and International Business, and Director of Center for International Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He received his Ph.D. in Strategy and Multinational Management at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania in 1992. His professional experience includes positions as a Management Consultant at McKinsey

Company (1992~1994), President & CEO of Korea Internet Holdings (2000~2001). Furthermore, he has served as a Board Member of Korean Academy of Strategic Management (1997~present), Board Member of Korean Academy of International Business (1998~present), and Advisory Committee Member at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1998~present). His current research areas include the evolution of firm capabilities, industry convergence and emerging strategies, corporate transformation, entrepreneurship and Corporate Venturing.

KIM, Dong-Jin, Vice Chairman & CEO Hyundai Motor Company

KIM, Jin-Hyun is the Chairman of Board, Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and planning; he also serves as Senior Research Advisor, Korea International Trade Association and Chairman, The World Peace Forum. Dr. Kim was the Minister of Science and Technology. He graduated from Seoul National University in 1958 with B.A.

KIM, Kook Joo, CEO, Jeju Bank

KIM, Kyung-Won is the President of Institute of Social Sciences; he also serves as president of the Seoul Forum for International affairs, a private council concerned with Korea's foreign relations. In 1994, Dr. Kim chaired Globalization Council, an advisory group to the Prime Minister of Republic of Korea Prior to his current position; Dr. Kim was Ambassador to the United States (1958~1988) and the United Nations (1982~1985). From 1975 to 1980, he served as Special Assistant for International Affairs to the President and from 1980 to 1981 as Chief of Staff to the President. Dr. Kim graduated from Williams College in 1959 with B.A. Magna Cum Laude in Political Science and from Harvard University with Ph. D. in Political Science in 1963.

KIM, Taehwan, Ph. D. (Columbia University), is a Research Professor at the Division of International Education & Exchange of Yonsei University. His research focus is on comparative political economy of post-socialist transformation with a particular focus on Russia. He recently wrote "Delegating Property Rights: A Property Rights Approach to Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union, Russia, China, and North Korea" (Korean Political Science Review, 2003) and "The Political Economy of Russian Financial Reforms: Double Movement of Market and Counter-Market Forces" (International Political Science Review, 2003), and co-authored "South Korea's

International Relations” (Samuel S. Kim (ed.), The International Relations of Northeast Asia, 2003). He was recently awarded Korea Research Foundation’s 2003 Junior Scholar Research Promotion Grant.

KIM, Taekwon is an Assistant Professor of International Management, and Chair Professor of International Management Program at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He received his Ph.D. in Managerial Science and Applied Economics at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in December 1990. Subsequently, he worked as an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California in San Diego (1990~1997). He is a member of Korean Society for Technology Management and Economics, The Decision Science Institute, and the INFORMS. He currently specializes in the research of production and operations management, economics of production and operations, technology management and economics of technology, foreign direct investment and technology transfer, and international technology licensing and transfer.

KIM, Won Kab, President & CEO, Hyundai Hysco

KIM, Woo-Nam, Member of Jeju Provincial Council

KIM, Woo Sik is the President of Yonsei University. He has taught for over 30 years at the Department of Chemical Engineering, Yonsei University since 1968. He has various academic and social careers including Vice President of the National Academy of Engineering (1998~2000), member of the Presidential Advisory Council for Science and Education (1999~2000), Vice President of the Korean Institute of Chemical Engineers, and Dean of the College of Engineering at Yonsei University.

KIM, Young Hie, Editor-at-Large, JoongAng Daily

KIM, Yung Hoon is a member of the Jeju Provincial Council. He is also an advisor for the Victims’ Families and Relatives of the Jeju 4·3 Incident. He graduated from Cheju National University majoring Korean Language and Literature.

KO, Jin Boo is currently a member of the National Assembly, and a Chairman of a district party chapter of the Millennium Democratic Party, and Vice-Director of the Training Institute of the Millennium Democratic Party. Born on May 11, 1946, Mr. Ko is originally from Jeju Island. Having graduated from the Graduate School of Medical

College, Chosun University with a Doctorate in Medicine in February of 1983, Koh has forged a career through diverse backgrounds. After having served as the chairman of a district party chapter of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) in 1996, Koh became the President of the Jejudo Graduates' Association of Chosun University in 1999. In 2000, Koh became the Chairman of a district party chapter of the Millennium Democratic Party and a member of the 16th National Assembly. From then, Koh has been on various committees including the Health and Welfare, and the Agriculture, Forestry, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Committee.

KO, Sung Joon is a Professor of Political Science at Cheju National University. He is former Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies from 1996~1998, and Visiting Professor of Columbia University (1999~2000). His publications include the book *The Consciousness and Spirit of Jeju Island in the Transitional Period*, and article entitled "The Cooperation between Jeju Island and East Asian Islands" in the *Journal of East Asian Studies*.

KO, Chung-Suk is President of Jeju Development Institute and Professor of College of Law & Political Science at Cheju National University. He graduated from Yonsei University majoring Public Administration and received his Ph.D. at Yonsei University. He was Dean of College of Law & Political Science and Graduate School of Public Administration at Cheju National University.

LEE, Chong-Oh, Chairman, Presidential Commission on Policy Planning

LEE, Chung Min is a Professor (tenured) of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University and Director, Division of International Education and Exchange, Yonsei University. Prior to joining Yonsei University in 1998, he was a Policy Analyst at RAND (1995~1998), a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan (1994~1995), a Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute (1989~1994), Research Fellow at the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University (1988~1989), and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1985~1988).

LEE, Duk Hoon is the President & Chief Executive Officer, Woori Bank started his professional financial management career in 2000 when the Korean government appointed him to the position of CEO and President of Daehan Investment Trust Company in January 2000. A year later, he moved to become the CEO and President

of Hanvit Bank, which has since been renamed as Woori Bank. Mr. Lee was one of the members of a committee to set up Woori Financial Group. Prior to entering the financial management profession, Dr. Lee was a senior researcher at the state-owned Korea Development Institute (KDI) where he specialized in research on the financial sector. During his 20 years career at KDI, he had participated in a wide range of government committee and task force teams that were set up to advise the Korean government on financial industrial sector policy development.

Dr. Lee received Ph.D in Economics from Purdue University in U.S.; and an M.A. also in economics from Wayne State University, U.S. He received his undergraduate degree in economics from Seoul's Sogang University.

LEE, Gil-Hyun, Chairman, Jejudo Tourism Association

LEE, Su-Hoon, Commissioner, Presidential Commission on Policy Planning

LEE, Sun-Jin is the Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Born on September 15th March 2001, Lee became the Director-General for Policy Planning at the MOFAT. In September of 2002, Lee served the Consul General for the Consulate General in Shanghai, China.

LEE, Young-Sun is a Professor of Economics at Yonsei University and also the Dean of Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in economics from University of Maryland in 1976. He was elected the president of Korea International Economic Association on Dec. 2002. Dr. Lee's research areas include international trade, political economy of policy making, and economic planning. His current research interest lies in transition economies, particularly North Korea. He has published several articles on international trade, such as, "The Changing Export Patterns of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan", *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (1986) and "A Study of the Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade among the Pacific Basin Countries", *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (1989). Out of his research interest in policy making, he published "A Political Economic Analysis of the Korean Economic Crisis", *Journal of Asian Economics* (1998). He also has numerous publications on the North Korean economy and Korean unification such as "Economic Integration on the Korean Peninsula: Effects and Implications" in *Korea-United States Cooperation in the New World Order* (1996) edited by C. Fred Bergsten and Il Sakong published by the Institute for International Economics and "Cost and Finance of Korean Unification" in *Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration* edited by Y. B. Choi,

Y. Merrill, Y. Yang, and S. Chang (2001). He also co-edited with Masao Okonogi *Japan and Unification* in 1999.

MOON, Chung-in is a Professor of Political Science and a former Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. Prior to joining Yonsei, he taught at the University of Kentucky, at the University of California in San Diego, and at Duke University. His publications include over 18 books and 180 scholarly articles on international politics, East Asian and Korean security, and Korean political economy. He is also the Co-Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the Jeju Peace Forum.

PARK, Jeong-In, Chairman & CEO Hyundai Mobis

PARK, Jin, Member of ROK National Assembly

SEO, Jung-Suk, Professor, Sungkyunkwan University, the National Commission on Jeju 4·3. Incident

SONG, Young-gil is a lawyer and a member of National Assembly. Currently he serves as a member of New Party for National Participatory Union Special Committee on Political Reform. Throughout his political career he held a number of memberships in diverse committees. In particular, from 2002 to 2003 he was a member of House Steering Committee and Deputy Floor Leader of the Millennium Democratic Party, in 2002 he served also as a member of Finance & Economy Committee and as a Chairman of the MDP Special Committee on Labor. His professional affiliation also includes memberships in Lawyers For Democratic Society, and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, both since 1997. He graduated from the school of Business Administration at Yonsei University in 1988.

SUH, Dae Won, had a distinguished career in diplomatic services for thirty years. He is currently Ambassador-at-Large at the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. Previously he served as an ambassador to the Republic of Hungary (2001~2003), and also as Deputy Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations from April 1998 to January 2001. Ambassador Suh received his B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Seoul National University and he also served as an International Fellow (1989~1990) at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He was the recipient of an Order of Service Merit (1991) for

his contribution to ROK's admission to the United Nations and Order of Merit (2003) of the Republic of Hungary in recognition of his contribution in development of Korean-Hungarian relations.

WOON, Hee Ryong is a lawyer and a member of ROK National Assembly, representing Yangcheon District Party Chapter, Grand National Party. From 1995 to 1998 he served as a public prosecutor at the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office, the Yeouju branch of Suwon District Public Prosecutor's Office, and Busan District Public Prosecutors Office. Subsequently, he was a lawyer at Chunchoo Law Firm, and a Legal Advisor for Korea Broadcasting System and Software Property Rights Committee. Since his entry into the National Assembly in 2000, he has served in a number of committees including Committee on Science, Technology, Communication, and Information (2000), Special Committee on Ethics (2000), Special Committee on Human Rights (2000), Legislative and Judicial Committee (2002), Special Committee for Political Reform (2003). Furthermore, he was Deputy Floor Leader (2000), and advisor for Korea-Japan Future Research Society and Korea-China Forum. He graduated from college of Law, Seoul National University in 1989.

WOO, Keun-Min is the Governor of Jeju Province, and the Chair of the Organizing Committee for the Jeju Peace Forum. Previously he has served in numerous positions including Vice Minister at the Ministry of Government Administration (1997~1998) and as a President of Namhae Chemical Co., Ltd. From 1996~1997 he was a Chairman of the Request Evaluation Committee, and also worked as a Planning and Management Officer, and Director of Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Government Administration. Furthermore, he served on the organizing committee of 2001 World Tae-Kwon-Do Championship, Honorary Chair of the 2001 World Islands' Culture Festival, and since 2002 has been the Chair of the Preparation Committee for the 83rd National Sports Games. He received his B.A. in Public Administration, Myung-ji University (1971); M.A. in Security Administration, Kyung-hee University (1973), and National Security Policy Program, the Graduate School of Defense in Seoul (1997~98).

YANG, Young Shik, Former Vice Minister of Unification, Visiting Professor, Korea University

YOO, Jay Kun was elected to his second term in 2000 as a Member of the National Assembly of Korea as the Candidate from the Millennium Democratic Party. As Chairman of the US-Korea Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Council, he has greatly

contributed to the better understanding between the legislatures of the two countries. He is currently Chairman of the National Convention and at the same time Chairman of the Special Committee on Foreign Relations and Cooperation of the Millennium Democratic Party.

YOON, Kook Jin, President & CEO, Kia Motors Corporation

YOON, Young-Kwan is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as a Professor in the Department of International Relations at Seoul National University. After earning both his M.A. and Ph.D. at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Yoon has had the opportunity to teach and study at many prestigious institutions. From September of 1996 to August of 1997, Yoon had the opportunity to teach at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, while in the following year he was a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. From January of 2000 to January of 2003, Yoon was a member of the Policy Evaluation Commission (Foreign Affairs and Trade) of the Prime Minister's Office and between 2001 until January 2003, Yoon served as President for the Korea Institute for Future Strategies. In January of 2003, Yoon was appointed to serve as the chairman for the Subcommittee for Foreign Affairs, Unification and National Security for the Presidential Transition Committee.